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In this thesis I wish to show the importance that the 
notion of god or a designing mind has in Plato's 
explanation of the sensible world as an orderly realm in 
the late dialogues. I offer an interpretation of mind as 
a foundation of cosmic order which shows it to have a 
coherent and economical place in the cosmologies of 
Timaeus, Philebus, Poli ticus and Laws X, and also to 
provide a useful or even indispensable background for 
these dialogues' ethical concerns. 
Thus, I analyse the philosophical meaning of the Demiurge 
in the Timaeus which, I argue, is a symbol of a 
teleological kind of efficient causation constantly 
ordering the universe, and try to show that his 
mythological functions can be subsumed into the actual 
functions performed by the World-Soul in the structure of 
reality (e. g. in the Timaeus itself, Philebus and Laws). 
This hypothesis rests on a non-literal interpretation of 
pre-cosmic or a-cosmic disorder in the myths of Timaeus 
and Politicus. 
Secondly, I investigate the relation between the divine 
or cosmic mind and human minds. I argue that god appears 
as a model for human behaviour: in the Timaeus, where the 
study of astronomy (i. e. the movements of the cosmic god) 
should be pursued by anyone wishing to be happy; in the 
Philebus, where the universe provides a model for the 
mixture between limit and unlimited that human beings 
should achieve; and in the Politicus, where god's concern 
for the universe in the myth should be taken as an 
example for the politician. In addition, I suggest that 
Plato's cosmological descriptions can be coloured by 
ethical and political preoccupations, so that, in the 
Politicus, the universe mythically appears as a 
projection of human life. I further explore the cosmic 
implications of human behaviour in the Laws, and how 
human souls as well as the World-Soul become responsible 
for cosmic order. In this way the thesis shows how the 
universe can not only act as a paradigm for human 
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By comparison with the large amount of attention that 
Plato's epistemology, metaphysics and ethics have lately 
received on the part of contemporary scholars, his 
cosmological thought has been relatively neglected. This 
circumstance may partly be due to the fact that a great 
deal of it is presented in the way of myth (as in Timaeus 
and Politicus), or in dialogues, such as the Philebus and 
Politicus, where the cosmology could be just seen as a 
digression from, respectively, the ethical or political 
context in which it appears; or in a dialogue such as the 
Laws, a late and awkwardly long creation attracting 
serious consideration mainly for its political and 
ethical reflections. An aggravating factor is that 
notions such as that of god or a designing mind are 
considered not only unfashionable but also difficult to 
trace within a coherent philosophical line in the 
interpretation of Plato. However, I wish to argue that 
these notions are in fact crucial for an understanding of 
Plato's explanation of the sensible realm as an orderly 
realm in the dialogues mentioned, and that an 
interpretation of mind as a foundation of cosmic order in 
these dialogues can be rendered which is not only 
coherent and economical, but which also shows how their 
cosmologies provide a useful or even indispensable 
background for their ethical concerns. In this manner I 
undertake to establish an interpretation which stresses 
the interconnections between macro and microcosm, and so 
will contrast with the rather compartmentalized approach 
that cosmology has standardly received in recent studies. ' 
By so doing I hope that a fresh picture of the 
cosmological Plato will emerge. 
1 Compare e. g. T. M. Robinson (1970), Brisson (1974), Vlastos (1975), 
Ostenfeld (1982), Mohr (1985). 
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In this thesis, then, I purport to analyse to what extent 
and in what way "Mind" can be taken as a foundation of 
cosmic order in four of Plato's dialogues, namely the 
Timaeus, Philebus, Politicus and Laws (book X), which are 
generally thought to be late. Before sketching the 
strategy I want to follow in this analysis, I shall start 
by briefly explicating, in section 1, some concepts 
contained in the title in a way that may facilitate an 
understanding of some of the issues to be dealt with in 
this work. Afterwards, in section 2, I shall provide, by 
way of background, a brief outline of how I take the 
subject to be treated in some passages from dialogues 
other than the ones at stake here, before setting out, in 
section 3, the main argument and structure of my thesis. 
Finally in this introduction, I shall deal with two 
points of method: firstly, in section 4, my approach to 
the chronological order of the dialogues to be studied 
and, secondly, in section 5, the issue of the status of 
muthos in relation to logos. 
I. COSMOS, MIND AND CAUSE 
1. I am concerned with cosmic order; this then is 
basically a thesis about cosmology in late Plato. The 
word "kosmos" is particularly rich, since it can mean, 
among other things, 2 both universe and order, or, in one 
go, the universe as order. 3 But there is a kosmos or order 
not only of the universe, but also of the individual soul4 
and the polis. 5 Although my focus in this thesis will be 
mainly on the macrocosm or the order of the universe, a 
2 Such as adornment (cf. e. g. Rep. II 373c1; also Tim. 40a6 which 
plays on the double meaning of 'universe' and 'adornment'). 
3 Cf. Gorg. 508a. See also Tim. 28b2-3, Pol. 269d7-8 ("what we have 
called ouranon kai kosmon") for Plato's conscious use of the word 
"kosmos" in the sense of universe in cosmological contexts. Cf. also 
infra, ch. 4, n. 12. 
4 Cf. e. g. Gorg. 504b5, c2. 
5 Cf. Prot. 322c3. 
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concern for the microcosm will be present also, 
particularly with respect to its interaction with the 
macrocosm. 
2. "Mind" is an ambiguous term in the title. It can 
suggest either, more narrowly, intellect (nous) or, more 
widely, soul (psuche) in the Platonic terminology. 
However, one of the points I want to defend in this 
thesis is that, at the level of the universe, the two 
coincide, that is to say, the soul or kind of soul which 
is mainly responsible for cosmic order can be described 
exclusively in terms of intellect; i. e. without any 
irrational faculties, and in turn there is no intellect 
for Plato that is not at the same time soul. In addition, 
there is the question whether it is only mind or soul at 
a cosmic level that is responsible for cosmic order, or 
whether individual human souls can contribute to it. I 
shall be arguing for the latter possibility especially in 
chapter 7. 
3. The talk about "foundation" suggests "cause" or 
"principle" in one way or another. So I shall be 
investigating: What kind of cause does Plato posit to 
account for the existing cosmic order? Is it only a 
generating cause or is it also a sustaining cause? Can we 
in both cases speak of "efficient" causality, to adopt 
terminology borrowed from Aristotelian interpreters but 
which could arguably be suggested by Plato's vocabulary 
itself? 6 I shall indeed be proposing here that it is an 
6 Note that it is Plato himself who uses the expression arche 
kineseös (principle of motion) and relates it to soul in Phaedrus 
245c9 and Laws X 895b3, cf. 896b1 (kineseös aitia) . Note also the 
term to poioun, "the agent", at Phil. 26e7 (to poioun kai to aition, 
cf. 27a5), something that will correspond to nous at 30c-e. By 
efficient cause, then, I shall be meaning in general terms something 
active which can produce certain effects (cf. M. Frede [1980: 217- 
8]). See also infra, ch. 2, sections 1.1. and 1.3. It is worth noting 
that this wide terminology will allow us to encompass both mechanical 
causes, which merely transmit received motion, and primary causes 
which initiate motion as the proper arche kineseös, the latter 
corresponding to soul or mind. Cf. infra n. 7. 
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active cause teleologically oriented, and, in that 
respect, I shall be discussing what is the kind of goal 
pursued and where Forms or Ideas fit into this picture; 
and what other kind of cause, if any, is involved in 
bringing about or sustaining cosmic order, as well as 
what limits the causal role of Mind has to encounter in 
this process. 
II. TOWARDS THE NOTION OF AN ORDERING COSMIC MIND 
Now, I said that I intend to show that Mind acts as a 
"cause" (aitia, aition), in the late dialogues, a cause 
understood basically in terms of an agent, 7 so that our 
concern -as much as Plato's- will be with cause in an 
efficient sense in the late dialogues. 8 Understanding how 
7 In the late dialogues that we are considering Plato refers to the 
agent of change indifferently as aitia or aition, so e. g. Plato 
expresses the principle that everything that becomes must do so by 
some aition in the Timaeus (28c2), or through some aitia in the 
Philebus (26e) which is identified with to poioun and to aition in 
the same passage -remitted to nous at 28a ff., esp. 30c5-6-, though 
the cause of generation is again called aitia at 23d7,27a-b, 30a10, 
30c5,30d3. Moreover, Plato refers to the two kinds of cause in the 
Timaeus indifferently as du' aitias eide at 68e6 and tön aition gene 
at 69a7 (each being productive of effects, 46d3, el, 4,6). The cause 
of the forward march of the universe in the Politicus is called theia 
aitia at 270a3, while the bodily is referred to as aition at 273b4; 
in Laws X soul is called both the aition (891e5) and the aitia 
(896b1) of motion. Therefore, we could not apply in these cases the 
distinction between aition (as the entity with causal role, like 
Anaxagoras' nous and Socrates' bones and sinews) and aitia (as the 
reason why or explanation, expressed propositionally) that M. Frede 
(1980: 223) tries to apply to Phaedo 96a ff.; though certainly in 
many cases aitia is more renderable as "reason why" than cause; e. g. 
at Tim. 29d7, where it is asked di' hentina aitian the Framer has 
built the universe, and what follows is an explanation ("he was 
good... and so he wished everything to be maximally similar to 
himself", 29e1-3); at Pol. 294d1 we must find the aitia of the need 
of laws in a polis, and we are then given the reasons. In addition, I 
think that Plato's postulation of a cause, at the ontological level, 
in the cosmology of these four dialogues mentioned has explanatory 
force, so that here these two aspects become hardly dissociable. 
8 We know however that the meaning of aitia in Greek is much more 
general than "cause" in English (on this see Vlastos [1969a: 76-81], 
and LSJ ad loc. ) and that the notion of cause in Greek philosophy has 
been used much more widely than in the sense of efficient cause, 
which seems however to be the prevailing sense in modern times (cf. 
Frede [1980: 217-8]; for a summary of the contemporary debate about 
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this cause works will provide us with an explanation, 
which is in this case a teleological explanation, insofar 
as that agent is a rational agent intending positive 
goals. The postulation of such an agent, then, will be 
Plato's way of accounting for the appearance of purpose 
and order in Nature. 
The notion that there is some purpose in Nature, as 
oriented towards the Ideas, can already be found hinted 
at as early as the Phaedo, with the suggestion that 
sticks and stones wish and strive to be like the Idea 
(cf. bouletai, 74d9-10, oregetai, 75a2, b1, prothumeitai, 
75b7). 9 A metaphorical language, at this stage, since 
nature hasn't yet been endowed with a mind that could 
account for such striving, and since Socrates in the 
dialogue declares himself to have been disappointed in 
his search for someone who could explain the cause of 
each thing by an appeal to a "demonic force" (daimonian 
ischun) or an intellect (nous) that orders the universe 
in the best possible state, as it now is (cf. 97b-98c - 
esp. 97b8-c6,98b7-, 99c1-3,99c8-9). 10 If we skip many 
pages of Plato's intellectual biography to have a look 
towards the end, that is precisely what we shall find in 
the Laws: "willing" (boulesthai) will be there, non- 
metaphorically, as one of the states of Soul leading the 
cosmos (X 897a1; cf. XII 967a4-5); the Nous diakosmön is 
proudly proclaimed as the source of all beauties in 
heaven (cf. XII 966e2-4,967b-d). By the time of the 
Laws, then, the striving of the sticks and stones in the 
causation cf. Sosa-Tooley [1993: 1-311, though there are still modern 
attempts to take "cause" in a wider sense than efficient cause; cf. 
Sosa [1980]). 
9 Certainly Plato emphasizes that these things fall short and cannot 
manage to be like the Equal itself, and stressing this inferiority is 
crucial for his argument for recollection in which the passage is 
inserted (cf. 74d9-e4,74e9-75a2). 
10 Note that the statement at 99c1-2 seems to express a belief in 
teleological arrangement, by the suggestion that being in the best 
possible state is how things are now (houtö nun keisthai), even 
though Plato doesn't yet articulate an explanation or justification 
of that belief in terms of an ordering Mind. 
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Phaedo will have found a cosmological foundation and the 
Anaxagorean Nous a proper place in Plato's ontology. 
There is however a journey from the Phaedo to the Laws 
that I cannot pretend to analyse comprehensively here; 
though perhaps some brief glimpses can be provided by 
glancing at suggestions found in different dialogues 
(other than the four that will be studied in detail), by 
way of background to my main thesis. 
Despite Socrates' dissatisfaction with Pre-Socratic 
accounts in the Phaedo, including Anaxagoras', the 
allusion to a Nous diakosmön shows that the idea was 
already present in Plato's mind, and dialogues like the 
Symposium show again an interest in teleological 
explanations. When Diotima asks Socrates "What do you 
think is the aition of this love and desire" to 
procreate? (207a6-7), and when Socrates asks to be told 
this aitia (207c7), what we are given is a teleological 
account: "Mortal nature seeks, as far as possible, to 
exist always and be immortal (aei to einai kai 
athanatos) . taut it can only be so by generation" (2U'/utl- 
3). Procreation thus becomes a means towards a goal, and 
the question why does love exist can be rendered as 'for 
what sake does love exist', the goal being participation 
in immortality (208b2-6: thneton athanasias metechei, cf. 
athanasias charin)"11 Love thus becomes an impulse in 
humans and animals, seeking a -conscious or unconscious- 
goal (cf. 207b-c). Now, it is strictly speaking the Idea 
(of Beauty) that will be described as aei on (211a1) at 
the end of Diotima's discourse: In addition, "Beauty 
itself... is always specifically one, whereas all the 
other beautiful things participate in it" (211b1-3) -and 
beautiful things are the object of love, insofar as we 
desire to procreate in them (206e); so that striving for 
immortality can be taken to be -probably in an 
11 As L. Wright (1976: 24) says, it belongs to teleological 
explanations that when we say "A in order that B", or "A for the sake 
of B", we ipso facto answer a question of the form "Why A". 
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unconscious and indirect way for most humans- striving to 
be like the Idea. Some hints, moreover, are made at the 
binding force of ergs, which, by being in between 
(metaxu, 202d11) human beings and gods, "fills in the gap 
in the middle of them, so that the whole becomes united 
with itself" (en mesöi de on amphoteron sumpleroi, huste 
to pan auto hautoi sundedesthai, 202e6-7). Love performs 
a sundein similar to the one that Plato was in the Phaedo 
expecting Anaxagoras' Mind to perform12 and a mediating 
function that anticipates the one which in later 
dialogues (such as the Timaeus) Plato will attribute to 
soul. 13 
By the time of the Republic love is described as a state 
of the soul, which in the case of the philosopher is 
directed towards contemplation of the Ideas (VI 485a10- 
b3); 14 the philosopher will, in turn, possess the mind 
that will be able to order, if not the whole cosmos, at 
least the state after the pattern of the Ideas: "By 
seeing the Good and using it as a paradigm, they must 
12 Cf. 99c1-6: materialistic accounts "do not look for the dunamis of 
things now being disposed in the best posible way they can be 
arranged (tethenai), nor do they think that it has a demonic force 
(daimonian ischun)", but they think there is an Atlas more powerful 
(ischuroteron), more immortal and more cohesive (mallon sunechonta); 
not realizing that in fact it is the good and fitting (to agathon kai 
deon) that binds and keeps things together (sundein kai sunechein). 
This passage seems to attribute the cohesive function first, more 
anthropomorphically, to a demonic force (daimonian ischun) than which 
in fact, Plato implies, no Atlas can be found more cohesive 
(sunechonta); secondly, to the good. Since in the end it would be 
nous that was expected to "dispose each thing in the best posible 
way" (hekaston tithenai tautei hopei an beltista echei, 97c5-6), one 
would expect that the good and cohesive structure of the cosmos is 
the result of nous ordering, which also performs a cohesive function. 
This duality of factors in explaining the unity and cohesiveness of 
the cosmos will reappear in the Timaeus, where the sundein is said to 
belong both to the Demiurge (32b-c), and to the analogia imposed by 
him (31c). Cf. also the hesitation in the Philebus about attributing 
the role of realizing symmetry both to peras and to nous as cause as 
we shall analyse infra, ch. 4, section 5.3. (Cf. a similar sunechein 
said to be performed in the cosmos by philia, söphrosune, justice and 
geometrical equality in Gorg. 507e6-508a8. ) 
13 Cf. the World-Soul as an intermediate entity at Tim. 35a1-b1. 
14 Cf. the same role of stergein at 485c4, of oregesthai at 485d4, 
and of epithumiai at 485d6-el. 
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kosmein the polis, the citizens and themselves" (VII 
540a8-bl); in this way the philosopher is called a 
demiourgos of virtue in his fellow-citizens -and thus of 
the goodness of the whole city (cf. VI 500d). But, what 
about the whole cosmos? 
Plato, we must remember, had shown, through Socrates, 
initial enthusiasm in the Phaedo about a Mind which could 
account for the good arrangement of the totality of 
things, despite later disappointment at the mechanical 
way Anaxagoras proceeded to explain each individual 
phenomenon (cf. 98b-c). But soon in the Republic we find 
allusions to a demiourgos of our sight (VI 507c), who has 
also framed the heaven -and things in it- "in as 
beautiful a way as is possible for such works to be 
framed" (VII 530a5-7), i. e. a designing agent who would 
have taken care not only of the universe as a whole but 
also of individual phenomena. Plato doesn't expand on the 
cosmological significance of this demiourgos; we shall 
have to wait till the late dialogues for that. However, 
the notion that cosmic order and beauty has its 
foundation in some sort of design starts becoming 
explicit here. 
The idea of an ordering mind appears also in the 
Phaedrus, where the soul of god -mainly, Zeus- is 
mythically invested with the Anaxagorean function of 
diakosmein panta (246e), and, despite its traditional 
face, it is described with particular emphasis on its 
noetic aspect (cf. nous, dianoia 247c-d) which feeds on 
the contemplation of the Ideas. Zeus, in turn, appears as 
a model to be imitated by any human with capacity for 
wisdom and government (252d-e, esp. 252e1-3), and the 
gods in general are portrayed as leaders that the human 
souls follow towards contemplation of the Ideas (246e- 
247a, 248a). In the same dialogue, and in the logos 
preceding this muthos, Plato presents an argument (245c5- 
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246a2) for the immortality of soul that postulates it as 
ungenerated principle of all motion, including therefore 
bodily motion, and it is argued that without that 
principle the whole ouranos would stand still (245d8-e2), 
an argument which in that way emphasizes the sustaining 
aspect of this generative cause. By this appeal to soul 
as arche kineseös Plato seems to have found a more 
articulated way of expressing efficient causation, and to 
advance a more friendly relation between soul and body 
(than that which we might find, say, in the Phaedo), 
since now it looks as if the essence of soul consists 
precisely in moving or animating body (cf. Phaedrus 
245e4-6). This idea seems to recur in other later 
dialogues, so that, rather than an obstacle (empodion to 
soma, Phaedo 65a10, cf. 66c1), the body will become 
mainly a vehicle (ochema) for the soul (cf. Tim. 41e2, 
69c7), 15 not only as its place of residence (even in its 
most blessed imaginable state) 16 but also as the 
instrument of the purposive action of intelligent souls. '7 
That motion is inherent to soul is again restated in the 
Sophist (249a-b), in the context of a passage (245e-249d) 
where the Eleatic Stranger argues for an intermediate 
position (cf. 249c10-d5) between those who contend that 
reality amounts to bodies and those who claim that it 
consists only of incorporeal immutable forms (246a4-c3); 
he tries to get the former to agree that qualities in 
soul, such as phronesis, are asomata (247b1-dl), and 
argues with respect to the latter that full being (to 
15 The contrast with the Phaedo is still noteworthy whether one 
posits a difference of view or just of stress between the two 
outlooks on the body outlined above. It is certainly clear that the 
body could also act as a hindrance to human fulfilment in the Timaeus 
(cf. 88b in relation with 90b), and that it had the status of a 
necessary condition in the Phaedo (99a-b); however, in the Phaedo it 
was not elevated to the rank of cause nor was it shown as an 
indispensable company for soul. Cf. also infra, ch. 2, section 1.3; 
ch. 3, section 1; ch. 7 section 1. 
16 Cf. Tim. 41d-e, 42b, 90a. 
17 Cf. e. g. Tim. 68e with 46c-e, Laws X 897a-b. 
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pantelös on) must equally include nous and phronesis, and 
therefore life, soul and motion (248e6-b6) . 
18 In this way 
phronesis would seem to be the bridge between the two 
camps: if both of them agree that it exists, then there 
is a kind of reality that is incorporeal (pace the sheer 
materialist) and in motion (pace the friends of the 
forms). Plato's interest in bridging the gap in this way 
seems no accident, when we find that in his later 
cosmology soul, especially intelligent soul, will 
precisely exhibit a mediating function between the 
corporeal and mutable and the incorporeal and immutable 
(cf. e. g. Tim. 35a1-b1). This is particularly true in the 
Timaeus of the World-Soul, and even though the Sophist 
doesn't contain any explicit reference to this kind of 
entity, still towards the end (265b-266b) we find some 
promising cosmological suggestions. 19 The generation of 
all living creatures, plants and the four elements is 
attributed to a divine productive art (theia poietike 
techne, cf. 265a10-11 with e3) in which god acts as a 
demiurge (theou demiourgountos, 265c4) and which can be 
rendered as "a divine cause operating with reason and 
knowledge" ([aitias] meta logou to kai epistemes theias, 
265c8-9). This kind of efficient cause is posited as an 
alternative to the widespread view which favours rather 
"a spontaneous cause which produces without thought" 
18 One should note that this is not a suggestion that intelligible 
forms must in some way move (as interpreted e. g. by de Vogel [1970: 
228-9]), but rather that full being must include not only immutable 
entities but also mutable ones (see esp. 249c10-d5); cf. Dorter 
(1994: 147-8), De Rijk (1986: 17-8,106). Let us note in addition 
that the Stranger has not got the friends of the forms to agree (i) 
with the criterion of being as power to act or be acted upon (they 
say that is a mark not of being, but of becoming, 248c); (ii) that 
for forms to be known involves a poiema or pathos (248d-e); even 
though they do agree that forms are known and that there is a knowing 
soul (248d1-2). So it would seem that phronesis is a more likely 
candidate than the concept of dunamis (as power to act or be acted 
upon) to mediate in the discussion (pace Dorter [1994: 144], McCabe 
[1994: 202-5]). For further discussion of Soph. 245e-249d cf. e. g. 
Cornford (1935: 242-8); Runciman (1962: 76-82); Seligman (1974: 30- 
40); Bluck (1975: 89-102); Teloh (1981: 190-1,194-5); Malcolm 
(1983); Prior (1985: 129-39); De Rijk (1986: 13-7,106); Dorter 
(1994: 142-50). 
19 On this passage compare the treatment of Brague (1991). 
20 
(aitias automates kai anew dianoias phuouses) or so- 
called "nature" (phusis) (265c7-8,265e3). This debate 
with materialistic theories as to the true cause in 
cosmological explanations and Plato's defence of design 
will become a motif reappearing in Timaeus, Philebus and 
Laws. In these two latter works, as we shall see, it is 
intelligent soul, especially the World-Soul, that will 
present itself as the primary aitia instead of any random 
or automatic materialistic force. 
This brief survey can then serve as a background against 
which we can start to explore the dialogues that will be 
the subject of this study. Let me now present the main 
claims I want to submit about Timaeus, Philebus, 
Politicus and Laws and outline the structure of the 
thesis. 
III. THE ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
In this thesis I shall be arguing that nous as foundation 
of cosmic order is to be understood basically in terms of 
a primary efficient cause operating teleologically within 
certain limits. I shall try to show how the contrast 
between random and purposive factors in the explanation 
of cosmic order is taken up and developed in Timaeus, 
Politicus, Philebus and Laws, and how, nonetheless, 
teleology is made to rely on mechanism. In this regard I 
wish to show how the mythological figure of the Demiurge 
-as it appears especially in the Timaeus, cf. also 
Politicus- can be understood in the light of the 
functions of the Soul at a cosmic level or World-Soul 
(defended more argumentatively in Philebus and Laws, but 
also present in Timaeus and Politicus), acting as primary 
cause in a perpetual universe. In this way the prevalence 
of complete random disorder in it will turn out to be a 
merely hypothetical postulate, though an actual 
possibility at the human and political level. This latter 
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circumstance will make us reflect on how the universe can 
act both as a model for human behaviour and be enhanced 
by it as a true kosmos. 
From this analysis I shall try to show that we do not 
need a separate intellect apart from the one embodied in 
the universe and heavenly bodies (what I call cosmic 
god/s) as primary cause of order at a cosmic level, even 
though, as much as we do not need a separate noes, we do 
need the cosmic god for the achievement of microcosmic 
order. In addition, we shall see how the cosmological 
description itself can sometimes be affected by ethical 
concerns. In this way Plato's interest in the macrocosm 
will reveal itself as not being independent of his 
preoccupations with the microcosm. 
In my first chapter on the Timaeus (chapter 2 following 
this introduction), I shall analyse in what sense the 
Demiurge appears mythically as the source of cosmic 
order, and shall attempt to uncover the philosophical 
meaning of that mythical postulation in terms of Plato's 
assertion of cosmic teleology, in the light of which the 
Demiurge appears as a symbol of the notion of primary 
causality. Secondly, I shall scrutinize whether the 
Demiurge deserves any ontological status within the 
structure of reality of the Timaeus, and argue (on the 
grounds of a previous rejection of interpretations of 
creation as a punctual act) that it should be taken as 
standing not for a separate nous but for the World-Soul. 
In showing how these two aspects are indispensably 
related, I shall oppose those views which have taken the 
Demiurge to symbolize exclusively one or the other. As to 
the topic of creation, which has divided interpreters 
mainly between those who take the gegone at 28b7 
literally or metaphorically, I shall be suggesting the 
via media that it can be meant literally but only 
partially so, since Plato also wants to say that the 
universe not only has been created, but is and will be so 
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if we take creation as a perpetual and beginningless 
process. 
That we do not need more than soul at a cosmic level 
(World-Soul and soul of the heavenly bodies, "cosmic god" 
in the collective sense) to mediate between Ideas and 
sensibles in the Timaeus will be shown not only from a 
metaphysical perspective but also from an ethical one. 
Thus, chapter 3 starts by picking up some conclusions 
about god in chapter 2 by showing how the predicate 
"god" is actually applied to the World-Soul and the 
heavenly bodies in the Timaeus. This cosmic god will be 
distinguished from what stands immediately above and 
below it in Plato's structure of reality, namely the 
Ideas and human reason respectively, in order to show in 
particular the relation of the latter to the cosmic god. 
I shall be arguing that the astronomically ordered 
universe provides a model of behaviour that we should 
follow, and I shall press the matter further by stressing 
the ethical function that such an abstract discipline as 
astronomy performs in the Timaeus by directly 
contributing towards human happiness. 
In chapter 4, on the Philebus, I shall analyse the 
fourfold classification at 23c-30e, which I take to be 
cosmological, and the relation between peras and apeiron 
as constituents of things pertaining to the sensible 
realm and the Mind that is posited as "cause" in that 
passage; then I shall compare it with the cosmology of 
the Timaeus to see up to what extent the two cosmologies 
can be read as complementary, or as shedding light on one 
another. This comparison, which I shall attempt in terms 
different from the standard ones, will help reinforce the 
cosmological import of the passage. We shall also see 
that the Philebus enunciates a macro-microcosm 
parallelism which marks the affinity and at the same time 
the difference between human minds and Cosmic Mind (or 
minds), insofar as the former, being of inferior pedigree 
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to the latter, still need to -and therefore might not- 
create in their lives, by imitation of the latter, a 
mixture which is already achieved in the universe. 
Now, as I shall be trying to show, it seems to be one of 
the strongest suggestions in several of Plato's dialogues 
that the universe is orderly due to the presence of a 
governing Nous, i. e. that Mind is the foundation of the 
cosmos in its present state. Discursive dialogues such as 
the Philebus and the Laws contain this evidence, as does 
the myth of the Timaeus, which ends with an appraisal of 
the beauty and completeness of the present cosmos. 
However, a chapter has to be devoted to examining whether 
that can also be maintained with regard to the myth of 
the Politicus. This is no idle question, for most of the 
existent literature -and virtually the whole of the 
English literature to my knowledge- has assumed Plato to 
maintain the contrary thesis here, namely that we are not 
living in an orderly universe under the presence of a 
guiding god. Even though, in a subsequent chapter, I 
shall present a non-literal reading of that myth, I think 
it is still important that literalists and non- 
literalists should, if possible, at least come to an 
agreement as to which reading of the myth is more 
suitable even if it is solely attached to the letter of 
the myth, for in that case the thesis proposed in my 
title, namely that Mind is the foundation of the - 
present- cosmic order, becomes more powerful by being 
sustainable under both readings. 
The non-literal reading of the myth of the Politicus 
which I want to submit in chapter 6, after having 
established, in chapter 5, what I believe to be the most 
appropriate literal reading of the myth, is one which, in 
the first place, takes into account the elements of 
cosmological importance that we can find in it, but, in a 
second instance, takes us much further than its 
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cosmological meaning towards disclosing, within that 
background, its anthropological and political 
significance. Firstly, I wish to argue, as in chapter 2 
with regard to the Timaeus, that Mind can be taken to be 
not only the cause of the present cosmic order but of 
cosmic order at all times, and show the implausibility of 
a picture of the universe undergoing alternating 
prevalence of order and disorder. I also think that the 
myth contains interesting suggestions about the nature of 
divine Mind as cause -which are parallel to its treatment 
in other dialogues- and furthermore, as a model for the 
mind of the politician. So I will go on to analyse why 
the macro-microcosm parallelism is as exaggerated as it 
appears to be in the myth of the Politicus, and show how 
the behaviour of the universe and its relation to god in 
the literal picture of that myth become rather a symbol 
and projection of human and political affairs, the real 
sphere where actual "drama" between good and evil could 
according to my view plausibly exist. 
Now, if chapter 6 serves to show how Plato's ethical and 
political preoccupations can tinge his own way of 
depicting the universe, so that it becomes a projection 
of the former, chapter 7, on Laws X, explores further 
that direction of thought by analysing up to what extent 
cosmic disorder can itself be said to have a human 
source. This question has to be established after 
answering the preliminary question in what sense could 
Plato possibly posit in the Laws not only Mind or a Good 
Soul as the foundation of cosmic order -as we could 
reasonably expect at this stage- but also -and 
surprisingly- an "Evil Soul" as the cause of disorder, 
and what status and scope of action could the latter 
have. In this respect I propose to dismiss any dualistic 
interpretation of Plato's Laws which posits the 
coexistence of two opposing cosmic principles, and 
present a reading of Laws X which emphasizes the 
existence of teleology as having its foundation in god at 
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a cosmic astronomical level and also at the level of 
cosmic justice as a framework for human behaviour. As far 
as human choice and responsibility is concerned, however, 
I wish to show that teleology is not something given but 
a task to be achieved by human souls, since they (and it 
would in Laws X appear only they) can be cause of evil - 
though they can also be cause of good- and so it is an 
open enterprise for them to contribute to cosmic 
teleology. In this regard, particular stress will be laid 
on the cosmic importance of human action, and so we shall 
see how human minds, as much as Cosmic Mind, will in the 
Laws become prominent in our search for a foundation of 
cosmic order that inspired the title of the present 
thesis. 
IV. THE ORDER OF THE DIALOGUES 
I hope to show that we can understand Plato as a 
philosopher who has, if not necessarily consistent theses 
throughout his career, at least consistent preoccupations 
as far as some central subjects of this thesis are 
concerned. I am not, however, making essential claims 
about chronology; I am content with the general agreement 
that Phaedo, Symposium and Republic are to be taken as 
middle dialogues, coming before the Parmenides; whereas 
the Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus and 
Laws are usually thought to be late. 20 Which dialogue 
comes before which in each group, particularly the 
20 The Phaedrus, for its part, is usually regarded as more or less 
transitional between the middle and late period (see e. g. Eggers Lan 
[1992: esp. 46]; White [1993: 3-7]; Nehamas and Woodruff [1995: xlv- 
xlvi]). For defenders of its place in the late group cf. Rowe (1992a: 
esp. 39), who however doesn't underplay the Phaedrus' relation with 
the middle dialogues and remains agnostic about its relation with the 
Timaeus; and T. M. Robinson (1995: xiv), who places the Phaedrus after 
the Timaeus and Politicus. However, Robinson's main motivation for so 
doing is his belief that the Timaeus doesn't yet contain the theory 
of soul as principle of motion that we find in the Phaedrus; a point 
with which I shall take issue below (cf. ch. 2, section 1.3 and n. 
44, section 2.2.2 and n. 81). 
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latter, is not a crucial concern for my thesis; rather I 
wish to show that there is, in the last four dialogues 
mentioned, some closeness in spirit as to cosmological 
issues that could be supported by, or support, closeness 
in date. 
We do know, however, that the Politicus (284b) mentions 
the Sophist, so that it seems to be meant to be read 
after, or at least with reference to the latter. 
Aristotle, for his part, reports the Laws as post-dating 
the Republic (Pol. 11 5-6,1264b24-9), and in fact there 
is general modern consensus -which corresponds to the 
Ancient tradition-21 that it is the work that occupied 
Plato till more or less the end of his life. Now, the 
relative dating of the Timaeus was certainly a hot issue 
some decades ago, particularly with Owen's proposal that 
it antedates the Parmenides and Cherniss' riposte, to 
which Owen did not reply. 22 Since then, few defenders have 
been found of Owen's thesis, 23 the main one perhaps having 
been, till recently, T. M. Robinson, though he too has now 
changed his mind by placing the Timaeus early in the late 
group, rather than at the end of the middle group. 24 The 
Philebus too, in turn, seems nowadays generally regarded 
as late. 25 26 
V. LOGOS AND MUTHOS 
21 Cf. e. g. [Olympiodorus], Prol. 24 10-15 (Westerink). 
22 Cf. Owen (1953); Cherniss (1957). 
23 For further criticism of Owen's thesis based partly on his own 
later views cf. Fine (1988a: 373-90). 
24 Cf. the Introduction in T. M. Robinson (1995: xiv-xv). 
25 The only exception perhaps being Waterfield (1980), (1982: 11), 
who questioned the general opinion about the lateness of the 
Philebus, though his method has been criticized by Benitez (1989: 2- 
3) -cf. also Hampton (1990: 8)- and has not gained support in the 
scholarly literature. 
26 Note that the latest stylometric studies, Brandwood (1990: 249- 
51), (1992: 113) and Ledger (1989: 198-206) agree in placing the 
Philebus and the Timaeus as late dialogues; though Ledger puts the 
Timaeus and Critias as the last dialogues, immediately preceded by 
the Laws. For a cautionary note on stylometry see e. g. T. M. Robinson 
(1992: esp. 381-2). 
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Two of the dialogues I shall be concerned with (namely, 
the Politicus and the Timaeus) deal with cosmology by way 
of myth. Much has been written on logos and muthos in 
Plato, 27 and several scholars have already emphasized that 
Platonic myths, as opposed to popular myths, are 
susceptible to philosophical analysis, 28 and that, far 
from being immersed in a popular or pre-logical way of 
thinking (such as that studied by anthropologists 
interested in myth), 29 or just uncritically incorporating 
the mythological tradition he inherits, Plato, though 
often appealing to the authority of tradition, mostly 
creates myths as his own fiction and uses them for 
rational purposes, even claiming a content of truth in 
them. 30 Muthos and logos can be two different ways of 
expressing philosophical ideas. 31 If this is so, muthos 
27 Cf. Brisson (1982), Annas (1982), Gaiser (1984), Mattei (1988), 
and the bibliographies in Gaiser and Brisson, including other works 
referred to below. 
28 See particularly Annas (1982: 119-20,122); compare with Gaiser 
(1984: 127). 
29 For discussion of this kind of myth, with reference to Levi- 
Bruhl, cf. Levi-Strauss (1973: 25-8,65). 
30 Cf. Frutiger (1930: 34), Brisson (1982: 144-51,171), Gaiser 
(1984: 127). See e. g. Gorg. 523a for the claim of truth, and 527a, 
where Plato opposes any view of his story as "myth" in ap ejorative 
sense of "old-wives tale". In the Timaeus too Plato is not unwilling 
to use the word 'true' in connection with his probable account (cf. 
30b8,38a1). 
31 E. g., the idea of the immortality of the soul, which is subject to 
both argument and myth in the Phaedo and Republic (on this see Annas 
[1982]); or, as we can see from the survey above and as I shall argue 
further, the philosophical notion of a Nous diakosmön, which appears 
mythically in the Timaeus (cf. also Phaedrus 246e4-7 together with 
246b6 and 247c-d), and argumentatively in Philebus and Laws (so that 
one should not suppose, as McCabe does [1992: 60-7], that muthos 
contradicts logos as far as Plato's interest in this notion is 
concerned) . Cf. also Gorg. 
526d-527a where the conclusions extracted 
from the myth coincide with the conclusions extracted through 
argument (e. g. at 508b-509a) summarized at 527a-e. Likewise, Plato 
has Socrates say in the Phaedo after framing a myth on immortality, 
that one shouldn't stick too strictly to how he describes things in 
myth (cf. tauta diischurisasthai houtös echein... ou prepei, 114d1-2), 
though it is appropriate to believe that some such description is the 
case, since the soul is immortal (cf. 114d2-6), something that has 
been subject to argument before. In other words, even though we are 
recommended not to attach too much credibility to all the details of 
a myth, there is still some basic philosophical idea or ideas it 
tries to express which should be taken seriously. And it is at least 
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and logos should be seen not 
complementarily: 32 muthos can 
understanding Plato's argument, 33 
can help us interpret a myth. 
antagonistically but 
prove important in 
and Plato's arguments 
If this is so, I do agree with Annas that a philosophical 
myth, as opposed to a popular myth, 34 should admit of some 
rational interpretation. 35 But the question then arises by 
what criteria should we undertake that kind of 
interpretation. A first criterion has already been 
advanced: trying to understand the relevance of the myth 
and the particular contribution it can make with regard 
to the argument of the dialogue; Plato can make that 
purpose explicit, as is the case with the Politicus 
myth, 36 though sometimes -or often- the richness of the 
myth displays, to closer analysis, some significance that 
goes much further or deeper than its prima facie lesson; 
here where the content of truth alleged for a myth (cf. n. 30) could 
lie. 
32 Cf. Rist (1964: 9-13); Gaiser (1984: 133,134-5); Mattei (1988: 
67). When Plato refers to his myth as a logos (Gorg. 523a2; cf. the 
indifferent use of eikos muthos and eikos logos in the Timaeus, 29d2, 
30b7; and perhaps also Pol. 277b-c as noted by R. Wright [1979: 
368]), we can see that muthos is a kind of logos in a wide sense 
(something that shows that not even Plato thinks of the distinction 
so sharply, cf. also Zaslavski [1981: 220]), though they are still 
opposed to argumentative discourse or logos in a narrow sense (cf. 
e. g. Phaedo 61b3-7). On this see Brisson (1982: 110-13); also Rep. II 
376e3-377a8, where Plato distinguishes two kinds of logoi, true and 
false, the latter being muthos -though he still insists that there, 
even though false as a whole, the myth he wants to make use of 
contains also some truth (377a5-6; contrast this with the myths of 
the poets which he takes as bad lies at 377d-e). 
33 Cf. Annas (1982: 119-20). I hope to be showing so particularly in 
chapter 6. In addition, though following rational purposes, myths 
seem a kind of discourse particularly suitable to spur the emotional 
side of the reader and through this bring him to further rational 
awareness. Cf. Blank (1993: 428 ff. ) for the general issue of Plato's 
use of emotional effect. For views on the emotional aspect appealed 
to by myths cf. Stewart (1960: 29); Brisson (1982: 100-5 with 151). 
34 It is the latter that do not seem to deserve the effort of 
interpretation (Phaedrus 229b-e) and whose lack of overt edifying 
message Plato explicitly opposes (cf. Rep. II 378d-e). Cf. Annas 
(1982: 121); Gadamer (1980: 43,67). 
35 Annas (1982: 119-20). 
36 See e. g. 275b and infra, ch. 6, section 2.2. Cf. also Gorg. 522e. 
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a deeper meaning that can still be discovered with the 
help of the discursive context of the dialogue. 37 
Now, when we go into a more detailed interpretation of a 
myth we become particularly sensitive to the fact that 
Platonic myths tend to be a peculiar kind of discourse, 
since together with features which are characteristically 
mythical (e. g. the narrative instead of argumentative 
order, the appeal to items or events which for Plato are 
beyond present verification by our senses or intellect, 
such as legendary figures, or events placed in a remote 
past or in the after-life) 38 Plato makes use of notions 
which also appear as object of argumentative treatment in 
other contexts in the same or different dialogues. Such 
is the case, for example, with the Ideas (alluded to 
mythically in the Politicus at 269d), the World-Body and 
the World-Soul (which appear in the myth of the Politicus 
and Timaeus but also in the macro-microcosm analogy 
argument of Philebus), or, in general, the allusion to a 
Nous diakosmön, that has appeared in section 2 to be 
subject both of mythical and argumentative treatment. 39 
This circumstance can give us a further clue, in the 
sense that, if we see Plato in a myth employing some 
notions that also appear in non-mythical and more 
argumentative related discourses, then perhaps we should 
not underestimate the philosophical importance of those 
elements even if they are in a mythical context. If this 
is so then we should be entitled to take some parts of a 
myth more seriously than others (particularly when we 
find internal contradiction within the same myth, or at 
least the possibility of contradictory readings). This 
becomes particularly important in the case of the Timaeus 
37 This has been shown by Sedley (1991: 359-83, cf. esp. 383) with 
regard to the final myth of the Phaedo, and I shall try to do so as 
regards the Politicus myth infra, chapter 6. One could then apply 
here the suggestion that Plato's openness where it is found can 
constitute an invitation to the reader to participate in the dialogue 
(cf. Sayre [1992: 236], Burnyeat [1990: 2-3], Zaslavski [1981: 219]). 
38 Cf. the analysis of Brisson (1982: 29,139-44,161-3,171); also 
Gaiser (1984: 126), Frutiger (1930: 33). 
39 Cf. also supra, note 31. 
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myth, which is referred to by Plato both as an eikos 
muthos and an eikos logos (29d2,30b7), and which more 
than any other myth introduces passages which look rather 
more like logoi in the strict sense, by appealing to 
statements which for Plato are verifiable at present or 
liable to be demonstrated (e. g. the twofold ontological 
distinction at 27d-28a, or the deduction that all bodies 
should be made out of triangles at 53c ff. ). 40 And, even 
though some readings of a myth can be more literal than 
others, as we shall find is the case with the Timaeus, 
literalists themselves would not disagree that some 
details are merely fanciful. 41 
In this respect, I endorse the view that we should not 
privilege myth above argument, 42 and I propose that if a 
detail of a myth contradicts something that Plato says in 
a more argumentative context, then that would provide us 
with a prima facie reason for not taking that mythical 
detail literally. In this way muthos should be 
subordinated to logos. 43 
In addition, as I shall suggest, it is a sign of richness 
rather than a defect that myths can be open to more than 
one reading (we couldn't expect otherwise given their 
symbolic nature); 44 however, that doesn't exempt us from 
the task of assessing, in the face of different 
interpretations of the same myth, or of particular issues 
posed in a myth, which interpretation (i) makes most 
sense of the myth in the light of the argument of the 
40 The latter having been taken to belong rather to the domain of 
dianoia or mathematical knowledge (Ashbaugh [1988: 14-5]); cf. also 
Frutiger (1930: 38), who excludes 27d-29c and 51b-52d from what he 
regards as mythical. 
41 Such as for example the krater in which the Demiurge mixes the 
components or residues of the World-Soul at 41d. Cf. Vlastos (1939: 
381 n. 1). 
42 Annas (1982: 121). 
43 For another defence of this subordination of muthos to logos and 
that this is the way Plato himself views myth cf. Brisson (1982: esp. 
110). 
44 Cf. Frutiger (1930: 103). 
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dialogue in which the myth is inserted, 45 and (ii) is most 
coherent and makes the text under consideration most 
philosophically coherent. 
In this regard, I agree with some modern hermeneutic 
studies that a presupposition of intelligibility is 
indispensable for any interpretation of a text. 46 Now, 
this text usually appears in a context, 47 and so the whole 
dialogue can act as context for a particular passage, and 
sometimes other dialogues can serve as context for one 
particular dialogue. 48 Even though of course priority will 
be given to internal evidence in a dialogue, that will 
not exclude further corroboration (as to similar points) 
from other dialogues when that is available. In this 
dissertation I attempt to show that the four late 
dialogues to be studied can be taken as illuminatory of 
each other at least as far as certain cosmological issues 
are concerned, and that they can collectively strengthen 
our understanding of Plato's late cosmological thought. 49 
45 Of course this applies when there happens to be argument apart 
from the myth, something that will be the case in the Politicus 
though not so much in the Timaeus, though, as I said, several 
passages look more argumentative within that myth itself. 
46 Cf. Gadamer (1975: 261). Intelligibility presupposes coherence, 
and this is not far from Socrates' recommendations that our thoughts 
should accord with one another (cf. Gorg. 482b-c). Let us note also 
the suggestions that philosophical dialogue is done not just for the 
sake of argument but for the sake of some truth which is a goal to be 
found (cf. e. g. Phil. 14b; on this general issue see the illuminating 
treatment of Tigerstedt [1977: 101-3]). I am not however making the 
claim that consistency of thought must be presupposed throughout 
Plato's life. But if we see one view being defended in one dialogue, 
and prima facie a different view on the same subject in another 
dialogue, then we have to investigate why Plato might be speaking 
differently on the same matter and account for those supposed changes 
(e. g. by postulating difference of emphasis or aspect, chronological 
developments, difference of intended audience, etc. ). Cf. e. g. Rowe 
(1992b: 65-7), Kraut (1984: 12). 
47 On this see Ricoeur (1970). 
48 Cf. Irwin (1988: 196). An example would be those cases where Plato 
seems to maintain the same thesis (e. g. his critique of materialistic 
theories of nature) through the mouths of various different main 
speakers, such as Timaeus in the Timaeus, Socrates in the Philebus, 
the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist and the Athenian Stranger in the 
Laws. 
49 There is the legitimate question up to what extent the arguments 
in the dialogues reflect Plato's own voice. M. Frede (1992) has 
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recently addressed this issue, but I find his position rather too 
agnostic. He claims for example that it is not clear whether Plato 
fully identifies himself with the main character of a dialogue, such 
as Socrates, since Plato distanced himself from many standardly 
Socratic positions, such as lack of interest in metaphysics and 
disapproval of natural philosophy (204-5); but at this point Frede is 
overriding the difference that he himself is trying to draw between 
the historical Socrates and the fictional Socrates. In fact the 
latter appears, in dialogues such as the Philebus, wholeheartedly 
endorsing cosmological and metaphysical arguments (cf. e. g. Phil. 
28c-30d, 58a). If the dramatic figure, such as Socrates in the 
Philebus, endorses a view that the historical Socrates didn't, then 
it rather argues against Frede, since the new views put in Socrates' 
mouth -at least to the extent to which they coincide with similar 
views expressed by different speakers in other dialogues, cf. note 
48- most probably come from Plato. Furthermore, Frede's claim that 
Plato "had a critical distance" towards Socrates (204) presupposes 
that there is something like Plato's views that we can pick up from 
his dialogues. Frede also suggests that the question-and-answer 
format makes the argument belong more to the respondent than to the 
questioner, since it is the former who says yes or no (205-6); 
however, this is to overlook the fact that the questioner often 
supports the answer if it is right, something indispensable for the 
argument to proceed or to finish (cf. e. g. Soph. 265d5, Phil. 29d1, 
6; not to mention the Laws, e. g. X 896b-c). The main speaker 
sometimes even speaks to or criticizes the interlocutor from a 
position of authority (cf. Pol. 263d-e); and at other times it is the 
main speaker who advances a thesis and the respondent who supports it 
(cf. Phil. 29e, 67a-b), and, at further times, it is the minor 
interlocutor who asks questions that the main speaker can answer (cf. 
e. g. Pol. 274e, 294a-b). And even though Frede distinguishes between 
aporetic (mainly Socratic) and non-aporetic dialogues, his account 
does not seem to pay sufficient attention to the latter before making 
general claims about Plato's dialogues (without, unfortunately, 
providing us with specific textual scrutiny). For a position 
critical of Frede's cf. Irwin (1995: 7-8 and 355 n. 10). For the 
suggestion that the main interlocutor of many late dialogues 
is 
presented "with the authority of the expert teacher" compare Gaiser 
(1984: 43), cf. a similar defence of the same point, that includes 
reference to Philebus and Politicus, by Sayre (1992: 
221 ff. ), and 
particularly as regards the Politicus by Miller 
(1980: xii-xix). 
For further discussion on how to read Plato cf. the essays contained 




THE DEMIURGE, CAUSE AND WORLD-SOUL IN THE 
TIMAEUS 
In the Timaeus we are promised an account that will start 
with the generation of the universe and end with the 
nature of man (27a5-6) It is true that more seems to be 
said about the first point, and so the cosmological 
aspect of the dialogue has usually -rightly- received a 
great deal of attention, though at the cost of some 
neglect of the second aspect and the interaction of the 
two. In the following pages I shall undertake to analyse 
both aspects. In this chapter I shall try to elucidate 
the meaning and status of god as he appears in the figure 
of the Demiurge, which will include taking a decision 
about the literal value or not of the Demiurge and of 
creation. After that, in the next chapter, I shall 
analyse which (other) entities are called "god" within 
the structure of reality of this dialogue and what is the 
relation of god to other ontological levels, particularly 
human reason. 
The Timaeus presents us with a cosmogonic myth which, 
within a scheme of temporal succession and of passage 
from chaos to order, represents the universe as generated 
by a cause which is called, among other names, "God", the 
"Demiurge" or the "Creator and Father" of the Universe 
(28a6, c3-4,29a3,30a2, b8). This story is referred to 
by Timaeus as an eikos logos or an eikos muthos (30b7, 
29d2). It is likely (eikos), he says, since its object, 
the sensible world, is a copy (eikon) of intelligible 
realities. And, given that an account is akin to the 
subject-matter it explains, our discourse about the 
changeable universe cannot claim to have the same 
accuracy, stability and epistemic force that discourses 
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concerning the Ideas have (cf. 29b-c). On the other hand, 
being a muthos, this story follows a narrative order and 
resorts to many poetic or literary devices that need to 
be interpreted. ' Given these features, the cosmogonic 
account has given rise to many different interpretations 
from antiquity to the present day particularly as regards 
two main questions: 
(I) Did Plato believe -or are we expected by Plato to 
believe- in a temporal beginning of the cosmos? Some 
readers have been inclined to take the story literally, 
giving therefore a positive answer to the question, 
whereas others have denied it by following a 
"metaphorical" or "non-literal" reading, according to 
which they try to seek a deeper meaning underlying the 
creation story. 2 
(II) How are we going to interpret the mysterious figure 
of the Demiurge? Here again there are several possible 
answers: 
1 However, as we noted in the Introduction (section 5) the Timaeus is 
a very special kind of myth, since, in addition to containing 
features that are recurrently characteristic of Platonic myths, it 
also introduces passages which look rather more like logoi in the 
strict sense, by appealing to statements which for Plato are 
verifiable at present or liable to be demonstrated. Given this 
complexity of the account of the Timaeus, I think we must take this 
myth seriously and not as a mere fancy, and interpret it according to 
the criteria proposed in the Introduction, thus making a priority of 
the passages which look more like logos, particularly if they seem to 
contradict more mythical passages. 
2 For a literal interpretation cf. Vlastos (1939: 379 ff. ), (1964: 
401 ff. ); Hackforth (1959: 17 ff. ); T. M. Robinson (1970: 64-5), 
(1979: 105 ff. ), (1993: 99 ff. ); Guthrie (1978: 302-5); Mohr (1989: 
293 ff. ). Against, cf. Taylor (1928: 66-9,79-80); Mondolfo (1934: 70 
ff. ); Cornford (1937: 37 ff., 176,203 ff. ); Cherniss (1944: 421-31); 
Tarän (1971: 372 ff. ); Brisson (1974: 104-5), (1991: 38,49 n. 21), 
(1992a: 36-7); Grube (1980: 162-3); Ostenfeld (1982: 240-2). In 
antiquity we can count Aristotle (De Caelo I 10,280a 28 ff.; Metaph. 
XII 6,1071b37-1072a2), Plutarch (De an. proc. 1014a-b) and Atticus 
(apud Proclus In Tim. I 283,27 ff. Diehl) in the first line, and 
Xenocrates (fr. 54 Heinze), Crantor (apud Plutarch De an. proc. 
1012f-1013b) and Proclus (In Tim. I 285,26-28; I 287,28-288,1 
Diehl) in the second. 
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a) just as a literary device, lacking any serious 
philosophical meaning at all; 3 
or as having some serious philosophical importance, 
though here in turn the Demiurge could be taken 
b) as a distinct entity in Plato's structure of reality, 
which deserves the independent status it is literally 
given in the myth, 4 or 
c) as having no independent literal status but being 
still the symbol of some other entity, function or 
concept in the Timaeus' cosmology. 5 
In the light of these questions, the purpose of this 
chapter is: 
(I) to examine the philosophical meaning of the creation 
myth and of the Demiurge; 
(II) to decide which is, if any, the ontological status 
of the Demiurge. 
I shall be arguing that we can make more sense of the 
text of the Timaeus if we take the Demiurge to be neither 
a creator of the world in the past nor a separate entity 
in the Timaeus' structure of reality. Conversely, I shall 
try to show that the Demiurge is a symbol of two related 
things: 
(I) the concept of teleological ordering, or, in Platonic 
terms, a function of primary causation that is in turn 
fulfilled mainly by 
(II) the World-Soul in Plato's cosmology. 
3 This seems to be the interpretation adopted by Aristotle when, in a 
context in which he criticizes Plato for the use of metaphors which 
he calls mere "empty words" (kenologein), he asks "what is it that 
works looking to the Ideas? " (ti gar esti to ergazomenon pros tas 
ideas apoblepon) (Metaph. I 9,991a19-23). This vocabulary is quite 
similar to that in the Timaeus (cf. apergazesthai and blepein of 
the Demiurge at 28a and 28c-29a), so that Aristotle's reference must 
be to the Demiurge. Cf. Guthrie (1978: 255-6, n. 3). 
4 For supporters of this view see notes 68 and 69 below. 
5 In this line cf. those mentioned in notes 54,55 and 67 below. 
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I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF CREATION AND OF THE 
DEMI URGE 
1. First approach to the philosophical meaning of the 
Demiurge 
As anticipated above, the figure of the Demiurge appears 
in the myth as the cause of the sensible universe. 
Timaeus asserts that "whatever becomes/is generated" 
(gignomenon) does so necessarily by virtue of a cause 
(28a4-5, c2-3) and argues that the universe has come into 
being (gegone, 28b7), since it is a sensible thing, and 
all sensible things become and are generated (gignomena 
kai genneta, cl-2). From this, it seems to follow, the 
sensible universe has a cause, and so the Demiurge is 
introduced as the aition (29a6) that accounts for the 
generation of the universe as a beautifully arranged 
cosmos (cf. 28b-29a), which creates it not ex nihilo but 
from a preexisting state of disorder, trying to make it 
resemble the eternal model of the Ideas (29a, 30a). Thus, 
there is a finality or purpose that this god tries to 
fulfil in his demiurgic action, as we find, for example, 
in Tim. 30a2-6: "Desiring (bouletheis), then, that 
everything should be good and nothing bad as far as 
possible, god took over whatever was visible but was not 
at rest but moving with disharmony and disorder, and 
brought it from disorder into order, judging that the 
latter is in every respect better than the former. " 
We can then distinguish several stages of his activity as 
a Craftsman: He looks to the Ideas (29a, 39e); he wishes 
that everything should be good, or as similar to the 
eternal model as possible (30a, b, 30d, 31a8-b1) -and 
this is the purpose or design that guides his work-; and 
he acts accordingly, after reflecting upon the most 
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suitable means to attain his end (cf. e. g. 30b, 32c-33b). 6 
In other words, the Demiurge has not only a theoretical 
function, by which he apprehends the intelligible order 
of the Ideas, but also a practical one, by which he tries 
to impose this order upon the sensible realm thus 
creating a true kosmos, according to an intelligent 
purpose or design which is recurrently emphasized 
throughout the myth (cf. techne, 33d1; pronoia, 30c1; 
dianoia, 38c3; epinoia 37c8, etc. ). This Demiurge, 
however, does not just limit himself to producing the 
world as an orderly whole, but also legislates (41e-42d), 
governs (48a2) and commands (41b-d). 7 
In this way, the Demiurge seems to be a mediator between 
the immutable Ideas (which are paradigms or goals which 
guide his purposive activity) and our sensible and 
changing world, by trying, in a productive manner, to 
frame the latter in resemblance to the former. In other 
words, he seems to be the efficient cause, or principle 
of becoming and order (cf. geneseos kai kosmou... arche, 
29e4), 8 that makes the fulfilment of teleology possible, 
by contemplating the order of the Ideal realm and 
imposing it upon the sensible world. This is how the 
Demiurge can give the universe a teleological 
orientation, thus enabling the Ideas to have an actual 
influence on or connection with the visible domain. The 
goal pursued by the Demiurge is the good (to eu, 68e5; to 
ariston, 46c8,68e1-2) of the universe, which he tries to 
frame (tektainomenos, 68e5) or fulfil (apotelon, 46d1). 
This goodness of the cosmos, in turn, is recurrently 
6 Cf., more precisely, for this reflection upon the best way to 
achieve the end that guides the demiurgic task, logisamenos 30b1; 
logismos theou 34a8; logou kai dianoias theou 38c3-4; dianoetheis 
32c8; logismon 33a6; nomisas 33b7; hegesato 33d1, etc. 
7 Note that 'demiourgos' can also have the meaning of "magistrate", 
as pointed out by Brisson (1974: 50,86-8) -cf. LSJ ad loc. -; see 
also Lopez (1963: 76-84), and Laws X 902d-e as an example where 
demiourgos seems to have the meaning of "governor" as well as that of 
"craftsman". 
8 This kind of efficient or "creative" causality is also suggested by 
the use of terms like poietes (28c3), gennesas (41a5), sunistas 
(30b5,32c7), apergazesthai (30b6), diakosmein (69c1), etc. 
38 
understood in the Timaeus in terms of order or 
mathematical proportion, which brings about unity in its 
constituents-9 
And this is, in my view, the most salient feature of the 
demiurgic action in general. In this respect, we must 
notice that the myth makes the Demiurge -as demiourgos 
pater, cf. 41a7- responsible for the creation of the 
immortal aspects of the universe (such as its body and 
soul, time, the heavenly bodies and human reason), 
whereas he delegates to the lesser gods created by him 
(hoi neoi theoi 42d6, hoi demiourgoi, 75b7-8) the task of 
framing the mortal parts of the world (cf. 41b ff. ) -such 
as the human body and its parts, the lower parts of human 
soul, plants, etc. - as well as of governing (diakubernan) 
mortal living beings, 42e. In any case, it is noteworthy 
that whatever demiurgic function is accomplished aims at 
the end that the world should be good or as similar to 
the Ideal model as possible (30a, b, 31a8-b1,38b-c, 39d- 
e, 41b-c). 
9 Cf. Lennox (1985: 214,216); Brisson (1991: 33 ff. ). For the 
connection between goodness and order see 29e-30a, where god, 
wanting all things to be good, makes them pass from disorder to 
order; 46e, where good and fair effects are contrasted with 
disorderly ones; 87c: pan to agathon kalon, to de kalon ouk ametron 
(a principle which is applied here on a microcosmic scale to any 
zöion, which needs summetria between its body and soul in order to be 
healthy, cf. 87c-d). For this order understood in terms of 
mathematical proportion causing unity cf. 31b-c: A fair combination 
of the four bodies in the universe is achieved by proportion 
(analogia) which produces unity most perfectly in the things it 
binds; at 41b1 to echon eu is connected with to kalös harmosthen; at 
53b to shape (diaschematizein) the precosmic traces eidesi to kai 
arithmois is to constitute them in the best and fairest way (from 
things which did not have that character); at 68e the Demiurge is 
said to have constructed the good (to eu) in all the things 
generated, and this is in turn, at 69b, rendered as introducing 
summetriai in each thing, both with respect to itself and to the 
others (note that in this case the "Demiurge" must be taken 
collectively -cf. infra, next paragraph- rather than personally, 
since he brings the good en pasin Lois gignomenois, 68e5 and not just 
in the part that is his responsibility). Finally, at 92c, the beauty 
and excellence of the universe (cf. aristos, kallistos) is connected 
with the fact that it is one (heis, monogenes). For an analysis of 
the good in terms of unity also in the Republic cf. Burnyeat (1987: 
238-40); Hitchcock (1985: 73-90). 
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Thus, e. g., god introduces order into disorder willing 
that everything should be good kata dunamin (30a); for 
the same purpose, he creates intellect and soul in the 
world (30b); he makes the universe one so that (hina) it 
could be similar to the Ideal Model, the panteles zöion, 
which is one (31a-b) -something to which proportion 
between the world's elements contributes, 31c-, and for 
that reason also he endows it with a complete and self- 
sufficient body (33a-d). God also creates time, which 
goes according to number, so that the universe could 
resemble the eternity of the model which remains in unity 
(37c-d, 38b-c), and, so that time could be generated, he 
in turn creates the planets for the delimiting and 
preserving of the numbers of time (38c). 10 
Now, it would seem more difficult to understand why the 
Demiurge should also will, within a teleological plan, 
the creation of the mortal parts of the universe. This 
can perhaps be understood by an appeal to what Lovejoy" 
has called the "principle of plenitude", namely the 
notion that a universe in which all the potentialities 
of being are realized and which contains as many 
different kinds of being as possible is a better universe 
than one which contains only the highest type of created 
beings. This principle can be seen to derive from Tim. 
41b-c, where the Demiurge, after having fashioned the 
beauties of the immortal heaven, realizes that there are 
still three mortal kinds (thneta gene tria) -i. e. the 
winged, the aquatic kind and that which moves on dry 
land, cf. 39e-40a- that haven't been generated: despite 
their mortality, they must be generated so that the 
universe may be complete (teleos), containing all the 
kinds of living beings (41b7-c2). This is imperative if 
10 Once more we can see here the relation between goodness, order and 
unity as the goal pursued by nous as the agent of teleology that we 
pointed out in the previous note. For the relation between unity and 
completeness see Patterson (1981: 114 ff. ). 
11 Cf. Lovejoy (1936: 50-5, esp. 52). 
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the universe is going to resemble the Ideal Living Being, 
which is teleon (30c-d) and thus contains as many kinds 
as this universe should have (39e-40a). On this 
principle, then, the demiurgic activity of the lesser 
gods proceeds (cf. e. g. 76d-e). 
The emphasis on teleology recurs in the description of 
the creation of plants and mortal parts of the body, and 
now the aim can be summarized, concretely, as helping, as 
much as possible, the ruling of reason in the individual 
within the limits imposed by necessity: 12 plants were 
created for the aid and nutrition of the mortal body 
(77a) -and we know a zöion is not kalon if its soul is 
joined to a body which is weak (87d)-; the thumos was 
especially located between the midriff and neck so that 
(hina), subordinated to reason, it could restrain 
appetites by force (70a); the intestines were framed in 
spiral in order that the food should not pass through too 
quickly and so compel the body to need more, making the 
human race incontinent and thus aphilosophon and amouson 
(73a). Sight, as we shall see, was given so that by 
contemplating the movements of heaven we could stabilize 
our thought, something in turn indispensable for 
philosophy (46e-47c). So, teleology seems to be at work 
in these microcosmic examples in facilitating a life of 
reason, a life that will parallel that of the macrocosm, 
in which Intellect rules. 13 
This teleological function underlies the mythical figure 
of the Demiurge and even his manifold appearance. In this 
12 For my treatment of necessity cf. infra, section 1.3 of this 
chapter. 
13 However, whether human reason should rule or not in the individual 
in actual practice, and thus cause him goods or evils, is something 
beyond the scope of god, who is anaitios of any kakia in the 
individuals (42d, e, cf. Rep. X 617e4-5). It is then the task and 
responsibility of human beings to live in a teleological way by 
making reason prevail in their lives (cf. Tim. 42b-c, 68e-69a, 87b, 
90b-d and infra, ch. 3, section 2); if they do so, there will be 
order and unity in their souls and they will produce good effects. 
For how human souls can contribute to cosmic teleology cf. chapter 7 
on Laws. 
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respect, if we follow the details of the narration, we 
shall notice that, once the lesser gods have been created 
and as the mythical account proceeds, the initial - 
theatrical- distinction between a -singular- major God 
creator of the immortal, and -several- lesser gods 
concerned with the mortal parts of the world is 
increasingly blurred, so that 'theos', 'theoi' and 'to 
theion' start to be used interchangeably. 14 15 
This would suggest that the Demiurge doesn't after all 
seem to have such a distinct personality, and perhaps we 
should focus not so much on his anthropomorphical 
appearance but on the -abstract and more impersonal- 
"demiurgic function" that he seems to represent in the 
universe, namely that of intelligent causation aiming at 
an end. This teleological function of intelligent 
14 Cf. Cornford (1937: 280); Cherniss (1944: 608); Tarän (1971: 381); 
Grube (1980: 169). Thus, e. g., theoi are said to be responsible for 
the donation of philosophy, which has to do with the immortal part of 
the soul (47b2,90d6). In addition, in several places we find the 
singular and the plural used indifferently in the same passage to 
describe the divine activity, such as in Tim. 44e-45a, 46e8-47c5, 
75b-d, 71a and 80e1 compared with 77a3. In other passages as well we 
find theos instead of theoi in the creation of mortal parts of the 
universe (cf. 71a7,71e3,74d6,78b2,92a3). And though it can 
certainly be argued that here theos can have a more collective and 
indeterminate meaning as alluding to "the deity" in general rather 
than to a specific god -thus becoming closer to some uses of 'to 
theion' in similar cases, cf. Tim. 76b2,90a8-, this would be another 
indication that, with regard to the figure of the Demiurge, Plato is 
no longer concerned with the dramatic initial anthropomorphic 
distinction between a singular god on the one hand and several lesser 
gods on the other. 
15 The fact that we find allusions to god both in the singular and in 
the plural would go against sheer "monotheistic" interpretations of 
the Timaeus, such as that of Ritter (1933: 380); Hackforth (1936: 
443). Cf. also the criticism of Taylor (1928: ad 29d7-30cl and 69c3) 
by Cornford (1937: xi) and the response by Taylor (1938: 182-4), with 
a further reply by Cornford (1938: 324) in which he basically comes 
to an agreement with Taylor that Plato's monotheism does not exclude 
polytheism but subordinates it in that he has a leading god that 
rules lesser gods. It is significant that not only in the Timaeus, 
but also in other dialogues, when a principal god is mentioned, we 
also find the allusion to other several gods (cf. Phil. 30d, Pol. 
271d, 272e, Laws VII 821a-b). In the Timaeus' cosmological structure 
this one-many character of god will in the end be reflected in the 
relation between the universe as one god and the several heavenly 
bodies as gods. Cf. infra, ch. 3, section 1. 
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causation may therefore be taken as a first hint of the 
philosophical meaning of the image of the Demiurge. 
Now, in order to investigate this subject more thoroughly 
we first have to take a decision about the philosophical 
meaning of temporal creation in the Timaeus. For we have 
to decide whether the Demiurge is or is not a creator of 
the world in the past, as the myth seems to describe him 
(cf. poietes, 28c3, epoiese 31b2). And this question 
implies another one: 
Does it make sense, if one wishes to maximize the 
coherence of the text, to believe that the universe had a 
beginning in time in the Timaeus, even in spite of the 
creationist style of the myth? Let us proceed to analyse 
this question. 
2. The problem of the temporal beginning of the world and 
the meaning of creation 
We must beware that when dealing with this topic we are 
faced with a difficult philosophical question. Kant16 
suggested that the problem about the beginning or non- 
beginning of the world is antinomical, since arguments 
could be given both in favour of the thesis and the 
antithesis, leaving the question unresolved for 
theoretical reason. This kind of suggestion could be 
applied to the history of the interpretation of the 
Timaeus, 17 which has divided its readers into two main 
lines, either literalist or non-literalist as far as the 
temporal creation of the universe is concerned. 18 On the 
one hand, we have the textual assertion that the universe 
gegonen, ap' arches Linos arxamenos, since the universe 
is a sensible thing, and all sensible things are 
16 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A 426= B 454; A 427=B 455. 
17 Even more generally, on arguments in antiquity for and against a 
beginning see Sorabji (1983: 193-282). 
18 cf. note 2 above. 
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generated (Tim. 28b-c). 19 On the other hand, one could 
express qualms about taking this assertion literally or 
as expressing creation as a single event in the past, so 
that the genesis of the world could have a different 
meaning. And, as I shall argue, other passages from the 
same dialogue could serve to qualify the gegone of 28b7 
or even go against its temporal interpretation as 
punctual generation in the past. 20 
Given the difficult character of the question and the 
ambiguities of the text, it would perhaps be beyond the 
scope of the interpreter to try to set out rigidly what 
Plato thought on the matter. It is, certainly, impossible 
to be dogmatic on this point, given also that, as a myth, 
the Timaeus is a symbolic kind of discourse whose 
richness lies in being open to more than one reading. 21 
All we can attempt to do here is to weigh different 
interpretations and see which, if any, entails fewest 
philosophical difficulties and makes the text of the 
Timaeus most philosophically cogent. 
In this respect, I think that a literal interpretation of 
the punctual beginning of the world in the Timaeus 
creates more difficulties than it solves, so that several 
arguments could be given for a non-literal view. Let us 
examine some of them. 
19 On whether this argument should be taken as having a force of its 
own and as coming before the beginning of the mythical account or not 
see, for a positive answer, Hackforth (1959: 17 ff. ), Vlastos (1964: 
402), T. M. Robinson (1979: 105 ff. ) and Prior (1985: 95) in a 
literalist line. Against, cf. Cornford (1937: 37 ff. ), Tarän (1971: 
382 ff. ). 
20 In addition, Phaedrus 245c ff. could be seen to contradict a 
literal reading of the creation of soul in the Timaeus (34b10 ff. ), 
for in the former dialogue soul is said to be ungenerated. 
21 Nor would it be surprising if Plato had wanted to be deliberately 
silent about a definite answer in order to stimulate discussion 
amongst his students (who probably also knew the argument of Phaedrus 
245c ff. ). That silence -which then needn't be "disturbing", pace 
Dillon (1989: 72)- might be suggested by the fact that even his 
direct disciples -such as Aristotle and Xenocrates, cf. supra n. 2- 
were in disagreement about the matter. 
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(i) If we take the Timaeus literally and suppose that the 
universe, as a sensible thing, has had a beginning, we 
should also admit that it will undergo corruption. For 
Plato asserts that sensible things are "generated and 
corrupted" (cf. gignomenon kai apol l umenon, 28a3). 
Similarly, the Republic had already stated that "whatever 
is generated undergoes corruption" (genomenoi panti 
phthora estin, VIII 546a2). However, this conclusion is 
contradicted by the assertion of the immortality of the 
world, its soul and the heavenly bodies in the Timaeus 
(cf. ageron for the world at 33a2; apaustou biou for the 
World-Soul at 36e4; aidia for the heavenly bodies at 
40b5) . 
22 So if the universe is immortal, it should have no 
beginning. 
The connection between genesis and perishability is 
restated at Tim. 41a7-b6, where the Demiurge says to the 
created gods that "whatever is bound is dissolvable" (to 
dethen pan luton), so, given that they were generated 
(cf. gegenesthe), they are not completely alutoi or 
immortal, though they shall not be dissolved because of 
the will of the Demiurge which is good. One could then 
apply this to the world and interpret literally that the 
universe is in fact generated and perishable, though it 
is made immortal by god's will. However, we must notice 
that at Tim. 28a it was claimed that sensible -generated- 
things are de facto corrupted, not just -de iure- 
corruptible, as Tim. 41a-b suggests. So, even if we take 
literally the suggestion that the universe is immortal 
just by the will of the Demiurge, being otherwise 
perishable, that would still mean, according to Tim. 28a3 
(cf. Rep. VIII 546a2), that it was not generated, for the 
claim in those passages is that everything that is 
generated is destroyed, not just destroyable. 
22 The same could be said for human reason, which is called athanaton 
at 42e7,43a4-5,69c6, etc. though at the same time created 
by god 
(41d ff. ). Cf. similar attributions of immortality to soul at 
Phaedrus 245c-246a and Laws XII 959b3-4,967d6-7. 
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(ii) As has often been stressed, 23 the supposition of a 
beginning of the world in time (from a previous chaotic 
state) seems to be contradicted by the Platonic notion of 
time in the Timaeus. In effect, according to Tim. 37d5-7 
(cf. 38a), time is the "image of eternity..., an image 
which moves by number" (i. e. the notion of number, and 
therefore that of order, is included in the very 
definition of "time"). In addition, it is coexistent with 
the kosmos as an ordered whole -as suggested by its 
coming into being "at the same time" as the universe, 
38b6-, so that without order there is no time. According 
to this, neither creation by the Demiurge nor the 
precosmic chaos in the Timaeus can have taken place in 
time, not even in the second kind of time that Vlastos 
suggests (as irreversible temporal succession of past and 
future which cannot be measured)24 since even past and 
future according to the text are created by the Demiurge 
(37e). 25 On the other hand, it is only the Ideas that 
exist outside of time (cf. 37c-38a, esp. 37e5-38a4), so 
the precosmic chaos could not have had an atemporal mode 
of being and therefore could not have existed at all. 
23 Cf., among others, Cherniss (1944: 426-7 n. 361-2), Tarän (1971: 
378-80), Brisson (1991: 49). Compare the argument in Proclus (In Tim. 
III 49,20-50,7 Diehl). 
24 Cf. Vlastos (1964: 410-1). For a "precosmic time" understood as 
duration cf. also Skemp (1942: 111), followed by Hackforth (1959: 
22). In antiquity, Proclus reports and criticizes a theory of a 
"twofold time" in support of a literal view of the precosmic chaos 
(In Tim. I 286,20 ff. Diehl). 
25 Vlastos in fact sees this textual evidence against his view, but 
answers only with arguments from silence, claiming that Plato at 
least does not deny the existence of a second kind of time, though 
neither is there any positive textual support for his view, as such a 
large claim would surely demand. These arguments are in turn based 
upon his claim that Plato sees past and future as "attributes" of 
time -as a rendering of chronou gegonota eide at 37e4- which could 
therefore, as "attributes", have existed independently of cosmic time 
(cf. Vlastos [1964: 410-2]). But "eidos" cannot mean "attribute", but 
rather means "kind" of time. And since we are told that time was 
generated together with the universe, it would follow that any 
generated kind of time was generated together with the universe. In 
addition, Plato explicitly links past and future to the measurability 
of time when he says at 38a that they are "kinds of time. . . which 
circles by number". 
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(iii) If we take the Timaeus picture literally, it would 
prima facie seem that in the Timaeus god undergoes a 
change from not creating to creating, or from inactivity 
to activity, and then, again, that he stops acting when 
he delegates to the lesser gods the creation of the 
mortal parts of the universe (Tim. 41c-d). This 
anthropomorphic characterization of god seems however to 
conflict with god's goodness (Tim. 29e), if we interpret 
it as explicated in other dialogues both before and after 
the Timaeus, e. g. in the Republic (II 380d-381d) , 26 where 
we read that, being perfect, god cannot change except for 
the worse, and Laws X (900c ff. ), where it is suggested 
that god cannot be inactive or lazy since his concern for 
the world is definitory of his goodness. 
Now, if there are reasons against taking creation or the 
beginning of the world in time literally, why did Plato 
choose this kind of picture? I think so much attention 
has been focused on creation or its denial that one tends 
to forget the most important purpose served by the 
creation myth, namely, to show that the universe is the 
product of intelligent design. It has been observed that 
cosmogonists prior to Plato often depicted the world as 
created by aimless forces; so Plato wants to meet them on 
their own ground and show, conversely, that the universe 
is the result of a teleological plan. 27 This is the same 
strategy he follows in the Laws, where he claims the 
superiority of birth of soul over body, but where no 
precosmic chaos is mentioned at all; rather, disorderly 
motion is there proved to be a hypothesis, how the world 
would be if it were not governed by intelligence as it is 
(cf. Laws X 898b-c) . 
28 One could think of the precosmic 
chaos in the Timaeus in the same way: although it could 
26 As pointed out by Tarän (1971: 380-1). 
27 Cf. Cornford (1937: 31), with particular reference to the 
Atomists. 
28 Cf. infra, ch. 7, section 3.2. 
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not have existed in time, it could still have the purpose 
in the myth of depicting how the world would be if the 
principles posited by the materialists prevailed, i. e., 
if god were absent from the universe and its tendency to 
disorder were left unchecked. 29 Rather than separate 
factors which rule in succession, ananke and Nous seem to 
be two factors which coexist in the cosmos as a sustasis 
of them (cf. Tim. 48a), but a sustasis in which Nous 
rules over necessity (cf. ibidem). 
Does this mean then that it is not right to say that the 
world gegone, as the text claims at Tim. 28b7? I would be 
inclined to say that it is right, though partial: If Nous 
is always coexisting with necessity, and if god is always 
governing the kosmos and being the cause of the 
generation of its order, then we should take generation 
by an intelligent cause as a perpetual process, and say 
that the universe not only gegone, but gignetai and 
genesetai unendingly. 30 This is exactly what is suggested 
by Tim. 38c1-3: "Whereas the paradeigma exists in all 
eternity, the former [=the ouranos at 38b6] continuously 
for all time (dia telous ton hapanta chronon) has been 
generated (gegonös), exists (on) and will exist 
(esomenos)". In addition, there are some other passages 
where creation is not just depicted in the past (as we 
can find for example at the beginning of the myth), but 
also in the present, something that would support the 
view of creation as a perpetual process. Thus e. g. we 
find the use of the words poiei (37d6) and mechanatai 
(37e3) -in a passage where, interestingly, Plato talks 
specifically about tense (37e4 ff. ), so that one would 
expect him to be particularly careful about the tenses he 
is using. 
29 In Tim. 53a8-b4, where it is said that the condition alogös kai 
ametrös belongs to things hotan apei Linos theos, I take the hotan as 
conditional. Cf. LSJ ad loc. 
30 This was Proclus' interpretation (In Tim. I 282,27-30; 288,14- 
17; 290,23-291,1; III 51,7-10 Diehl). 
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If, then, generation is a perpetual process, gegone at 
28b6 could be taken as pointing also to the more general 
concept of genesis as process of change, as Cornford31 has 
interpreted and as we could take those passages where the 
world itself is connected with the realm of becoming 
(genesis kai to pan tode, 29d7-el; genesis kai kosmos, 
29e4) and where we are told that, "as ousia is to 
genesis, so is aletheia to pistis" (29c3). 32 
And it is still important that at Tim. 28b Plato says 
that the universe gegonen ap'arches. For this talk about 
"generation" is also meant to point at the dependence of 
the world on a higher principle, insofar as it has a 
31 Cf. Cornford (1937: 26); also Cherniss (1944: 422), Tarän (1971: 
384). 
32 As Cornford (1937: 24-6) has remarked, genesis or becoming can 
have both the meaning of "coming into existence at some time", or 
"being in process of change"; in the latter sense, "it is true that 
in such becoming something new is always appearing, something old 
passing away, but the process itself can be conceived as going on 
perpetually, without beginning or end" (25). We can, in turn, take 
becoming as process of change at least in the sense of constant 
generation (as I am arguing in the case of the universe) or constant 
change in some or other respect. 
M. Frede (1988) has recently challenged the latter interpretation, by 
contending that, if there is some respect in which something is 
becoming, there is another one in which it isn't becoming, i. e. is, 
but objects of experience do not have any kind of being whatsoever, 
since this would go against "the clear and straightforward contrast 
between being and becoming" established by Plato at Tim. 27d6-28a1 
(40). His argument, though, is unconvincing, since Plato immediately 
qualifies the contrast at 28a3-4 by saying that to gignomenon... 
ontös oudepote on (never really is); something that Frede concedes on 
p. 39 ("Plato may be ready to admit that ordinary objects of 
experience... can have 'being' in an ordinary sense of the verb 'to 
be', but he here would be denying that they could be said to be in 
some philosophical sense of 'to be', whatever this may be") though 
then he overlooks his own provision in the process of his argument. 
Plato is not denying being or existence to sensible particulars, 
since he does indeed attribute ousia or einai to them in the Timaeus: 
specifically, he speaks of ousia gignomene at 35a1-3 and ousia 
skedaste at 37a5; cf. 52d3 for attribution of einai to genesis; what 
they certainly don't have is real being in the sense of the stable 
and constantly unchanging being of the Ideas, and it is in these 
terms that the philosophical contrast between genesis and ousia is 
drawn. For further discussion on being and becoming cf. Code (1988), 
Bolton (1975), Nehamas (1975), Irwin (1977), Jordan (1983: 48-66), 
Prior (1985: 89-93); on the philosophical meaning of "being" cf. 
Vlastos (1965), Kahn (1981). See also infra, ch. 4, n. 19. 
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derivative existence and is not the ultimate reality. 33 
This is what Brisson has called "ontological generation"34 
-as an alternative to the interpretation of genesis as 
mere generation in the past- and seems to be suggested 
not only by the image of creation but also by the fact 
that the universe is said to have no immortality in its 
own right but is dependent on a superior cause. 
If this is so, what about the "Creator God" (poietes, 
28c3)? It seems that the Demiurge should not be 
interpreted as a god who anthropomorphically created the 
world "once upon a time", but can at the very most be 
called "creator" insofar as he is the efficient cause 
which is perpetually generating and in that way keeping 
order in the universe. Let us recall, however, that the 
artisanal metaphor, suggesting a definite product and 
different steps of the work starting and developing in 
time, has proven most useful for Plato to suggest the 
teleological arrangement of the world, like any good 
product of art, 35 which is made not at random but with a 
definite purpose (cf. Gorg. 503e-504a) seeking to 
fulfil an end through a chain of means. It is to this 
teleological -and not merely mechanical- arrangement of 
the world that we should now turn our attention, by 
investigating further the philosophical meaning of the 
Demiurge. 
33 Cf. also infra, ch. 3, section 2.1. 
34 Cf. Brisson (1974: 336-8). The same suggestion is found in 
Hackforth (1936: 442); Cherniss (1944: 424). 
35 It is also interesting to notice that Aristotle, while taking 
creation literally and thus criticizing Plato in favour of the view 
that the universe is eternal (De Caelo I 10,279b12-280a11,280a28 
ff. ), more than once, however, resorted to the artisanal metaphor - 
which he seemed to have criticized at Metaph. I9 991a19-23, cf. 
supra, n. 3- to emphasize the teleological arrangement in the cosmos. 





3. The Demiurge as a symbol of intelligent causation 
working in a perpetual universe 
In view of what has been said, the Demiurge in the 
Timaeus seems to have not only the function of generating 
order (cf. 29e4) as a cause (aition, 28c2) but also, if 
this generation is perpetual, that of keeping the cosmos 
in good order. This in turn corresponds to the function 
of governing that the myth allots to him (cf. 48a2, 
42e3); a governance which, despite its usual description 
in the past, must also be understood as present if the 
world is to continue being orderly, since we read that 
everything behaves without plan and measure (alogös kai 
ametros) whenever god is absent from something (hotan 
apei Linos theos, 53a8-b4), in a context where god must 
allude to the Demiurge. 36 So, if the world is good and 
fair (as Plato takes for granted at 29a5,92c), i. e. 
orderly (cf. 87c4-5), it is implied that god must be 
present in it to sustain it, and not just "retire" from 
it once he has finished his work. 
Now, we should notice that, in many other dialogues, 
these functions of ordering and governance are said to 
belong either to Nous or to god. 37 Thus we could infer 
that the Demiurge is or symbolizes a nous, which has, 
apart from an intellectual role of contemplating the 
Ideas, an active or efficient role with respect to the 
sensible world. This assumption is supported by some 
references in the Timaeus itself: we have, on the one 
hand, numerous allusions to intellectual activities of 
the Demiurge (cf. 39e, and also 30b1,32c8,33a6,33b7, 
33d1,34a8,38c3, etc. ); on the other hand, the works of 
the Demiurge are called "ta dia nou dedemiourgemena" 
36 Since it is subsequently said that [he] dieschematisato the 
precosmic traces with forms and numbers (b4-5). 
37 Nous diakosmön panta: Phaedo 97c1-2; Phil. 28e3, Laws XII 967b5-6 
(cf. Crat. 400a8-10); for god as kosmön or diakosmön cf. Phaedrus 
246e4-5, Pol. 273d4, e3, Laws X 899b7-8. For Nous as basileus or 
archon cf. Phil. 28c7,30d8; for god in the same role, cf. Pol. 
271d5, Laws X 903b7,904a6,905e2, etc. 
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(47e4), and the Demiurge is pictured as a nous that rules 
over necessity by persuasion (48a2). So god presents the 
essential feature of rationality, and -inextricably- 
goodness (cf. 29a, e), since his producing good effects 
is based on his knowledge of the Ideas. 
We can then ask ourselves: How does this causation of 
nous operate upon the world? Not omnipotently, it seems, 
for the Demiurge is limited not only by the Ideal pattern 
(the "Perfect Living Being", 31b1, cf. 30c, 39e1) that 
guides his work but also by "necessity" (ananke, 47e5- 
48a5), also called "necessary cause" (68e-69a). This 
seems to be a property inherent in the materials which 
fill in space upon which god works, 38 and represents a 
potential source of disorder within the universe, so that 
the constant task of nous consists in checking, kata 
dunamin, this tendency to disorder and making it 
subservient to its own purposes. So we find that ananke 
is an ambiguous concept in the Timaeus (in the light of 
46c-e, 47e-48a, 68e-69a): 
(i) if or when ananke is undirected by nous, or left to 
itself, it becomes closely connected with chance (tuche) 
as cause of disorder. 39 Under these circumstances, ananke 
38 At 48a-b necessity or the wandering cause is connected with the 
nature of the -so called- four elements and the pathe that they 
possessed before the generation of the universe. This in turn would 
correspond with to sömatoeides in Pol. 273b4-6, which is said to be 
suntrophon to the nature of the universe (cf. emphuton at 269d3) and 
to belong to the ancient nature that prevailed before the present 
cosmic order. For its connection with to apeiron in the Philebus see 
infra, ch. 4, sections 5.4 and 5.5 (note also apeiron in Pol. 273d6 
in connection with the anomoiotes inherent to the bodily). 
39 Cf. the relation between ex anankes and to tuchon corresponding 
to a type of cause at Tim. 46e; tuche ex anankes at Laws X 889c1-2 
also in a causal context. (Cf. Cornford [1937: 165 ff. ]; Guthrie 
[1978: 273]. ) In this latter case, chance as a cause (cf. 888e) is 
contrasted with techne, nous, theos and psuche as akin concepts, 
in 
the debate Plato holds with his materialistic opponents as to the 
primary principle of everything (889c, 892b-c). We find a similar 
opposition in the Sophist (265c, e), where chance seems now to 
be put 
in terms of an "aitia automate" and without purpose (aneu dianoias) 
in contrast with a divine poietike techne or a demiurgic cause 
52 
(cf. 46e2) corresponds to those "causes which, if/when 
deprived of intelligence, always produce random and 
disorderly effects" (taitiai] hosai monotheisai 
phroneseös to tuchon atakton hekastote exergazontai, 
46e5-6). In this respect ananke is a "wandering cause" 
(planomene aitia, 48a, cf. its relation with ananke in 
the same passage, and particularly di'anankes at 47e4-5), 
and is responsible for the -disorderly- motion that is 
depicted to have taken place in the precosmos (cf. 48a-b, 
where the wandering cause is said to "produce motion by 
nature", 48a7, and the further reference to the 
properties of the bodily before the generation of the 
cosmos, 48b3-5). 
(ii) Under the guidance (or "persuasion" -to put it 
mythically) of Nous, ananke becomes an orderly mechanism 
of bodily causes and effects that serves or cooperates as 
a means for the good purposes of nous (cf. 46c7-e2,47e5- 
48a5,68e1-69a5). In this respect ananke becomes a "co- 
cause" (sunaition, 46c7, cf. its connection with ex 
anankes at 46e1-2) or "subservient cause" (aitia 
huperetousa -cf. ex anankes- at 68e) for the latter, 
something necessary in the sense of the means without 
which an end cannot be fulfilled. 40 However Plato 
operating with logos and episteme (cf. supra, Introd., section 2); 
and in the Philebus (28d), where the force of the irrational and 
random and mere chance (ten tou alogou kai eikei dunamin kai to hopei 
etuchen) competes with phronesis or nous for the governance of the 
universe. (Cf. also the opposition of causes in Tim. 46e which we 
shall analyse below. ) 
40 Cf. Cornford (1937: 174); Moreau (1939: 39 ff), and its connection 
with the concept of "hypothetical necessity" in Aristotle, Metaph. V 
5 (cf. also the connection between anankaiai aitiai and aneu tout(5n 
at Tim. 69a). At Pol. 281d-e Plato distinguishes two kinds of 
technai, sunaition and aitia and describes the former as 
providing the instruments without which (hon me paragenomenön) the 
demiurgic techne cannot do its work. Cf. also the distinction, 
already in Phaedo 99b3-4, between to aition töi onti and ekeino aneu 
hou to aition ouk an pot'eie aition, though here Plato refuses to 
call the latter causes in any sense and their importance is 
downgraded, by contrast with his attempt in the Timaeus to give 
detailed mechanical descriptions; cf. Easterling (1967: 34-5), 
Guthrie (1978: 273). (For a teleological reading of aitia in the 
final myth of the Phaedo cf. Sedley [1991: 370-2]. ) 
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carefully stresses that necessary or secondary causes 
should be sought for the sake of primary (46d8) or 
"divine" causes (68e7-69a5) towards the fulfilment of the 
good (cf. to ariston 46c8 and to eu 68e5). 41 
We can see that, in this description, both necessary and 
primary causes appear to be thought of as efficient, 
insofar as both of them produce certain effects (cf. 
apergazomena at 46d3, exergazontai at 46e6 and kinounton 
at 46e2 predicated of necessary causes, and demiourgoi of 
primary causes at 46e4). In the second case, that kind of 
efficient cause has also a teleological constituent; 42 in 
the first, it may or may not have it according to its 
subordination or not to primary causes, since it is by 
itself blind to any goal. Both necessary and primary 
causes seem to be necessary conditions for the fulfilment 
of teleology, and one could wonder what it is that makes 
the former "primary". It doesn't seem satisfactory to 
adopt Fine's criterion of "saliency" that she uses as 
regards the Phaedo to mark off the cause from its 
necessary material conditions, 43 since the question might 
then arise what is it that makes it salient, by what 
criterion do we call it salient. It seems rather that 
primacy lies in initiating a causal chain, a primacy that 
is given in addition an axiological import by being 
purposively oriented towards a positive goal. 44 
41 This "good" does not need to be the Idea in the transcendent way 
Ideas are described in the Timaeus, but can just be a character 
immanent to the world which the Demiurge tries to "complete" or 
"fulfil" (apotelön, 46d1). The main Idea that Plato mentions as 
guiding the Demiurge's activity is that of ho esti zöion (39e8), 
which is already teleon (cf. 30d2,39e1) and whose completeness he 
tries to imitate in the world he produces. The use of the word idea 
at 46c8 can thus be associated with an immanent -and not 
transcendent- character of goodness, in the same way as in Tim. 28a6- 
8 ho demiourgos is said to "realize" (cf. apergazetai) the form 
(idea) of something by looking at a paradigm, something that 
unequivocally suggests that idea does not have to be applied to the 
transcendent Idea. Pace T. M. Robinson (1993: 104-5). 
42 To adopt terminology of Fine's (1987: 93). 
43 Cf. Fine (1987: 91). 
44 This is suggested by Tim. 46c7-e6, firstly, by Plato's complaint 
against those who mistake sunaitia with real aitia that those things 
do not have in themselves logos or nous (d4), and, secondly, in his 
54 
Now, even if we interpret that Nous is always in control 
of the universe, we could still wonder whether necessity 
as described above in (i) -i. e. left to itself as a cause 
of disorder- is just an abstraction or has a real 
presence within the ordered cosmos under the rule of 
Nous. 45 Evidence from the text inclines us towards the 
latter possibility. For Plato repeatedly uses restrictive 
expressions when alluding to the operation of 
Intelligence upon necessity. So, for example, we are told 
at 48a that Nous rules over ananke "by persuading her to 
lead towards the best the majority [ta pleista, and not 
to panta] of things that take place"; 46 at 46c7-dl god 
makes use of co-causes "when fulfilling, so far as 
possible (kata to dunaton) the form of the best". These 
qualifications would suggest that there is always a 
characterization of secondary causes as those which are moved by 
other things (e1), implying that primary causes are not moved by 
other things. The latter point, and the association of primary causes 
with soul at d6, would lead us to postulate the theory of soul as 
self-mover and principle of motion -expounded in Phaedrus 245c ff. 
and Laws X 896a-b- as present also in the Timaeus. I shall argue 
below that it is in fact soul -and particularly the World-Soul at the 
macrocosmic level- that should in fact be taken as principle of 
motion in the Timaeus. 
45 That the triumph of Nous over ananke is complete was the thesis 
put forward by Taylor (1928: 293 ad 46e5-6), and afterwards 
criticized by Cornford (1937: 209), who was in turn followed, among 
others, by Cherniss and Ross (cf. note 47 below); though recently 
Lennox (1985: 209-12) has returned to the old position. 
46 It is striking that Lennox (1985: 210), when arguing for the 
opposite view that there is no residue of recalcitrant necessity left 
in a world demiurgically framed, quotes precisely this passage, which 
would rather count as counterevidence for his view. In addition, 
Lennox supposes that there is no compromise in the Timaeus between 
the Demiurge and his materials, though this view seems challenged by 
Tim. 75a-c, where the deity has to choose between two properties 
which would be best together but which cannot 
be combined: it is 
inborn in the bones' necessary nature (cf. ex anankes... phusis, 
75a7-b1) that they cannot have a great deal of flesh and sharp 
perception at the same time; if they could, our 
head would be 
surrounded with flesh and we would live longer and more 
healthily; 
but, as things are, the gods have to reflect on the alternatives 
(cf. 
analogizomenoi poteron b8) and choose (haireteon c3) a 
better race 
with shorter life, i. e. having a head with sharp perception 
and 
intelligence but much weaker. This does clearly suggest a compromise, 
since we are told that the head would 
have had both characteristics 
"if these had admitted to coexist" (75b4). 
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random residue of necessity left in the cosmos upon which 
Nous could not settle with absolute control, 47 so that the 
"instrument" could ocassionally become an "obstacle". 
This however does not prevent Plato from saying that the 
world is "the most beautiful of things generated" 
(29a5) . 48 
What has been said can thus serve to illustrate the 
relation between Nous and ananke, or teleology and 
mechanism in the Timaeus cosmology. Ananke, or secondary 
causes, are also described as those aitiai which "occur 
by other things being moved and in turn moving other 
things by necessity" (46e1-2); this is referred to bodies 
(46d7) and corresponds to what we could call a mechanical 
series. However, as we have seen, this mechanism does not 
seem to become truly orderly except by the intervention 
of nous, which for the most part deprives those bodily 
traces of their tendency to disorder (cf. 47e ff,, 53a-b, 
69b-c). And so the workings of god correspond to those 
47 Cf. Cornford (1937: 209); Cherniss (1944: 421-2,444); Ross 
(1951: 128). That residue of ananke would be particularly present not 
so much in heaven, where nous seems to prevail to such an extent that 
the heavenly bodies are called gods, but in the earthly and mortal 
domain. We read already in the Theaetetus (176a5-8) that it is 
necessary that "evils wander about the mortal nature and this realm", 
not among the gods. And it is precisely as regards our mortal domain 
that the Timaeus myth gives the specific examples of the resistance 
that ananke opposes to Nous. We can see this in certain properties of 
the materials on which the deity works, which are not so docile for 
his purposes, such as the hard constitution of the bones, which 
presents the advantage of serving for the protection of the brain and 
marrow, but has the concomitant disadvantage of making the bones 
brittle (cf. Tim. 73b-74b); or in the fact that the deity has to 
compromise in the construction of the human head, abundance of flesh 
not being compatible with acute perception (cf. 75a7-b1 referred to 
in note above). Cf. Cornford (1937: 175-6); also Festugiere (1949: 
111-3) on the random motions of the infant at 43a-b as manifesting 
ananke without the rule of nous. Note that the universe is described 
as a mixture arising from the combination of ananke and nous 
(memeigmene... ex anankes to kai nou sustaseös, 47e5-48a2), a 
description that would go against the view that the distinction 
between necessary and primary causes concerns merely our explanation 
and understanding of the world and is "not an account of distinct 
aspects of the world's make-up", as contended by Lennox (1985: 212). 
48 These random effects could still be explained within a theory of 
soul as principle of all motion, as has been attempted by Cherniss 
(1944: 444-5) and Brisson (1974: 503-4); cf. infra, ch. 7, section 5. 
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primary or divine causes which "by using nous, are 
artisans of fair and good effects" (46e4), i. e. orderly 
effects, since pan to agathon kalon, to de kalon ouk 
ametron, 87c4-5. But, at the same time, the teleological 
action of Nous leans on this mechanical succession as a 
means without which the former could not be fulfilled. So 
we can see how teleology subordinates mechanism but at 
the same time relies on it for its achievement. Thus the 
relation between the two is not one of exclusion but of 
complementarity. 49 
We could in general terms attempt to illuminate such a 
relation between teleology and mechanism in the following 
way on the basis of the model of human craftsmanship: (i) 
conceiving the end (say, in this case, achieving the best 
possible similarity between the world and its model), 
which goes from the notion of the end to be realized (ii) 
back to the conditions which serve as its means; (iii) 
fulfilment of the end through the realization of its 
means, which is effected in a direction opposite to 
(ii). 50 Through (i) and (ii) we can see how teleology is 
prior to (and in that sense subordinates) mechanism; 
through (iii), how the former leans on the latter for its 
actual fulfilment. 
49 In this regard, the Timaeus' attitude towards its "materialistic" 
predecessors would be one not of exclusion but of subordination 
within its own teleological outlook. For Plato's debt to Presocratic 
accounts in the Timaeus, such as those of Empedocles and the 
Atomists, and his in turn original contribution to the mechanical 
description of phenomena, cf. Lloyd (1968: 84-90). 
50 Cf. Moreau (1939: 39 ff. ); and a similar picture of the relation 
between teleology and mechanism in Hartmann (1932: 274-7). It would 
be in stage (iii) that we have the effective causal chain 
directed 
towards its goal, and since what triggers it is the intending of the 
goal by the agent, we can see how this description of 
teleology 
avoids the problem of "reverse causation" (from the 
future goal to 
the events triggered by it) that has in modern 
literature been 
identified as one of the main charges or difficulties that 
teleological accounts have to address when no intentional agent 
is 
posited (cf. e. g. Nissen [1986: 129-32], L. Wright 
[1976: 7-11]). 
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In this way, the same phenomenon such as vision can admit 
of both a mechanical and a teleological explanation: at 
Tim. 45b-d its mechanism is explained in terms of the 
theory of "collision" between fires, though this 
mechanical order is introduced by the gods (45b4-6) and 
has no other purpose or greater function (ergon, 46e8) 
than to enable human beings to contemplate the 
undisturbed motions in heaven so as to correct the 
wandering motions of human intellect (47b-c) and, by 
learning number, acquire philosophical wisdom (47a4-b2). 
Now, in the light of what has been said, we find that the 
relation between nous and ananke is, according to the 
causal scheme of Tim. 46c-e and 68e-69a, identical with 
that between primary or divine causes and secondary or 
necessary causes. In fact,, we have seen above that ananke 
corresponds to necessary causes, and we can equally 
expect that nous correspond to the primary or divine kind 
of causation. This is precisely what seems to be 
suggested by Plato's definition of primary causes, since 
these are said to belong to an "intelligent nature" 
(emphron phusis) at 46d851 and called hosai meta nou kalon 
kai agathon demiourgoi at 46e4. There are two key words 
here: nous and demiourgoi, which strongly suggest that, 
at a more abstract or conceptual level, the Demiurge is a 
symbol of this function of primary efficient causation, 
which is responsible for the fulfilment of teleology in 
the universe. 52 
51 This would rule out that the primary causes could correspond to 
the Ideas (see infra, section 2.1). In addition, phusis is in its 
true sense said to correspond to soul, in connection with intellect 
and techne, at Laws X 892b-c. Cf. infra, ch. 7 section 1. 
52 In this definition of primary cause we can note again two 
essential features of god: his rationality and therefore his 
goodness, which is known by its effects: the order in the cosmos, 
which is recurrently due, as we have seen, to a Nous diakosmön. For 
these features of rationality and goodness as characterizing god in 
general cf. for god's goodness, Tim. 29e1-2,30a6-7,42e2-4, Rep. II 
379a7 ff., Phaedrus 247a7, Theaet. 176a5-cl, Laws X 899b5-7,900d2, 
901e ff; for god's rationality, Tim. 51e5-6, Symp. 204a1-2, Phaedrus 
247c-d, Theaet. 176b1-3, Laws X 900d5-7,902e8. 
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This hypothesis is in turn supported by the fact that, in 
the two passages dealing with the distinction between 
primary and secondary causes, it is at first god or the 
Demiurge who is introduced as "taking over" 
(parelambanen, 68e3) or "making use of" (chretai, 46c8) 
necessary causes as "co-causes" towards the fulfilment of 
the the good (46c8-dl, 68e5-6), and immediately 
afterwards the text passes on to speak of primary or 
divine causes as opposed to the necessary or secondary 
ones (46d1-e6,68e6-69a5). We can see here how, even 
though these passages start with a mythological allusion 
to the Demiurge, his functions are subsequently put, in a 
more abstract way, in terms of primary causation, 
something that would again confirm that the former is a 
symbol of the latter. On the other hand, that the 
Demiurge corresponds to these divine or "primary causes"53 
is supported by the very beginning of the myth, where he 
is called "the best of causes" (29a5-6). 
So, in the light of all this, we can conclude that the 
Demiurge is the mythical counterpart of the notion of 
intelligent primary causes, which are defined precisely 
as demiourgoi of good effects, 54 and which guarantee the 
fulfilment of teleology in the universe by subordinating 
and at the same time depending on mechanism. And this is, 
in my view, the deepest philosophical meaning underlying 
the figure of the Demiurge. 
II. THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE DEMI URGE 
53 As we can see from the plural, it is the demiurgic intelligent 
action in general (both that of the Demiurge Father and of the lesser 
gods, including the heavenly bodies) that corresponds to this 
kind of 
causation. 
54 The idea that the Demiurge symbolizes the primary causes at 46e4 
is briefly suggested by Cherniss (1944: 607), (1950: 207), (1954: 
25); cf. Taran (1971: 381) after Cherniss. 
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So far we have seen that the Demiurge is a symbol of a 
kind of -efficient- causation. However, we still have to 
decide which entity or entities embody that abstract 
concept of causation within the Platonic structure of 
reality. In other words, we have to investigate the 
ontological status of the Demiurge. We have seen that the 
Demiurge is or performs the functions of a nous. But what 
kind of nous is it? Does the Demiurge represent a 
separate nous in the Timaeus ontology (distinct from the 
Ideas, the World-Soul, etc. ), which deserves the 
independent status it is given in the myth? Or is it 
rather the mythical double of some other entity which 
would fulfil his causal function, such as the Ideas or 
the World-Soul, even though they appear as different from 
the Demiurge in the story? I shall try to argue, within 
the second line, that it is the World-Soul that fulfils 
the causal function performed by the Demiurge. For that 
purpose I shall start by ruling out the other 
possibilities. 
1. Can the Demiurge be a symbol of the Ideas? 
If the Demiurge is a nous the answer should be no, 
despite the fact that several scholars have been tempted 
to take him in this way. 55 That Ideas and nous are 
different entities seems constantly presupposed in the 
Timaeus as a distinction between the object and the 
faculty which knows it (27d5-28a4,37a-c, 52a1-4). On the 
other hand, the dependence of nous on the Ideas is clear 
at 37b-c, where nous is described as arising in soul when 
the latter is in contact with the Ideas (cf. also Rep. VI 
508d). Ideas are the objects of intelligence which exist 
independently (cf. auto eph' heautou, 51b8, auta kath' 
hauta, 51c1; cf. 51d4-5), 56 whereas, conversely, 
55 For the Demiurge as a symbol of the Ideas and/or the Good cf. 
Mugnier (1930: 131 ff. ); Robin (1938: 180); Moreau (1939: 35-6,43- 
5); Verdenius, (1954: 248); Hampton (1990: 90,116 n. 66); and, with 
slight variations, Dies (1927: 550-1,553-5). 
56 Remember also Parm. 132b-c against the suggestion that the Ideas 
could be thoughts in the soul (cf. Burnyeat [1982: 20-2]), a passage 
60 
intelligence as such depends on the existence of its 
object. Ideas are said to be intelligible (noeta, cf. 
e. g. 30c7,48e6,51c5; nooumena 51d5) rather than 
intelligent. In addition, Ideas are essentially immutable 
(akinetos, Tim. 38a3, cf. 52a1-3), whereas nous is said 
to be in motion (Tim. 34a). 57 This motion, we could add, 
gives the demiurgic intellect an efficient power of 
actual influence on the sensible and moving world which 
Ideas, in their immutability, lack, limiting themselves 
to being goals or paradigms (29a-c, 39e7,48e5). We must 
recall, in this respect, that the feature of efficient 
cause or arche kineseos which Aristotle rightly did not 
find in Plato's Ideas (cf. Metaph. I 9,991a11 ff., 
991b3-5), is in Plato's dialogues generally fulfilled not 
by the latter58 but by soul (explicitly called arche 
kineseos in Phaedrus 245c9 and aitia kineseos in Laws X 
896b1, cf. arche kineseos at 895b3), or specifically by 
nous (in its role of diakosmein and poiein), 59 as happens 
at a cosmic level with the nous of the Demiurge, who is 
called -as we have seen- the principle of becoming and 
order (arche... geneseos kai kosmou, 29e4). And it is 
because of this efficient and mediating power that the 
Demiurgic nous can connect the heterogeneous realms of 
Ideas and sensibles, the ontological gap between which 
seems particularly emphasized in the Timaeus. 60 
that would additionally challenge any view of Ideas as concepts in 
God's mind (pace Ashbaugh [1988: 60]). 
57 Likewise, when in several passages of the Timaeus we read that the 
world has been made in the image of the "perfect" or "intelligible 
living being" (cf. z(5ion 30c, to panteles zöion 31b1, noeton zöion 
39e1, etc. ) we should interpret that Plato is not so much alluding to 
the Ideas as living (pace de Vogel [1970: 229]) as to the Idea of 
Living Being. Cf. Cornford (1937: 40-1); Cherniss (1944: 576-7); 
Brisson (1974: 81-2); Patterson (1981: 112). 
58 The passage at Tim. 50c7-d4, where the Receptacle is compared to a 
mother, the sensible world to a son and Ideas to a father -something 
that looks striking given that the Demiurge was called a father at 
28c3-, seems rather to be settling the latter comparison in terms of 
the resemblance between the product and its original, with which, 
again, Plato would be stressing the character of the Ideas as 
paradigms rather than efficient causes. (Cf. Brisson [1974: 129]. ) 
59 Cf. e. g. Phil. 26e-27b, 28e, 30c5-7. 
60 Arguably more so than in any other dialogue: on this see the 
analysis by Ross (1951: 228-32); from a different perspective, the 
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In this respect Vlastos is not quite right when asserting 
that "the teleological function... in the Timaeus 
pertains exclusively to mind or soul", 61 since perhaps we 
shouldn't be led to exclude the Ideas from teleological 
explanations. Borrowing Aristotelian concepts, one could 
say that in fact two kinds of causality would be implicit 
in the Platonic concept of "primary cause": the efficient 
one (exerted by nous) and the final one (corresponding to 
the Ideas to which nous looks). 62 Or, in the words of 
Fine, nous ordering things for the best is "an efficient 
cause with a teleological constituent", so that Ideas 
could be final causes in the Timaeus insofar as they are 
goals or models of intelligent activity, in a way that 
makes them, if not efficient causes, at least relevant in 
the explanation of this kind of efficient causation. 63 If 
this is so, and despite views to the contrary, 64 the 
causation exerted by nous would not displace any causal 
role fulfilled by the Ideas65 -even though they are not 
explicitly called "causes" in the Timaeus- but would 
rather presuppose it -inasmuch as they are the model to 
which intelligence must look so as to order the sensible 
by its desire to make the latter resemble the former. At 
the same time, intelligence would give true efficacy to 
any causal role Ideas could perform, insofar as the 
same point is maintained by Teloh (1981: 210,217-8). Let us recall 
that the Timaeus speaks of the relation between Ideas and sensibles 
in terms of "paradigms", "copies" and "imitation" (cf. e. g. 28c-29a, 
29c, 37c-d, 48e-49a), something that tends to stress, in principle, 
the ontological distance rather than the "communication" or 
"participation" between both domains. 
61 Vlastos (1969a: 88). 
62 Cf. Lopez (1963: 146) and Ross (1951: 239) as to the need of both 
kinds of causation for a cosmological explanation. 
63 Cf. Fine (1987: 90-1,110-1). 
64 Cf. e. g. De Lacy (1939: 111-2). 
65 For the debate about Forms as causes in the Phaedo (e. g. 99b, 100b 
ff. ) and, particularly, about whether Forms are final causes there or 
relevant at all for the positing of teleological causes cf., 
in 
favour, Fine (1987: 111-2), Byrne (1989: 8); contra, Vlastos (1969a: 
87-8). For Forms taken as formal causes in the Phaedo cf. Fine (1987: 
97-101), Hitchcock (1985: 71). For the Good interpreted as formal 
cause in the Republic see Hitchcock (ibidem); as final cause, see 
Dye (1978: 54-6). 
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causality of nous makes it possible to fulfil an end 
through a chain of mechanical means thus attenuating the 
chorismos that would otherwise exist between Ideas and 
sensibles. 66 And it is this efficient role of 
intelligence, rather than any efficient role of the 
Ideas, that is emphasized in the concept of primary cause 
in the Timaeus. 
Given, then, that the Demiurge is or symbolizes a nous 
which can on no account be identified with the Ideas but 
is dependent on them in the Timaeus ontology, let us now 
analyse more precisely the ontological status of this 
nous, particularly in relation to the world and its soul. 
2. What kind of nous is the Demiurge? 
In this respect, there have been two main lines of 
interpretation: 
1) that which takes the Demiurge to be separate from the 
world and its soul, i. e. over and above it; 
2) that which interprets the Demiurge to be in the world, 
in the sense of being totally or partially identical with 
the World-Soul. 67 
The first interpretation can in turn take two forms: 
66 In this respect I can agree with Lennox when he states that 
"participation... understood as a relation between copy and paradigm 
in virtue of which the copy may bear the name of the paradigm, is not 
something which occurs independently of an intelligent agent aiming 
to achieve some good" ([1985: 213]; cf. also Fine [1987: 111] for the 
need of an agent for paradigms to be teleological ai tiai) . That the 
image of the Demiurge can provide a way to account for how 
participation between two heterogeneous ontological domains such as 
the Ideas and sensibles is at all possible -a question so critically 
posed in the Parmenides, 133c-134e- was already suggested by several 
scholars such as Taylor (1928: 646); Cherniss (1932: 237); Solmsen 
(1942: 103) -see also Prior (1985: 96); and I shall take up this 
question again infra, section 2.2.2. 
67 For total identification see Theiler (1925: 69-73, esp. 72), Bury 
(1929: 10), Festugiere (1947: 20-1), (1949: 104-5), Claghorn (1954: 
119), Grube (1980: 170). For partial identification see Cornford 
(1937: 205,208), Morrow (1950: 437) and Ostenfeld (1982: 246). 
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l. a. the Demiurge is an independent nous which is 
completely separate from every kind of Soul . 68 
l. b. the Demiurge is a nous with a soul of its own, but 
different and separate from the world and its soul. 69 
I shall try to argue against 1) in its two forms in order 
to defend 2). 
2.1. Is the Demiurge an independent nous, separate from 
the world and its soul? 
2.1. a. If we suppose so, and think in addition that this 
nous is separate from every kind of soul, we have to face 
several difficulties. 
(i) First, we are led to an antinomy: 
-Thesis: If the Demiurge embodies nous and, according to 
the mythical description, he is the creator of soul -as 
the defenders of this view claim-, then the Demiurge 
should be a nous separate and ontologically prior to 
soul. 
-Antithesis: If soul is the only principle of motion 
(Phaedrus 245c ff., Laws X 896a-b, something certainly 
suggested at Tim. 46c7-e2, cf. 37b5), and nous partakes 
of motion (Tim. 34a, cf. Laws X 897c ff. ), 7° soul should 
be ontologically prior to nous. 71 
68 Cf. Hackforth (1936: 439 ff. ) (strongly criticized by Cherniss 
[1944: 606-81); after him Solmsen (1942: 113,115); Brisson (1974: 
81-4); Guthrie (1978: 215,275 n. 1); Mohr (1985: 183); Menn (1992: 
556,558). 
69 Cf. Taylor (1928: 64,77,82); Skemp (1942: 114); Lopez (1963: 
177-8); Demos (1968: 145); T. M. Robinson (1969: 251 ff. ), (1970: 
103), (1986: 145 n. 1). 
70 Both these characteristics (self-motion of soul and motion of 
nous) are paradoxically admitted by supporters of the view we are 
criticizing, such as Hackforth (1936: 446) and Brisson (1974: 
333 
ff. ). 
71 Cf. Bury (1929: 9) .I speak of A as "ontologically prior" 
to B in 
the sense of A being able to exist independently from B, 
but not 
viceversa (cf. Aristotle, Metaph. V 11,1019a2-4, who 
interestingly 
refers to Plato in this context). 
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It seems that we should prefer the second conclusion, 
because it is supported by non-mythical texts, 72 whereas 
the first one just limits itself to the mythical 
description. In addition, there is in fact further 
textual evidence for the view that nous is a faculty of 
soul which cannot exist without it: 
(ii) Plato recurrently stresses, both in the Timaeus and 
in other late dialogues, that nous cannot exist without 
soul. So in Tim. 30b3 we read that "it is impossible for 
intellect to belong to anything separately from soul" 
(noun d'au choris psuches adunaton paragenesthai toi). 
That this claim is general, or valid for anything (toi) 
seems fairly clear from the text, 73 and it is by virtue of 
this general validity that the claim will then be applied 
to the specific case of the nous in the world (that is 
why god "framed nous in soul, and soul in body", Tim. 
30b4-5). An equally general claim, applying to any nous, 
is found in Phil. 30c9-10: "wisdom and intellect could 
never arise without soul" (sophia men kai noun aneu 
psuches ouk an pote genoisthen) and Soph. 249a, where 
nous and life are made to reside in soul. 
In addition, we tend to find nous described not as an 
entity different from soul or separate from it, but just 
as a state or faculty of soul, namely soul's power of 
knowing the Ideas (Tim. 37a-c; cf. Rep. VI 508d4-6). In 
the Timaeus (37a6, cl-5) we read that, when soul is in 
contact with the indivisible, and its discourse deals 
with the rational (the Ideas), then "intellect and 
72 Note that, according to this, Mohr's (1985: 182-3) endorsement of 
the view that nous can exist independently of soul and 
does not have 
to do with becoming or change seems untenable (as much as 
his 
suggestion that at Laws 897-898 it is rational soul -as 
different 
from nous- that has motion; cf. the explicit mention of nou 
kinesis 
kai periphora at Laws 897c5-6 and nou periodos at 
898a5). For 
criticism of Mohr see also T. M. Robinson (1995: xx-xxi). 
73 Pace Hackforth's attempt to circumscribe it not to nous but to 
what has nous: the world (1936: 445); followed by Brisson 
(1974: 83). 
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knowledge of necessity is achieved" (nous episteme to ex 
anankes apoteleitai). It is true that in the context 
Plato is speaking of the World-Soul, but he adds a clause 
that makes the point general: "But if anyone should ever 
say that it is in any of the things which exist, except 
soul, that these two states come about, he will be saying 
anything but the truth" (37c3-5). 
In this way nous turns out to be logically and 
ontologically dependent on soul, since it would seem that 
it cannot be explained without soul nor can it be 
ontologically separate from soul. 
2.1. b. Now, perhaps for these reasons many scholars, 
still wanting to preserve the "transcendence" of the 
Demiurge as a personal God have been inclined to maintain 
that the Demiurge is an ensouled nous, though his soul is 
distinct from and superior to the World-Soul. 74 In what 
follows I shall mention three difficulties that this view 
entails, though the arguments can equally be applied 
against 2.1. a, i. e. against any position that makes the 
Demiurge separate from and over and above the world, 
whether he be ensouled or not. 
(i) If we have two nous, i. e. that of the Demiurge, and 
that of the World-Soul, we seem to be duplicating 
entities, 75 if, as we shall see, both of them would be 
performing the same functions of contemplating the Ideas 
on the one hand and ruling over the universe on the other 
hand (cf. infra section 2.2). It seems rather more 
economical to suppose that there is just one nous in the 
structure of reality, and that the mythical image of the 
Demiurge can be subsumed into the -non-mythical- nous in 
the world, the motions of which in the heavens we can 
learn (Tim. 47b-c, 90c-d) and whose existence Plato tries 
74 Cf. the scholars mentioned in note 69. 
75 Compare here the suggestion of Archer-Hind (1888: 38-9). 
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to prove in other contexts (cf. e. g. Phil. 28e ff.; Laws 
XII 966d-967a with 967e1). 
(ii) If we admit that the Demiurge is a mediator or link 
between transcendent Ideas (which are immutable, 38a3) 
and our sensible moving world, we meet a real paradox if 
we make this nous as separate as those Ideas it tries to 
connect to our world. In other words, god's nous would be 
chöris, instead of filling in the chorismos between Ideas 
and sensibles, and we would then have a new problem of 
"dualism" to solve: What would the relation of this 
separate nous be to the world and its soul? Rather than 
providing a way out of the problem of separation, as the 
Demiurge initially seemed to, we would thus be 
duplicating it. However, as we shall see in the 
Politicus, the chorismos from god, who there again 
appears as a demiourgos (273b1), seems to be the state 
when that god is not governing the cosmos (Pol. 273c-d: 
If/when the universe is separated from god, increasing 
disorder takes place). If, however, one of the properties 
of the demiurgic god is to rule in the cosmos (cf. Tim. 
48a), he should not be separate. 
(iii) Finally, let us notice that: 
-If the Demiurge is a nous, he is in motion (from Tim. 
34a, cf. Laws X 897c). 
-But motion presupposes space. (This is implied by Tim. 
34a, where the motion of nous is described as occurring 
in the same [place] (en toi autöi). 76 More explicitly, it 
is stated in Laws X 893cl-2 that "whatever moves [psychic 
motion is being included] ... moves 
in a place"). 
-In turn, space implies body, since there is no void 
in 
the universe (Tim. 58a). 
From this we could infer that the Demiurge should not 
only be ensouled, but also in a body. 
76 In this passage of the Timaeus rotatory motion is mentioned as the 
one which is especially concerned with nous (cf. peri noun 
kai 
phronesin malista ousan, 34a2-3) and not just a mere model or analogy 
for the motion of nous (as contended by Lee [1976: 73]). 
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Now, the body he is in should be: 
(a) either different from and exterior to the World-Body; 
but this is impossible, for there is nothing outside the 
World-Body, rather there is just one single material 
universe (Tim. 31a, 32c-33d); or 
(b) immanent to the universe. 
Having rejected the first possibility we are left with 
the second, and this body god is in should be the whole 
Body of the Universe, since god governs and exerts his 
influence over the whole cosmos. But the only thing that 
is said to pervade the World-Body in the Timaeus is the 
World-Soul (34b, 36e) . 77 Hence we could conclude that the 
Demiurge should be taken as the latter. 
2.2. Does the Demiurge stand for the World-Soul (or 
Intelligence in the World-Soul)? 
In the previous analysis I have tried to pave the way for 
adopting this view, and now I shall try to defend it 
further by focusing on the striking similarities of 
function that both the Demiurge and the World-Soul would 
be performing in a perpetual universe, to such an extent 
that they seem to be fulfilled by the same entity. 
77 For the closer relation between soul and body in the later 
dialogues (cf. supra, Introd., section 2), see e. g. Phaedrus 245c 
ff., where the "new" definition of soul as the principle of motion 
seems to imply that it is the principle of the motion of something; 
and though soul can be the principle of its own psychic states (such 
as those mentioned in a similar context in Laws X 896e8-897a4), the 
union of soul with body (as its principle of motion) is nonetheless 
stressed, particularly at 245e4-6: "all body.. . which 
itself from 
itself has motion from within, is animate, since this is precisely 
the nature of soul" (h(5s tautes ouses phuseös psuches), i. e. the 
essence of soul seems to consist in animating a body through the 
motion that it imparts to it from within. On this general point 
compare the treatment of Ostenfeld (1987: 21-2,33), (1990). It is 
also noteworthy that in the Timaeus not even human reason is separate 
from a body, even in the most blessed state it can achieve, for in 
the latter case the reward consists, according to the myth, not in 
the detachment from all body but, conversely, in going to dwell in 
the incorruptible body of a star (42b2-5, cf. 90a). 
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(i) As to the mediating role, we have seen that it seems 
to be mythically performed by the Demiurge (insofar as he 
connects the heterogeneous domains of Ideas and 
sensibles, 29a, e ff. ). But, on the other hand, the text 
seems to allot the same role pre-eminently to the World- 
Soul, the ontological constitution of which is described 
in the Timaeus as intermediate between the indivisible or 
intelligible and the divisible or sensible, 78 being 
therefore partly akin to the Ideas and partly akin to the 
sensible things (35a1-b1). And so, by virtue of its 
twofold nature, it can act as a bridge between these two 
realms and connect them, as we shall see next. 
(ii) As to the contemplative and efficient functions 
that, as we have noted, mythically characterize the 
Demiurge, we find that in fact they are performed by the 
World-Soul by virtue of its twofold nature. 
-On the one hand, the World-Soul has an intellectual 
knowledge of the Ideal order (cf. 37a-c), insofar, we 
could say, as the World-Soul partakes of the indivisible 
(35a). 
-On the other, insofar as it partakes of "the divisible 
ousia which becomes in the case of bodies" (35a2-3), it 
moves, and it does so in -perpetual- order (37a-b) ; 79 and 
this is how, we can infer, it can project the Ideal order 
onto the sensible realm. 80 In other words, the World-Soul 
performs an efficient function both of generating order 
(if we grant that it is a principle of motion, in the 
78 More precisely, this passage of the Timaeus describes the World- 
Soul as composed of a mixture of three elements: existence (ousia), 
identity (auton) and difference (thateron), each of which is 
intermediate between the indivisible (ameriston) and the divisible 
(meriston). For this interpretation (and the reading of the passage, 
which varies from Burnet's at 35a4) see Grube (1932; also 1980: 142), 
followed by Cornford (1937: 59-61) and now generally accepted. 
79 Here we read that soul turns upon itself -which implies orderly 
motion-: aute to anakukloumene pros hauten, 37a5; it grasps what has 
dispersed or indivisible existence when kinoumene dia pases heautes, 
37a6-7; it is to kinoumenon huph' hautou, 37b5. 
80 Cf. Festugiere (1947: 21), (1949: 103). 
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light of Tim. 37b5 and 46d-e), 81 and of governing the 
universe (Tim. 34c), as does the Demiurge. 
(iii) As to the function of primary causation, we have 
seen the Demiurge to be a symbol of it, but we still had 
to find out which entity fulfils this function. And we 
can now realize that, in point of fact, it is soul that 
is said to embody the role of primary causation: At Tim. 
46d-e, where we have seen a distinction between two kinds 
of causes, primary and secondary, the latter is said to 
have to do with bodies, and the former with logos and 
nous, because "among entities (ton ontön), soul is the 
only one for which it is appropriate to possess nous" 
(46d5-6). 
This view is in turn developed in Laws X, where, speaking 
of primary and secondary motion instead of primary and 
secondary causality, Plato characterizes the motion of 
soul as the primary cause of all the other kinds of 
motion and as a primary motion which, associated with 
nous, makes use of (chromene) the secondary motions of 
bodies in order to guide everything rightly and happily 
(cf. 895b, 896e-897b). 
81 These are in fact passages that remind us of the theory of the 
soul as self-mover and principle of motion developed in Phaedrus 245c 
ff. and Laws X (e. g. 896a-b). In the first place, 46d-e draws a 
contraposition between secondary causes, "which occur by other things 
being moved and in turn moving other things by necessity" (46e1-2) 
and "the first causes of the wise nature" (46d8), in a way that 
suggests that the latter are the principle of the former (cf. supra, 
note 44), something that is reinforced in the light of the analogous 
contraposition in Phaedrus 245c and Laws X 896a-b. Also recalling the 
notion of soul as self-mover in these passages, in Tim. 37b5 soul 
is 
called "that which is moved by itself" (to kinoumenon huph' 
hautou). 
Cf. Cherniss (1944: 428 ff., 455), (1954: 26 n. 24); Brisson (1974: 
335-6). For other scholars in favour of the theory of soul as self- 
mover and arche kineseös as being present in the Timaeus, cf. 
Robin 
(1938: 165-6), Morrow (1950: 437); against, see Vlastos (1939: 390- 
9), Herter (1957: 330), Demos (1968: 143 ff. ), T. M. Robinson (1969: 
249), Mohr (1985: 174). 
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Thus we can see that it is the teleological action of 
soul, qua rational, which leans on mechanism and 
subordinates it by using it as a means towards an end. In 
other words, it is soul, and particularly the World- 
Soul, 82 that performs the role of primary causality that 
we had seen symbolized by the Demiurge. 
In sum, for the several 
inclined to believe that, 
nous, he does so not as 
representing the rational 
belongs to the World-Soul. 
reasons expounded, I feel 
if the Demiurge symbolizes 
a separate entity but as 
character that essentially 
This conclusion might however seem to need further 
elucidation, for one could wonder whether nous, or that 
"rational character", is wholly or only partly identical 
with the World-Soul. And the answer should be that, 
unlike human beings, in the case of the cosmos Soul and 
Intellect completely coincide. In other words, the World- 
Soul83 is exclusively rational and lacks any "irrational" 
faculties, 84 as many passages in the Timaeus suggest. 
First, the World-Soul is described as having the same 
nature as human individual reason, only with a greater 
degree of purity (41d). Secondly, the World-Soul as a 
whole is said to have an "emphrön bios for the whole of 
82 As I shall argue also to be the case as regards Laws X 896e-897b 
infra, in chapter 7. 
83 As well as the souls of the heavenly bodies; cf. infra, ch. 3, 
section 1. 
84 Pace Morrow (1950: 437), who thinks that the disorderly motion in 
the Timaeus derives from the irrational part of the World-Soul, and 
Cornford (1937: 205,208) who supposes that the source of that 
irrational motion is the Circle of the Other, considered in 
abstraction from the Circle of the Same (cf. also Robin [1938: 166]). 
Apart from the evidence we are considering, we must remember that 
only after its constitution is the "mixture" of the World-Soul 
divided into two Circles, which have therefore the same nature; cf. 
Cherniss (1944: 410 n. 339), (1954: 26, n. 28); Ostenfeld (1982: 328, 
n. 171). So I cannot agree with Cornford in his suggestion that the 
Demiurge symbolizes just "Reason in the World-Soul" as a distinct 
part of it identical with the Circle of the Same (1937: 39,361, 
208). 
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time" (36e4-5). Thirdly, Plato often characterizes the 
motion with which Soul moves the body of the universe as 
the motion of nous in the heavens (34a, 47b7,89a1-3, 
90c8-dl), so here we can see that he speaks of the World- 
Soul and the World-Intellect indifferently. 85 For this 
same reason, it is no wonder that in many passages it is 
soul that is ascribed the functions that we have seen to 
pertain to nous, such as governing (Tim. 34c, Laws X 
892a, 896c; as well as that of imposing order, Laws X 
898c, 899b, cf. Crat. 400a). 
III. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have examined the meaning and status 
of the Demiurge on the basis of an interpretation of 
creation as a beginningless and perpetual process, 
according to which god appears as constantly generating 
and sustaining the universe as orderly. In this context, 
I have argued for -what would seem- two theses: 
I. That the Demiurge is a symbol of the function of 
primary causation. 
II. That the Demiurge is a symbol of the World-Soul. 
85 In a very narrow sense, though, nous could be said to be just the 
upper faculty of soul by which it knows the Ideas, as opposed to the 
lower faculty of doxa by which it apprehends sensibles at Tim. 37a-c 
-and it is through this role of knowing the Ideas that the Circle of 
the Same is called the "most intelligent" (phronimötates) revolution, 
39c2. However, not even the lower function of doxa could in this case 
be said to be "irrational", for let us remember that the World-Soul 
has doxai which are bebaioi kai aletheis (37b8). Tim. 43d ff. (esp. 
44a-b) suggests that any true judgements about the sensible (which 
make the holder of the judgement rational, emphrön) should be 
guaranteed by the ruling role of the Circle of the Same; though Plato 
can still say that mere orthe doxa is alogos, as he claims for the 
majority of men at 51e (cf. 27d5-28a4). But the World-Soul opines not 
only "truly" but "stably" at 37b8 -stability being a feature that 
was initially reserved for the Ideas at 29b6-, thus suggesting that 
its doxa is not alogos: the World-Soul would have logos insofar as, 
by knowing the Ideas, it can, when apprehending the sensible, give an 
account of it in the light of the knowledge of that after which the 
sensible is copied. 
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These two theses have been regarded not only as different 
but sometimes also as incompatible, e. g. by Cherniss, 86 
who criticizes Festugiere for holding the latter view 
instead of the former. However, I would like to suggest 
that, far from being mutually exclusive, the two theses 
are just two aspects of the same thesis. For I. just 
alludes to a function which needs an entity to perform 
it, which is found in II. Or, in other words, I. 
corresponds to the philosophical and abstract meaning of 
the figure of the Demiurge, but this meaning cannot be 
fully understood unless we refer it to the entity that 
embodies it. The complete correspondence between these 
two levels is made evident in Laws X (895d-896b), where 
we are told that "the motion with the power to move 
itself" -which has the function of primary causation, 
894b ff. - is the definition -logos- which "refers" (cf. 
prosagoreuomen) to the same entity (ousia) which we call 
"soul". And we have seen that the Timaeus too emphasizes 
soul as the only entity which can have nous -and 
therefore operate as primary cause- in contrast with 
causes which are devoid of all wisdom (46d-e). 
From this perspective, I. and II. are wholly 
complementary and must go indispensably together. For 
that reason I have tried to argue that the Demiurge is a 
symbol of the teleological function of primary causation 
which is mainly fulfilled by the World-Soul in Plato's 
structure of reality. 
86 Cherniss (1950: 207 n. 1. ), where he reviews Festugiere (1949). 
Cf. also Tarän (1971: 407 n. 164). 
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CHAPTER 3 
COSMIC GOD AND HUMAN REASON IN THE TIMAEUS 
So far I have been arguing that the Demiurge's 
teleological function is symbolized mainly by the World- 
Soul. By this I do not discard that, secondarily, his 
action can also in reality be fulfilled by the souls of 
the heavenly bodies, which have similarly cosmic 
influence and the same nature as the World-Soul, ' and 
which are subordinate to it in a way that recalls the 
subordination of the lesser demiurges to the main 
Artisan. In order to support this claim I shall be 
looking at allusions both to the World, or Nous in the 
World, as god, and to the heavenly bodies as gods, in a 
manner that could reflect the initial anthropomorphic 
distinction between the Demiurge as main god and the 
other lesser gods involved in the creation of the cosmos. 
We can also wonder why human reason is not called god - 
though it is called divine and a daimon- and this will 
lead us to clarify the relation between the latter and 
god in the cosmic sense which will strengthen our 
understanding of his role as both a mediator -this time, 
I shall be arguing, between human beings and the Ideas- 
and as a model for human reason in general. 
I. THE COSMIC GODS 
Let us start with the first issue. We have seen that god 
in the Timaeus, in his mythical appearance, is embodied 
in the figure of the Demiurge; as far as his 
philosophical meaning is concerned, I have argued that 
"god", qua Demiurge, represents a function of 
intelligent, teleological causation; finally, as far as 
1 As is shown by the fact that they haven't given rise to a new 
mixture. 
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his ontological status is concerned, I have proposed that 
the Demiurge is a symbol of the World-Soul, or soul at a 
cosmic level in general, which could also include the 
heavenly bodies. Let us first examine the textual basis 
for the claim I want to make, namely that the World-Soul 
and the heavenly bodies are gods. To address this issue I 
shall analyse briefly the different levels of divinity in 
the structure of reality as presented in the Timaeus. 
1. Nous in the World or the Universe as god 
Even though there is no explicit allusion to the World- 
Soul as theos in the Timaeus, it is said that it started 
a "divine beginning (theian archen) of endless and 
intelligent life for the whole of time" (36e4-5), and its 
status as god can be inferred from the allusions both to 
Cosmic Nous and to the Universe as god. 
Thus, at Tim. 47b6-c4 we are told that we have been given 
vision "so that, when contemplating the revolutions of 
intellect in heaven (en ouranoi Lou nou... periodous) we 
can use them for the revolutions of reason within us... 
and that, by imitating the revolutions of god, which are 
totally unwandering (tas tou theou pantos aplaneis ousas) 
we might settle down the wandering revolutions within 
ourselves". The context seems to suggest that "god" in 
the latter clause refers to intellect in heaven (both 
being the subject to whom the revolutions we should 
imitate belong), and this would accord with 90c-d, where, 
for the same purpose of correcting the revolutions of our 
thought, we are encouraged to follow and learn the 
"reasonings and revolutions of the All" (hai tou pantos 
dianoeseis kai periphorai, c8-dl) (i. e. not just the 
physical visible motions of the corporeal universe but 
the intellections in which the motions of its soul 
consist). 
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Obviously, the nous at 47b7 which is alluded to as god at 
c3 is the Cosmic Nous, since it is en ouranoi; and we 
have at the end of the previous chapter seen that Plato 
in the Timaeus often characterizes the motion with which 
Soul moves the body of the universe as the motion of nous 
in the heavens (cf. e. g. 89a2-3,90c-d), so that, in this 
respect, the World-Soul is identical with the World- 
Intellect. If this is so, affirming the divinity of the 
latter would be tantamount to affirming the divinity of 
the former. So, because of its World-Soul, the proper 
motion of the universe's body is said to be the motion 
which particularly belongs to nous, namely rotation 
moving "regularly in the same place and on itself" (kata 
tauta en toi autoi kai en heautöi, 34a3). But we can see 
also that not only does nous exist en psuchei but also 
psuche exists en somati (30b4-5), so that the divinity of 
nous is in fact embodied in the whole zoion empsuchon 
ennoun (30b8), i. e. the whole corporeal universe which it 
animates. This is, then, why we find Plato asserting 
that the universe is a god. 2 It is for example called 
"happy god" at 34b8; "self-sufficient and most complete 
god" at 68e3-4; "sensible god which is an image of the 
intelligible" at 92c7. Surely, this god is called 
"sensible" (92c7) insofar as it has a body, since soul as 
such is invisible (36e6). In this way, when we affirm the 
divinity of Nous we are referring to an aspect of the 
kosmos that our analysis isolates, but which in point of 
fact does not exist without a body, therefore 
constituting the basis of the divinity of the sensible 
world itself. 
This living universe, which encompasses all other living 
beings, is "a sensible god... greatest and best and most 
fine and complete" (theos aisthetos, megistos kai aristos 
kallistos to kai teleotatos, 92c7-8), and so the major 
2 Cf. Solmsen (1942: 118); Festugiere (1947: 22). At Laws XII 
966d 




god among sensible beings, 3 at a singular level of 
divinity; whereas the heavenly bodies and the Earth will 
come after it as a plural level, as we shall now see. 
2. The heavenly bodies as gods 
At Tim. 39e10 Plato refers to the "heavenly class of 
gods" (ouranion theon genos), in a passage that makes 
successive allusion to the fixed stars (40a2-b6), the 
planets (40b6-8, cf. 38c ff. ) and the Earth, which is 
called "the first and oldest of the gods which have been 
born in the universe" (40c2-3). All these are referred to 
as "visible and generated gods" (theoi horatoi kai 
gennetoi, 40d4) in the plural, and are also living beings 
endowed with intelligent soul and a body. 
So, the stars are called "divine and perpetual living 
beings" at 40b5, and are said to think (dianoein) always 
the same at 40a8-bl. So too the planets are said to have 
life and soul (their bodies having been bound with 
psychic bonds, 38e5), and their possession of 
intelligence is implied by their learning (manthanein) 
what was prescribed to them (38e6), -surely their own 
celestial motions, in the light of 36d4-5. It is, then, 
again their possession of nous that we can take as a 
foundation of their divinity, and we can see how that 
exercise of nous is constant in a way that is manifested 
in regular behaviour: Each star moves "in the same place 
and regularly, thinking always the same things for itself 
about the same things" (peri tön autön aei to auta 
heautöi dianooumenoi, 40a8-bl) (the latter, we could 
suppose, are the Ideas). This text is most enlightening 
also in the sense that not only the World-Soul, as we 
have seen, but also the heavenly bodies seem to have the 
twofold functions of having intellectual contemplation, 
3 Cf. Reverdin (1945: 47); Moreau (1939: 81). See also ton megiston 
theon kai Kolon ton kosmon, Laws VII 821a2; for my reading of this 
phrase cf. infra, chapter 7, n. 32. 
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on the one hand, and inextricably moving in an orderly 
fashion. With this we confirm that whatever order we 
observe in the heavens (including that of the motion of 
the planets, which do not actually "wander", since each 
of them follows one single circular path according to 
proportion)4 is due to and evinces the presence of nous. 
And given their properties of intellection and motion 
(cf. 38e, 40a-b), which they share with the World-Soul, it 
is no wonder that the heavenly bodies can also act as 
primary causes. 
We must remember in this respect that the gods to whom 
the Demiurge delegates the task of framing the mortal 
parts of the universe (in accordance with his 
teleological plan of making the universe complete in the 
resemblance of the teleon zöion) are those generated by 
him, i. e. the heavenly bodies themselves -and also the 
traditional gods, probably as their counterparts (41a-c). 5 
4 Though Plato uses the word planen at 40b6, he seems basically to be 
keeping to the traditional denomination. In fact the Timaeus doesn't 
suggest at all that the planets divert from their route, but would 
conversely stress that, despite the complexity of their motions, they 
all follow the route of the different orbits into which the Circle of 
the Other was divided (see e. g. 36d; 38c7-8; and 39c-d where planas 
at 39d1 seems to be used ironically in a context that would 
conversely stress the regularity of the courses of the planets as 
measures of time). Cf. Vlastos (1975: 99-100,101-2), (1980: 24-5 n. 
26). The protest against thinking that planets "wander" is explicitly 
found in Laws VII 822a, the reason being adduced that "each of them 
traverses the same route, i. e. not many but always one single route 
in a circle" (a6-8). 
5 Plato introduces his allusion to the gods of the traditional 
mythologies at Tim. 40d6-e3, after finishing his account of the 
visible -cosmic- gods. Even though this passage 
has usually been 
taken to be ironical (Taylor [1928: ad loc. ]; Cornford [1937: 139]; 
Vlastos [1939: 381]; Reverdin [1945: 53]), it is interesting to note 
the positive role that the text subsequently allocates to them. For 
both types of divinity -i. e. both heavenly bodies and traditional 
gods- are commended to frame the mortal aspects of the universe and 
govern the mortal being, since the Demiurge 
in the myth is said to 
address, for that purpose, all (pantes) the gods that 
had genesis, 
"both those which revolve evidently [=stars] and those who appear 
in 
whatever way they wish [=traditional gods]" 
(41a3-6). (That the 
Demiurge is in some way responsible for the creation of all of them, 
including the latter, is suggested by his advising them to perform 
their demiourgia by imitating the power that he used 
in creating 
them, 41c5-6. ) In this respect, it is remarkable that the gods of the 
traditional religion share with the astral gods the same 
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Even though they appear in the myth with an 
anthropomorphic role of "creation" (demiourgia, 41c4-5) - 
and also "nurture" (trophe, 41d2), making grow (cf. 
auxanete, 41d3) and ruling or piloting (diakubernan, 
42e3)- of mortal beings, that role could be interpreted 
more astronomically in the sense of the active role that 
the heavenly bodies -and particularly the Sun- have as to 
the generation, growth and nurture (genesin kai auxen kai 
trophen) of life on the Earth (Rep. VI 509b2-4), 6 thus 
ruling (epitropeuön) and being the cause (aitios) of 
things there (Rep. VII 516b9-c2). 
At the same time, a correlation between Demiurge-lesser 
gods on the one hand, and World-Soul-heavenly bodies on 
the other, seems to hold also in the sense that in both 
cases the divinity shows a one-many aspect in which a 
single major god prevails or rules over the lesser ones. 
So, in the same way as the Demiurge was said to give 
responsibility in the intelligent and telelogical organization of the 
cosmos -at 47d, e. g., it is the Muses who are said to be responsible 
for the donation of harmony-, so that Plato would be here redefining 
the nature of those gods according to his own conception of divinity 
(as he had tried to do also in Rep. II 377d ff. ). Cf. Solmsen (1942: 
118). In this guise, both traditional and astral gods seem to be here 
identical at least as far as their cosmogonic function in the 
universe is concerned. In addition, we must notice that heaven and 
earth appear in a double aspect, first as "cosmic gods" created by 
the Demiurge (ouranos at 34b5-8, ge at 40b8-c3), then, in a 
personified way, as the first link of the genealogy from which the 
other traditional gods proceed (Ges to kai Ouranou, 40e5); cf. Taylor 
(1938: 184). Hence we can suppose that the latter are being thought 
of as the traditional counterpart of the former, in what we could 
interpret as an attempt by Plato not to exclude but to integrate the 
traditional inheritance into his own cosmic religion. This attempt is 
already visible in the Phaedrus -246e-, where Zeus appears with the 
functions of epimeleisthai and diakosmein panta which in more 
cosmological contexts belong to the World-Soul, and seems to 
reappear, as I shall argue, in other late cosmological passages, e. g. 
Pol. 272b, where the god who presently rules the cosmos 
is called 
"Zeus" -though also described 
demiurgically as theos ho kosmesas [ton 
kosmon] 273d; Phil. 30d, where the cosmos itself seems to be called 
Zeus; and Laws X 904e, where the powers in charge of the universe are 
described in terms of "the gods who dwell in Olympus". It is also 
noteworthy that in the Laws both the heavenly 
bodies (VII 821c6-d4) 
and the traditional gods (IV 717a-b) are recommended 
to be 
worshipped. 
6 Cf. Cornford (1937: 141). 
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orders to the young gods (cf. 42d, 41a ff 
.), and to have 
a ruling role -which can be seen as the prevailing of a 
unitarian teleological design in the whole universe- so 
is the World-Soul (or the Circle of the Same)7 said to 
prevail over the motions of the heavenly bodies (see 
kratos 36c7, cf. 39a1-2,40b2), 8 apart from the overall 
power that it exerts on the sensible or the World-Body as 
such (34b10-35a1). In this way, the structure of the 
cosmos itself shows relations between its different 
levels of divinity which are analogous to those which 
were initially depicted demiurgically. 9 
II. THE COSMIC GOD AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE HUMAN SOUL AND 
THE IDEAS 
1. God, Ideas and the human soul 
7 As Cornford (1937: 79) has observed, "the motion of the Same is 
both a proper self-motion of the World-Soul, manifested physically as 
the axial rotation of the whole body of the world, and also an 
imparted motion" which affects the heavenly bodies. Cf. note 8. 
8 Astronomically, this seems to imply that the World-Soul imparts to 
the heavenly bodies a motion of forward rotation along the outer 
orbit of the Same (in the case of the Fixed Stars, 40b1-2), which, by 
coinciding with the axial rotation of the whole celestial sphere 
(alluded to at 34a), also carries round -and in that sense prevails 
over, 39a1-2- all the inner planetary circles contained in the 
sphere, which can however still have the motion of the Other in the 
opposite direction to that of the Same. (This latter phenomenon 
results in the spiral twist of the planets because they have two 
different motions in opposite directions, 39a4-b2. ) Cf. Cornford - 
after Proclus- (1937: 76,78-9); Heath (1913: 160). Thus, the Circle 
of the Same is called he exö phora at 36c4, and the World-Soul is 
said to pervade and envelop the World-Body from the centre and even 
from the outside (exöthen) at 34b and 36e; so we should think that 
the outer motion of the circumference of the universe (i. e. that of 
the Same) coincides with the whole rotation of the sphere on its own 
axis. This would also carry with it the planetary orbits into which 
the Circle of the Other is split -since the Circle of the Other is 
said to be joined with the Circle of the Same, 36c1- even though they 
also go in the opposite direction (36c). 
9 Note also that in both cases there is imitation of the major god 
by 
the lesser gods: the young gods try to imitate their father 
in their 
task of creation (41c5,42e8,69c5); the shape of the 
heavenly bodies 
was made round by imitation of the universe (40a4). 
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We have thus seen how the World (and therefore its Soul) 
and heavenly bodies are gods in the cosmic structure of 
the Timaeus, and how both these kinds of soul can be seen 
to perform a function of intelligent causation, being 
exclusively and essentially rational and good. If we take 
these latter characteristics to be a defining feature of 
"god", we can then understand why, save for one 
problematic passage, 10 the Ideas are not called theos in 
the Timaeus, since, as we have seen, they are static and 
intelligible, not intelligent. " They are, however, the 
highest level of reality, even superior to god (as Plato 
suggests here, Tim. 29a; and also at Phaedrus 249c5-6, 
247d, cf. its anticipation in Eut. 10a) and in the last 
resort the foundation of god's divinity, since the latter 
lies in nous and nous would not exist without the Ideas 
(cf. e. g. Tim. 37a-c), which are its object and enjoy 
ontological priority over it. (In the Phaedrus we read 
that Ideas are those things "by being in front of which 
god is divine", pros hoisper theos ön theios estin, 
249c5-6. ) However, Plato does call the Ideas "divine" 
(theia), a concept which is wider than that of god - 
applying, in the myth of the Timaeus, mainly to the 
Ideas, god and human reason- and is used basically of 
"immortal" entities, with positive axiological 
10 The passage is Tim. 37c6-7, where the world is called tön aidiön 
theön gegonos agalma, something that could be read as meaning that 
the world is an image of gods which are the Ideas (taking agalma as a 
synonym of eikön and opposed to paradeigma in the light of 37c7-8, 
37d1,37d5-7); however Cornford (1937: 99-102) has argued that an 
agalma is not simply an image but a place intended for occupation by 
a god or gods, thus a kind of "shrine". So he translates 37c6-7 as "a 
shrine brought into being for the everlasting gods", the latter being 
the heavenly bodies or celestial gods of 39e10, which will be called 
aidia at 40b5. 
11 This however does not exclude that the Ideas could correspond to 
another aspect of the Judaeo-Christian conception of "God", since, as 
Grube (1980: 151-2) has remarked, God can be thought of -statically- 
as the ultimate reality, the absolute being, or -dynamically- as a 
creator and source of all life and movement. These two aspects 
usually go hand in hand in this conception of God. In the Timaeus, 
however, the former aspect would correspond to the Ideas, the latter 
to a superhuman nous, and it is this that Plato tends to call theos. 
81 
connotations. 12 The Ideas are called in the Politicus "the 
most divine of all things" (tois panton theiotatois, 
269d6), and this could rightly apply to the Timaeus, 
since, we could say, only Ideas are immortal, or 
eternal, 13 in their own right (de iure), whereas the 
immortality of god, as well as that of human reason, is 
meant to be contingent (i . e. , de facto but not de iure), 
insofar as it depends on a higher source (cf. Tim. 41a-b, 
43d). 
Now, if rationality is that which seems to define god, we 
can also wonder whether human beings or human reason 
could be called theos by the same token. However we find 
that Plato does not call them theos. 
In the first place, we can see that, whereas the universe 
and the heavenly bodies are called theoi with the 
characteristic that they are immortal both with respect 
to their soul (36e) and their body (33a), the human 
being, conversely, is not immortal in all the elements of 
his composition. Human reason, 14 in fact, is said to be 
12 Cf. Mugnier (1930: 116-7). For 'theios' applied to the Ideas see 
90c1; to god in its different aspects or referents, 68d4,76b2; 
68e7,36e4,40a2,40b5; to human reason, 90c4,8,73a7, c7,88b2, 
69d, 72d (in these latter two passages theion is contrasted with 
thneton, an opposition parallel to that between athanaton-thneton at 
e. g. 41c-d, 42e-43a, 69c-d, etc. ). Plato also applies the term 
derivatively to that which contains human reason, and so he calls our 
head "divine" (44d5), since it is "the abode of what is most divine 
and sacred" (ten tou theiotatou kai hierötatou oikesin, 45a1). 
13 For the attribute of immortality applied to the Ideas cf. infra, 
section 2.2. This feature is rather anthropomorphic, though more 
precisely Plato will call them "eternal" (diaiönios, 38b8,39e2; cf. 
Eggers Lan [1984: 175]; T. M. Robinson [1986: 144-5,149]). 
14 Plato alludes to the immortal part of the human soul in several 
different ways, that can be translated widely as "reason", 
"thought", "intellect". So, he calls it logos at 42d1,70a5, d5, 
71a3, d4, stressing its function of kratein or hegemonein over 
passions or the other parts of the soul; he also denominates it 
dianoia at 88a8, c2, emphasizing the balance that must exist between 
exercizing it (e. g. through mathematics) and the body through 
gymnastics; and at 47b it is to correct the dianoeseis in us that we 
should use the revolutions of nous in heaven. Note in these cases 
that dianoia is the suitable term if Plato were trying to stress a 
capacity for mathematical studies (as he had done in the Republic); 
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immortal and akin 
lesser degree, it 
but, unlike them 
body, which will 
42e-43a), and has 
to that body (cf. 
to that of the gods 
shares their same i 
it is conjoined 
be returned to the 
another two psychic 
69c ff. ), which are 
(since, though to a 
nature, Tim. 41c-d), 
with a corruptible 
four elements (cf. 
faculties, adapted 
equally mortal. 15 
Most importantly, the possession of those two lower 
mortal faculties apart from the rational one, which do 
not necessarily behave in conformity to it, means for the 
human being the possession of other possibilities of life 
apart from the one which is characteristic of the gods as 
though the use of this term, as much as that of nous, seems to be 
loose in the Timaeus. Thus e. g. at 71b3, c4 Plato speaks 
indifferently of nous or dianoia to refer to the rational part of the 
soul, as the source from which the thoughts reflected in the liver 
proceed, and at 92c2 it is the loss or gain of nous or anoia that 
determines the transformation of humans into animals and viceversa 
(the study of philosophy or astronomy being a mark of the presence of 
nous, cf. 91d-e) . At some other places, 
however, nous is used more 
specifically to refer to the capacity or state of cognition of the 
Ideas, e. g. at 51c-e (cf. also noesis at 28a1,52a4; and 37c2 where 
nous and episteme arise in the World-Soul in contact with the Ideas). 
In other passages he also uses logismos (86c3), phronesis or to 
phronimon for the rational part of the soul (75e4,64b5), and 
characterizes the one in whom it is working properly as emphrön 
(44b7), by contrast with its absence which makes someone anous (44a8; 
cf. anoetos at 44c3) . In general terms, 
the rational or divine part 
of the soul is described as made up, like the World-Soul, of the 
circle of the Same and that of the Other (cf. 42c, 43d), having by 
nature the same intervals as the World-Soul (43d, cf. 35b-36b). As 
in the World-Soul, so in the human rational soul the revolution of 
the Same has the capacity to rule (cf. archousa, hegemön 44a4). That 
allows both, from a theoretical perspective, true judgements 
(even 
about the sensibles, 44a) and, from a practical one, the mastering of 
one's own passions (cf. 42c-d). 
15 Tim. 42a3-b1 makes it abundantly clear that pathemata like thumos 
(which will correspond to the spirited part of the soul at 
70a) and 
erös mixed with pleasure and pain (as would be experienced 
by the 
lower part of our soul) supervene inevitably when the 
immortal soul 
is implanted in bodies to which things come in and from which they go 
out. That is to say, it is because the mortal 
body is not self- 
sufficient that, e. g., the desire for food exists; unlike 
the 
immortal Body of the Universe, which is autarkes (33c-d, cf. 
33a). In 
this way, whereas the cosmic god seems to be at complete comfort 
in 
his body -a real friend to himself, 
34b-, which doesn't create for 
him any needs, for us the body constitutes not only a vehicle 
(ochema) for reason -as Plato clearly states 
in the Timaeus, 41e2, 
69c7, cf. 44d-e: huperesia 44d7, ochema e2- but also, 
in our earthly 
life, a potential source of limitation for its continuous activity. 
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invariably intelligent. 16 So Plato says that "if a man 
dwells upon appetites (epithumias) or ambitions 
(philonikias)" -i. e. the predominant desires of the 
appetitive and spirited parts of the soul respectively, 
cf. Tim. 70d7,70a3, Rep. IX 580e-581b- "and spends 
intense effort in that, all his opinions must of 
necessity be mortal"; whereas "if he has devoted himself 
to the love of knowledge and true thoughts, and exercised 
these things above all others in him, he must by all 
necessity think things immortal and divine", be 
distinctively happy and participate in immortality as far 
as human nature permits (90b-c). 
In this manner, far from being something essential and 
exclusive, reason becomes in man a possibility that he 
may or may not exercise -the lack of exercise of which 
determines what the myth describes as humans' "fall" into 
lower animals, cf. 42b-d, 91a-92c. That the life of 
reason is a possibility for man seems also fairly clear 
from the "conditional decrees" for the destiny of the 
soul, which establish that if the human being rules over 
his passions he will be just in this life and happy 
thereafter, but if he doesn't, he will be unjust and 
suffer successive transformations (into women and 
animals) until he is able to rule with reason his own 
body and thus return to the first and best condition 
(42b-d). 
Now, if reason is a possibility which needs practice 
(being also helped by a good education and an appropriate 
way of government in the polis, 44b8-c2,86d7-e3,87a7- 
b9), it can obviously remain unrealized. It not only does 
not rule in the infant, whose soul is initially anous 
(44a8) but also, if man is negligent, he returns to Hades 
16 For "tripartition" in the human soul understood in terms of 
possibilities of life cf. also Rep. IX 580d ff., Phaedrus 256a-c; on 
that subject in the Timaeus cf. Taylor (1928: ad 90b1-6 and 69c7). 
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unfulfilled and without intelligence (ateles kai anoetos, 
44c3) . 17 
In fact, human reason is repeatedly called "theion" 
insofar as it is that immortal part of us akin to the 
gods; it is also called a "daimon" that god has given to 
us, which dwells in the upper part of our body and 
elevates us to our abode in heaven (90a), since by the 
exercise of reason we become similar to god (90d); 18 and 
this daimon one should care for and keep in good order 
(eu kekosmemenos) so as to be happy and partake in 
immortality so far as that is possible (cf. 90c). But, 
as we have seen, the human being also has the possibility 
of following the rule of the other faculties of his soul, 
filling himself with mortal opinions and thus becoming 
mortal, "to the extent to which it is maximally possible 
to become mortal" (90b). 19 So, reason being a possibility, 
it is no wonder that the character of immortality -and 
similarity with god- which belongs to human reason is 
also a possibility for man -as suggested in the above 
passage- but not something guaranteed. 
In sum, we can conclude that human reason cannot be 
called a god because the human being, unlike the gods, 
does not necessarily and continuously exercise reason and 
therefore act rationally. For him rationality is not 
17 That is to say, anoetos would refer to the unfulfilment of the 
capacity which hasn't been exercised. The capacity, however, seems 
never itself lost: even if the myth presents the picture of man 
reincarnating into lower animals, he can still in that state "prevail 
over through reason" (logöi kratesas, 42d1) the turbulent and 
unreasoning mass of fire, water and earth that was added to him and 
thus "reach the form of the first and best condition" (42d2; cf. 
92c1-3). Cf. Sorabji (1993: 10). 
18 In this respect human reason as a daimon would keep the feature, 
which the Symposium allots to to daimonion, of mediating between man 
and god (202d13-el). Cf. Reverdin (1945: 136-8). 
19 The latter qualification may seem striking but we must understand 
it in the sense that it is not reincarnation into lower animals but 
freedom from the limitations of a mortal body that Plato regards as 
the true form of immortality (here symbolized as returning to the 
body of one's native star, 42b). 
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something essentially "given", but a task that he must 
realize. What is at the very most given to him is the 
possibility of realizing it, and this ethical possibility 
distinguishes him from god. 
2. God as a model for human reason 
Now, if reason is a capacity that human beings should 
fulfil, we can ask ourselves how they can manage to do 
so. This will in turn illuminate the role played by god 
in this respect. 
I shall tackle the issue by addressing three questions: 
1) Whether Plato still believes that human beings can 
have access to the Ideas in the Timaeus, or whether it is 
now only god who can do so. 20 
2) Having argued for the first possibility as far as a 
privileged minority of people is concerned, how they can 
achieve it. 
3) What second best is left for men other than 
philosophers in order to be happy. 
I wish to argue that it is basically astronomy, or the 
intellectual study of the movements of the cosmic god, 
that provides an answer to both 2. and 3. 
1. It has been contended that Plato in the Timaeus 
reduces philosophy to a mere study of the "nature of the 
universe" (47a7, cf. 41e2), 21 with the implication that he 
20 This question would be particularly provoking if one were to 
suppose that the Timaeus post-dates the Parmenides, where it is 
aporetically suggested that Ideas would only be knowable by god but 
not by us (134b-c). 
21 Cf. Kucharski (1966: 319,326). 
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abandons the conception that the ultimate goal of the 
philosopher is the Ideas. On the one hand, it is true 
that the dialogue stresses the relation of the nous of 
god -rather than that of human beings- with the Ideas 
(cf. 29a, 37a-c), and thus we see god performing the 
functions of a dialectician at 39e, where he 
distinguishes the different species comprised in the Idea 
of Living Being (ho esti zoion). However, at Tim. 51e 
Plato asserts that "of doxa alethes one must say that all 
men partake, whereas of nous only gods and a small class 
of men", nous being in this context the cognitive 
correlate of the Ideas whose existence the whole passage 
in question (51b7-52a4, cf. esp. 51d3-5) tries to settle. 
So we can see that, even though it is now god 
preeminently who is put in relation to the Ideas, Plato 
still allows that possibility for a small minority of 
human beings, who would naturally be the philosophers. 
2. Now, as 51e seems to suggest, knowledge of the Ideas 
is hard to achieve for man. And so we find, in the 
Timaeus, an attempt by Plato to bridge the gap between 
human beings and the Ideas (which is in a sense an 
example of the more general gap between Ideas and 
sensibles). The key concept, in this respect, is the 
World-Soul: We have seen that from a metaphysical 
perspective, and because of its ontological constitution, 
it serves to mediate between the indivisible and the 
divisible, i. e. Ideas and sensibles (cf. 35a1-b1). This 
World-Soul (or the universe that it animates), as we also 
know, is a god; itself has a mathematical structure (35b 
ff. ) and rules over the motions of the divine stars and 
planets, which, from an ethical perspective, human beings 
are encouraged to learn. This learning of astronomy 
involves mainly the exercise of intellectual functions22 
22 Vision is, of course, in the Timaeus a necessary condition of 
astronomical research, for without it no inquiry into the heavens is 
possible (47a). But it is made clear that we must participate in the 
reasonings or calculations (logismoi) of the universe (47c), and this 
is done by thinking which is assimilated to the object of thought 
(cf. toi katanooumenöi to katanooun exomoiösai, 90d4). Cf. also 91d6- 
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and is based on the apprehension of mathematical 
relationships23 (such as those governing the relative 
distances between the heavenly bodies, cf. 35b ff., 36d2- 
3). 24 And this knowledge of astronomy will constitute in 
the Timaeus again, as in the Republic, the possibility 
of an intermediate step towards the knowledge of Ideas. 
So, at 47a4-b2, we read that the observation of days, 
months and years has given us the notion of number and 
time, and the possibility of researching the nature of 
the universe, from which (ex hon) we have derived 
philosophy, the greatest good that has been gifted to 
mortals by the gods. 
At 90b-c, in its turn, we are told that, whoever has 
devoted himself to love of knowledge and true thoughts, 
must think things immortal and divine (phronein athanata 
kai theia) -if he be in contact with truth-, participate 
in immortality (as far as is possible for human nature) 
and be happy. What are those athanata kai theia that one 
must think? We know that 'athanata kai theia' is an 
expression that Plato uses in previous dialogues for the 
e1 for the implication that it is wrong to suppose that the firmest 
proof about the heavens is obtained through the sense of sight. On 
the subject see e. g. Vlastos (1980: 6-8). 
23 It is quite telling, in this respect, that the text speaks of 
apprehending the harmonies and revolutions of the All (tas tou pantos 
harmonias to kai periphoras, 90d3-4), taking into account that the 
World-Soul itself is said to participate in logismos and harmonia 
(36e6-37a1), being composed of mathematical intervals (35b-36a). 
24 At Tim. 36d2-3 we read that "the inner circle [of the Other] was 
divided six times into seven unequal circles, according to each 
interval of the double and triple [proportions]", in a way that 
remits to the double and triple intervals into which the World Soul 
is divided at 35b-c, on the basis of the numbers 1,2,3,4,8,9, 
27 which form two geometrical (square and cubic) progressions. In the 
light of this, Tim. 36d2-3 would then suggest that the distances 
between the planetary orbits correspond to the six intervals between 
the seven terms of the series, 1,2,3,4,8,9,27; though the way 
that happens, as Cornford (1937: 79) has remarked, is subject to 
different interpretations. The simplest view seems to be that these 
figures measure the radii of successive orbits, so that the radius of 
the Moon's orbit equals one, that of the the Sun's 2, and so on up to 
Saturn whose radius or distance from the Earth would equal 27. In 
this line of interpretation see e. g. Brisson (1974: 40-1). For 
different interpretations in antiquity see Heath (1913: 164). 
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Ideas (Phaedo 80b1,81a5 -cf. 79d-80a-, Rep. X 611e2-3); 
and aletheias ephaptetai in 90c1-2 immediately recalls 
tou alethous ephaptomenoi in Symp. 212a5, where the 
allusion is to an Idea. But athanata kai theia could also 
here include -as well as the Ideas- the "harmonies and 
revolutions of the All" which, some lines immediately 
below (90c-d), we are recommended to learn and intellect, 
thus "assimilating that which thinks to the object of 
thought" (90d3-4) and so taking care of the daimon that 
is within us by furnishing it with its proper motions. 
Let us remember, in this respect, that the heavenly 
bodies have been called theia kai aidia at 40b5, and the 
universe a god as we have seen. The openness of the 
passage is suggestive, since, by allowing that the human 
mind can have access to the divine either in the form of 
the cosmic god, or the Ideas, Plato would be allowing 
that human beings can be happy in either way, and 
therefore without necessarily being philosophers, but 
just by studying astronomy. 25 
But why does astronomy contribute to human happiness? 
Whereas in the Republic the ethical consequences of the 
study of astronomy were not particularly highlighted, 26 
they are in the Timaeus: We should learn astronomy, or 
the unperturbed revolutions of intellect in heaven, in 
order to correct the wandering revolutions of our thought 
(47b-c, cf. 39b4-cl), which underwent perturbations at 
25 If, as I have argued in the previous chapter, intellect in heaven 
belongs to the order of the primary or "divine" causes, then it 
becomes clear why, at 68e7-69a2, it is recommended that we should 
search for the divine kind of cause in all things so as to acquire a 
happy life insofar as our nature permits. 
26 It is certainly clear that the function of astronomy, as much as 
that of all the propaedeutic sciences, is to be conducive to ousia 
and the Good in the Republic (see e. g. VII 523a, 527b, d-e, 532c); 
though not much is explicitly said about the ethical immediate 
advantages that such a study could convey independently of 
its 
function as a prelude to dialectic. For an attempt to draw out the 
ethical implications of mathematics in the Republic cf. Burnyeat 
(1987: 238-40, esp. 240), though here again the emphasis is only put 
on the training of the politician, and not people 
in general as I 
shall be claiming for the Timaeus. 
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our birth (43a-e) . 27 Only if they are working properly can 
those revolutions rule (44a-b). And Plato, as we have 
seen, also in the Timaeus makes happiness lie in a life 
based in the rule of reason (cf. e. g. 90c5-6, where the 
meaning of the word eudaimön is d erived analytically from 
having one's daimon -i. e. one's reason- in good order) . 
Now, we can see that the astronomical universe will 
provide a proximate model for human behaviour; something 
that has two kinds of consequences, non-immediate, for 
the philosopher, and immediate, for every kind of person. 
Astronomy will serve a most important function towards 
knowledge of the Ideas by the philosopher since studying 
astronomy makes our rational soul orderly (i. e. helps it 
regain its own mathematical proportion -43d-44c-28 in 
accordance with that of the universe). And only if the 
revolutions of our reason are working properly can we 
have access to truth at all (44a-b), be it concerned with 
sensibles or, particularly for our purposes, with Ideas 
as the object of episteme and nous (37b3-c3). That is 
why, at 90b-d, the only way we could know the Ideas would 
be through learning the harmonies and revolutions of the 
whole celestial system. If this is so, astronomy would in 
the Timaeus be an indispensable step towards philosophy 
proper. 29 The propaedeutic character of astronomy was 
certainly indicated in the Republic (VII, 528e ff. ), but 
now it presents by itself also a religious function. We 
should thus "assimilate that which thinks to the object 
of thought" (90d4), and having assimilated it 
(homoiosanta, d5), achieve the end of the best life that 
27 These perturbations prevail in the infant soul but can also 
continue in adult life, thus being the cause of diseases and evil for 
the soul, though "one must strive, as far as one can, through nurture 
and one's practices and studies to escape evil and choose (helein) 
the contrary" (87b6-8). 
28 cf. esp. 44b8-c2 and infra, n. 35. 
29 As noted by Brisson (1992a: 62,246-7 n. 321 and 325) and 
suggested by Sedley (1991: 376-7). In this chapter I try to explain 
in more detail how that can be possible. 
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the gods put before men. This homoiosis is conceived 
mainly in terms of communion with god, 30 specifically here 
with the god of the universe (cf. tou pantos 90c8, d3) . 31 
And in this way god would have a mediating role in 
enabling man to participate in the Ideas. Its mediation 
would be both epistemological (since only by knowing god 
in its mathematical proportion -and thus becoming 
orderly- can our reason know the Ideas), religious (since 
only participation in this god allows for a further 
participation in the highest level of the divine) and 
ethical (as a step towards the happy philosophical life). 
The macrocosm, in its constant regularity, would provide 
us with the pattern which we should follow in the first 
instance in order to become truly just and wise. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that, whereas the middle 
dialogues tended to stress the relation of affinity and 
similarity between the human being and the Ideas (cf. 
e. g. Phaedo 79d3, e1,84b2, Rep. VI 487a5,490b4, X 611e2 
for sungeneia, Phaedo 79b16, e1,80b3, Rep. VI 500c5 for 
homoiösis), the Timaeus stresses the affinity or 
similarity between the human being and god. 32 Microcosmic 
reason has been made in the Timaeus to have the same kind 
of motion and share the same nature as the macrocosmic 
one -and to proceed from the same mythical source- (41d) 
and this entitles the former to be called "athanatois 
homönumon" (41c6). It is then by virtue of this kindred 
nature (cf. Tim. 47b8,90a5, c8 for sungeneia) that man 
can become similar to god (homoiösanta, 90d5), 
participate in him (metaschontes, 47c2) or imitate him 
(mimoumenoi, 47c2) as the model of behaviour that human 
30 Plato stresses similarity with god as an aim to be striven for by 
humans in several dialogues. Cf. Theaet. 176b1-2: homoiösis theöi 
kata to dunaton; also Rep. X 613b1, Phaedrus 253b-c and Laws IV 716c- 
d. 
31 Cf. Festugiere (1949: 138-9), followed by Lopez (1963: 196). For 
the foreshadowing of Hellenistic conceptions of man as citizen of the 
universe see Solmsen (1983: 365). I don't see any basis for claiming 
that this resemblance with god is a process that cannot be achieved 
during our earthly existence -as Lovibond (1991: 55) seems to 
suggest; the text at 90d5-7 rather speaks of "the best life put 
before men by the gods both for the present and for the future time". 
32 Cf. Des Places (1964: 88); Kucharski (1966: 327). 
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reason should follow (47c-d, 90d). But, in turn, the 
Ideas are the model that is imitated by god, not only in 
his demiurgic presentation (29a, 37c-d, 39e), but also by 
the universe and the heavenly bodies, whose motions 
constitute time (39d1) and which would, like time, 
imitate as far as possible, through their regularity, the 
ummovable paradigm of eternity (37c-38b; 39d7-e2). 33 
In this way, the human ascent towards the Ideas would 
involve several intermediary levels: Whereas human reason 
is a daimon that connects terrestrial man with the 
celestial gods (cf. 90a), god in turn would be a link 
between human reason and the Ideas in a first level of 
paradeigmatism, which would facilitate the ascent towards 
the second level. 34 But it is also possible that other 
human beings than philosophers (namely the majority) 
could take the celestial god as their only model, without 
further ascent. 
3. In that respect, the study of astronomy provides also 
immediate results, since an orderly intellect serves to 
make us act rightly. Hence we find the Timaeus promising 
that if a man uses the rational part of his soul to rule 
over his passions (something to which the appropriate 
paideia contributes, 44b8-c2,35 cf. 86e1-2,87b) he will 
be just and happy and free from reincarnation (42b), 
though it predicts transformation into lower animals for 
those who haven't studied astronomy properly -either they 
just did it with their senses, or they didn't do it at 
all (91d-e). In this way, the study of astronomy, which 
is recommended as the same therapeia for everybody (panti 
33 See menei and kata tauta used of the stars at 40b5-6 (cf. 40a8-bl) 
and menontos used of the eternity of the Ideas at 37d6 and kata tauta 
of the Ideas at 38a3,52a1. 
34 This mediating function can also be seen in the Phaedrus, where it 
is the traditional gods (though with a special emphasis on their 
noetic aspect, 247c-d) who lead the procession of souls to 
contemplate the Ideas (cf. 247a, 248a, 250b). On this see Ferrari 
(1987: 127-32). 
35 Cornford (1937: ad loc. ) identifies this paideia as astronomy, in 
the light of 47c. 
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mia, 90c6; cf. hekaston dei at 90d1), 36 would seem to 
secure a way of happiness for any individual. If this is 
so, in contrast e. g. with the Phaedo where happiness -and 
liberation- strictly speaking only belonged to the 
philosopher (cf. 80e-81a), 37 Plato's views in the Timaeus 
would come closer to those expressed in other later 
dialogues, such as the Philebus and the Laws. In the 
Philebus, in fact, Plato is concerned about a mixed life 
of knowledge and pleasure that would make every rational 
being happy (cf. an thröpoi s pasi, 11d5). The epi s teme at 
36 Speaking in general terms about the care and health of every 
zöion, the Timaeus states that in order to avoid disproportion 
between body and soul the only solution is neither to move (kinein) 
soul without body, nor body without soul -87d, 88b- (and then, e. g., 
practice gymnastics together with mathematics, 88c); but we know in 
the light of 90c-d that, as far as our rational soul is concerned, 
the motion recommended to it is the learning of the kindred motions 
of the universe. 
37 Certainly, the Republic can be seen already as an attempt to 
extend happiness to the whole of society, given its emphasis that the 
state founded there pursues the happiness not only of the guardians 
but also of the rest of the polis (IV 420b, 466a). But this happiness 
seems in the end parasitic on the ideal conditions established by the 
rule of a philosopher. So, at I 354a the just man is said to be 
happy, and at VII 521a the happy man must have the wealth of a wise 
and virtuous life. But at IV 443c-d we learn that justice in the soul 
lies in each part of the soul doing its own, thus bringing about 
self-rule and internal order: a just action will be that which helps 
to preserve this condition of the soul, and wisdom (sophia) the 
science which supervises (epistatousan epistemen) that action (443e). 
But, strictly speaking, wisdom based in episteme does not seem to lie 
within every ordinary individual, but just in the philosopher. For it 
is only thanks to the smallest group, which rules, that a polis can 
be said to be "wise as a whole"; and it is the knowledge of the ruler 
which is the only true wisdom (IV 428e-429a). So, e. g., a soldier in 
the ideal city has right opinion about the things that he has been 
taught to fear (IV 429b-c), but it is only the philosopher who can 
justify -and impart- that right opinion in the light of his 
particular knowledge (cf. VII 520c). Without the latter no happiness 
seems in the end guaranteed for either the individual or the polis in 
the Republic; whereas the role of astronomy in the Timaeus seems to 
provide a means to happiness in principle independent of philosophy, 
or of any ideal rule that could be exercised by the philosopher. (For 
further discussion of this issue in the Republic cf. Vlastos [1969b: 
136-9], Annas [1981: 136 ff., 306 ff. ], Irwin [1995: 229 ff. ]. ) 
Of course certainly we still need in the Timaeus a good kind of 
education, but this could exist within a bad form of government as a 
way of counteracting it, cf. Tim 87b: we become evil when the forms 
of government are bad and bad discourse is made in the cities 
privately and publicly, and when, furthermore (eti), no lessons 
(mathemata) that could be curative of those [i. e. those bad forms of 
government and discourse] are learned from a young age". 
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stake here includes not only the precise knowledge of the 
Ideas -a sense however that it keeps (as the "truer", 
61d10-e4), 38 together with nous and phronesis (58d6-7, 
59d1)- but is given -together with the others-39 a 
strikingly wide sense (cf. 59b7,61d10-e3) that, by 
including right opinions (cf. 58e-59b, esp. 59a1 with 
59b7), allows everybody to participate in it. In like 
manner we can find some uses in the Timaeus of the term 
philosophia, in a wide sense that applies to fields other 
than the Ideas (cf. e. g. 88b-c, where pases philosophias 
and mathematics are advised to be exercised as a 
counterpart to gymnastics in order for anyone to deserve 
being called kalos kai agathos). 
The Laws (VII 809c-d, 817e-818c), for its part, and 
unlike the Republic, 40 makes more explicit the need for 
every citizen to study astronomy (and mathematics in 
general), 41 and distinguishes two kinds: a less accurate 
kind (to be learnt by the majority) 42 and a more accurate 
38 In like manner dialectic will also keep its privileged position of 
access to the Ideas. Cf. Phil. 57e6 ff., 58d4 ff. 
39 For this wide sense as regards nous see 59b7; and as regards 
phronesis see 19b (which speaks of kinds of phronesis that need to be 
divided, like epistemai at 13e-14a), and 61d (where the question is 
posed whether all kinds of pleasure or all kinds of phronesis should 
be included in the mixture, and the text immediately passes on to 
distinguish different kinds of episteme, as if this and phronesis 
were synonyms). 
40 Let us remember that in the Republic mathematical studies appear 
as indispensable only in the curriculum of those who are candidates 
to be guardians of the state (VII 521c ff. ). 
41 The importance of astronomy, and mathematics in general, is 
highlighted in several respects: (i) mathematics quickens the mind 
(cf. Rep. VII 526b) and improves one's own nature (para ten hautou 
phusin epididonta, V, 747b5-6); (ii) a basic but sufficient knowledge 
of astronomy facilitates comprehension of the workings of the 
calendar as far as it is necessary for the administration of the city 
(VII 809c-d); (iii) it helps prevent impiety and blasphemous 
statements about the heavenly bodies (821c-e); (iv) it is a necessary 
condition for man's becoming "divine" (theios genesthai), i. e. for 
his attaining his best state (818c). Cf. Dicks (1970: 137-8). 
42 After stating that every free man should learn arithmetic, 
metretike and astronomy (VII 817e), Plato recognizes explicitly that 
it is not necessary that hoi polloi should do that di'akribeias, for 
that "is not easy nor at all possible for everybody" (818a). In other 
words, Plato is still aware of the limitations of the majority of 
people (as much as he was in the Republic when stating that "it 
is 
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one (this would be compulsory only for the guardians of 
the state, cf. XII 965a-b, 966c ff., esp. 967d4-968a4) . 43 
The Timaeus does not distinguish between these two kinds 
of astronomy, but it at least highlights its importance 
for general education in a way that anticipates the more 
detailed treatment of the Laws. 44 
III. CONCLUSION 
In sum, we can find in the Timaeus a Plato who, on the 
one hand, retains the belief of the middle dialogues that 
the Ideas are the ultimate goal of the philosopher, 45 
though, on the other hand, he is now more worried, 
firstly, about bridging the gap between us and the Ideas 
and, secondly, about finding some guarantee of right 
behaviour and therefore happiness for every kind of 
person. In both respects the study of astronomy, that is, 
the intellection of the cosmic god or gods, proves to 
serve a most important ethical function. God can either 
be the only model of human behaviour, or a step towards 
higher goals. And in the latter sense we have seen how 
god turns out to be a mediator not only at a metaphysical 
impossible that the crowd be philosophic" VI 494a4), though now 
positively willing to maximize their capacities. 
43 This difference is one between more basic or simpler pieces of 
knowledge and more complex or detailed ones, not between what is more 
or less true. For Plato says that even the less accurate kind 
comprises what is anankaion in mathematical studies, a necessity that 
binds even the gods (818b) and must be known as the right basis for 
further study (cf. tauta estin ha dei labonta orthös pröta epi talla 
ionta toutön hegoumenön tön methematön manthanein, 818d6-8), even by 
the one who is going to take care of humans (818c2). Plato in 
addition complains in the subsequent lines that it is worse to learn 
something in the wrong way than to be absolutely inexperienced about 
these things (819a3-6). 
44 As far as I am aware, this particular aspect of the Timaeus hasn't 
received due attention from other scholars. Kung (1989), while 
noting the importance of mathematical studies for human virtue (309), 
doesn't however draw any distinction between the philosopher and 
ordinary people in this regard, nor does she point out any difference 
between the ethical treatment of astronomy in the Republic on the one 
hand, and the Timaeus and the Laws on the other, which she takes as 
exhibiting the same line of thought (cf. ibidem). 
45 Cf. e. g. Phaedo 66b ff., Rep. VI 504d-505b, VII 540a-b. 
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level, by connecting the sensible realm in general with 
the Ideas, but also at an ethical, epistemological and 
religious level for human beings. And, even though in the 
first sense god could partly appear mythically as a 
personal Demiurge, we have seen how that mediation is in 
the cosmos actually fulfilled by the World-Soul and the 
heavenly bodies, for whose status as gods the text 
supplies plentiful evidence. And this is, in the end, the 
kind of god that matters from an ethical perspective, 
the god that can be seen, learned and argued for. 46 
46 For Plato's detailed argument for the existence of god, which, as 
Craig (1980: 15) has noted, goes no further than the World-Soul and 
the heavenly bodies, see infra, ch. 7 on Laws X. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that no separate nous 
(such as one could think of the Demiurge to be) apart from the cosmic 
god plays any role in the cognitive ascent of the soul towards the 
Ideas, so that one could wonder, if one wanted to posit the Demiurge 
as a nous separate from that of the world, whether there would be any 
point in building a metaphysics which has no epistemological 
correlate for every level. (Note that in later Platonism, e. g. 
Plotinus -cf. Enn. V1 10 with VI 9 3-4- the correlation between the 
metaphysical on the one hand, and the epistemological and the ethical 
on the other, is particularly emphasized. ) 
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CHAPTER 4 
PERAS, APEIRON AND CAUSE IN THE PHILEBUS 
The passage of the Philebus (14-31) dealing with the 
problem of one and many and the notions of peras and 
apeiron has proved to be one of the most obscure and 
controversial in the history of Platonic interpretation. 
Do these notions apply to the Ideas? If so, what does it 
mean to say that Ideas can contain "infinitude" in them? 
Do they also apply to the sensible realities -and again, 
what does this mean in that case? Or are there no 
transcendent Ideas in the Philebus, so that Plato has 
changed his view from that which is taken to be typical 
of the middle dialogues? ' Or, perhaps, should we change 
our approach based only on the dialogues and look to 
Aristotle's report on "Plato's unwritten doctrines" to 
find a clue to the interpretation of the Philebus? 2 And 
what is the purpose of this passage in a dialogue which 
is mostly devoted to elucidating the nature of pleasure 
and its place in a happy life? These are some of the 
questions that the pages under discussion provoke. 
Some recent attention has been paid to the Philebus 
though little, to my knowledge, has been written on the 
cosmological aspects of the dialogue. In this chapter I 
shall be dealing mainly with the cosmological import of 
the notion of "cause" and its interaction with the 
related concepts of peras, apeiron and mixture in Phil. 
1 As is suggested e. g. by Owen (1953: 321 n. 3,338), Teloh (1981: 
179-80,186,188) and, from a different perspective, Sayre (1983: 10- 
3,160-3). In an agnostic position, though sympathetic to 
revisionism, cf. Shiner (1974: esp. 67-8). 
2 For an extreme line that minimizes the importance of the written 
dialogues, cf. e. g. Kraemer (1982) and Gaiser (1963). Sayre, on the 
other hand, relies on Aristotle but contends that what he refers to 
as the unwritten doctrines can in fact be found in the dialogues (cf. 
1983: 11-3); whereas Kolb (1983: 510) claims that the unwritten 
doctrines stand behind Plato's Philebus not as a necessary 
presupposition but as a helpful guide for the discussion of many of 
the problems there. 
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23c-31a. Therefore 
other problems exce 
on the assumption 
sufficient material 
be made. 3 However, 
what I consider to 
discussion. 
I shall not be concerned with the 
pt indirectly. I shall also be working 
that Plato's text itself gives us 
to allow a coherent interpretation to 
I shall start by setting out briefly 
be the background to the cosmological 
I. THE CONTEXT FOR THE COSMOLOGICAL DISCUSSION 
The problem to be studied arises in the context of the 
ethical purpose of the dialogue, which is to decide how 
human beings can achieve a happy life and what is the 
good for them, be it intelligence, pleasure, or a life 
superior to both (cf. llb-12a). Now, this problem 
involves, to start with, two separate discussions which 
deal with the notions of peras and apeiron. I shall try 
to show that the latter (23c-31a) is cosmological. As to 
the former (14c-19b), I take it, with many scholars, 4 to 
be dialectical, in the sense that it deals with -and is 
basically a reflection on- the process of division 
(diairesis, 15a7, cf. dielön 14e1) of monads into further 
subkinds, the emphasis being put on the Ideas, or those 
monads which are beyond generation and corruption (14d 
ff., esp. 15a-b) .5 The point would be to show how each 
3 For a full recent discussion of the problem of Plato's unwritten 
doctrines see Methexis 6 (1993), which is devoted to the subject. 
4 Cf. Bury (1897: xxxv-xxxix); Taylor (1926: 412); Cornford (1935: 
186); Robin (1938: 68-70); Hackforth (1945: 21); Cherniss (1945: 18), 
(1947: 234); Ross (1951: 131 ff. ); R. Robinson (1953: 70,162,231- 
2); Friedlaender (1969: 319-21); Grube (1980: 44-5); Davidson (1990: 
33 ff., 174-5); Hampton (1990: 23-8); D. Frede (1992: 427), (1993: 
xxix-xxx); De Chiara-Quenzer (1993: 41-2). For a different line, cf. 
e. g. Gosling (1975: 196 ff). 
5 It is the use of the appropriate method of dealing with the one and 
the many which distinguishes the dialectical from the eristic method 
of discussion at 17a (and so Waterfield [1980: 282] may be right that 
"the passage is best read, then, simply as a recommendation of 
scientific analysis in general, as Socrates' remark at 16c2-3 
suggests", since the method is said to be applicable to all 
disciplines). However, at 57e-58a, dialectic is also characterized in 
terms of its object: the eternal, true and identical being (cf. d4- 
5). We can then still talk of Ideas in the Philebus, at least in the 
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generic monad contains a limited number of kinds 
mediating between it and the indefinite quantity (apeira) 
of sensibles in which it is ultimately "dispersed" (cf. 
15b). Each initial monad, we can say, would then be 
limited in itself and in the number of kinds falling 
under it, as well as being paradoxically split up in the 
infinitude -as indefinite number- of sensibles that 
participate in it. The notions of peras and apeiron seem 
to have an application in this context which will 
contrast with their application6 in the following passage 
(23c ff. ) .7 
The shift from the former to the latter is however 
coherent. 8 The text comes back to the initial question 
about intellect and pleasure and which of them is 
preferable, and says it is important to determine how 
sense that here Plato still posits a realm of entities that is 
eternal, stable, divine, apprehensible by the highest form of 
cognition and irreducible to the realm of genesis (cf. 57e-58a, 59c- 
d, 61e-62a). It is with these non-generated entities that Plato is 
mainly concerned in this passage (cf. 15a-b), even though the method 
at stake here -division aiming at classification- can be applied more 
widely than to the Ideas. Cf. infra, note 14. For this twofold use of 
dialectic cf. D. Frede (1993: 71 n. 1). 
6 Note that, while in the former passage peras and apeiron are 
instrumental notions governing the method of division, in the latter 
(23c ff. ) they themselves become objects of division. Other 
differences will become clearer later, though there will still be a 
common denominator insofar as peras will be connected with number and 
apeiron with lack of definite quantity. 
7 The crucial text in the dialectical context as regards these 
notions is 16c9-10: "the things that are always said to exist consist 
of one and many and contain naturally the finite and the infinite" 
(ex henos men kai pollön ontön tön aei legomenön einai, peras de kai 
apeirian en hautois sumphuton echontön). The expression tön aei 
legomenön einai can be taken to refer to the Ideas (cf. e. g. Striker 
[1970: 18-22]), or to reality in general including both sensibles and 
Ideas (cf. e. g. Waterfield [1980: 282], Benitez [1989: 41-2]), 
but 
in either case Ideas would appear to be included, since the context 
is those monads which escape generation and corruption 
(15a-b, cf. 
Parm. 128e-131c), and since the method at stake is meant to 
have a 
wide scope, for through it all the arts have been 
discovered (16c2- 
3), among which the art concerned specifically with the 
Ideas (57e- 
58a) should a fortiori be included. Cf. D. Frede 
(1993: xxix). Pace 
Gosling (1975: 84). 
8 The shift is marked by the assertion, at 23b-c, that 
"other 
weapons" are needed than those of the previous 
discussion, and that 
we should make a new beginning (arche). 
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many and of what sort (hoposa kai hopoia, 19b3) are the 
kinds of pleasure and wisdom. In this respect the 
divisional search proves to be vital and will be 
extremely useful in the second part of the dialogue (31b 
ff. ), which precisely sets out to divide pleasure and 
episteme in order to establish which kinds of each of 
them ought to play a part in a happy and good human life. 
But we can also see, Socrates says, that neither a life 
of mere pleasure nor a life of mere knowledge would be 
self-sufficient (hikanon, 20d4, cf. autarkeia 67a7) and 
therefore the truly good life, desirable and complete for 
everyone. For nobody would like, for example, to feel 
pleasure without remembering it or being conscious of it; 
nor would one like to have wisdom without feeling 
pleasure in it (20e-21e). In this way a mixture of hedone 
and nous seems to be a better way of living than each 
taken separately. Though, Socrates contends, even in this 
case nous seems to be more akin than pleasure to that by 
taking which the mixed life becomes both choiceworthy and 
good (22d) It is precisely in order to clarify this 
point that Socrates introduces a fourfold classification 
of everything in the cosmos into peras, apeiron, the 
mixture of these and the cause. As we shall see, the 
purpose of this division is to show that the good life 
corresponds to the kind of the mixture, pleasure to the 
class of apeiron and intellect to the class of the cause. 
Against this background, I shall be focusing on the 
cosmological passage at Phil. 23c-31a and its fourfold 
classification. The aim of this chapter will be to show 
that the passage under discussion is in fact 
cosmological, i. e. concerned with the sensible universe 
as a whole -including both its body and soul- or with 
entities within it. In that context, I propose to analyse 
the four genera of the Philebus and the place and role of 
nous within the classification. The analysis will in turn 
be illuminated by a comparison with the Timaeus. 
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I shall be arguing that the Philebus provides a 
cosmological account which -despite the differences 
between these dialogues- shows connections with the one 
in the Timaeus and is particularly rich in emphasizing 
the causal role of nous as a principle of the existence 
and teleological arrangement of the cosmos by virtue of 
the imposition of peras upon apeiron; a principle, 
however, that should be taken as inherent in the universe 
it sustains, which, again, stands by itself as a model 
for human beings to follow in their pursuit of the good. 
II. THE REALM CLASSIFIED 
In Phil. 23c4-5 Socrates suggests dividing "all the 
things that now exist in the whole" (panta to nun onta en 
toi panti) "into two, or rather, if you wish, into three 
[classes]" (i. e. apeiron, peras and the mixture of the 
two), to which he will afterwards add a fourth: the 
cause. 
Now, what kind of reality is Plato classifying in this 
passage? The question is controversial, perhaps because 
Plato has just been dealing with the notions of peras and 
apeiron in a dialectical context. This could then make us 
believe that the scope of the fourfold distinction at 23c 
ff. includes not only sensible realities but also the 
realm of Ideas, as some interpreters have thought. 9 My 
purpose is not to deny that the notions of peras and 
apeiron can be predicated of the Ideas, since this seems 
to be allowed in the preceding discussion. However, I 
think in this passage those notions are used in a 
different manner and apply to different entities, in a 
way that makes it unlikely that Ideas are being 
considered here. I shall attempt to show how this is so 
9 See, for example, Jackson (1882: 283 ff. ), Rodier (1926: 87), and, 
from a different perspective, Sayre (1983: 161 ff. ), who think of 
Ideas as a kind of mixed reality according to that classification. 
Cf. infra, note 14. 
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and hence follow the cosmological interpretation of the 
passage . 10 
In the first place, the nun in the expression to nun onta 
en toi panti would seem a rather awkward way of referring 
to the Ideas, " which are in fact called onta aei at Phil. 
61e3. Moreover, there are several contextual reasons for 
taking the expression to nun onta en toi panti to apply 
only to the sensible universe, the main one being that, 
apart from the occurrence of to pan here -at 23c4-, all 
the other references to to pan in this passage which 
extends up to 31a appear to refer to the physical 
universe. Thus, we have the allusions to the kosmos at 
Phil. 28e4, and to to pan as a synonym of the kosmos, in 
the passage concerning the analogy between macro and 
microcosm at 29a-30a. (Cf. to pan contrasted with par' 
hemin at 29b9-10, cl-2, c6, d2,30a3-6 and the parallel 
use of kosmos contrasted with par' heroin at 29e1-6. ) When 
we are told, for example, about fire en toi panti at 29b- 
c, or that the body of to pan has a soul, at 30a, it is 
obvious that the meaning of to pan here cannot be other 
than the sensible universe. The governance of nous is 
said to be exerted on to pan at 30d8 (aei tou pantos nous 
archei), or on heaven and earth at 28c7-8 (nous esti 
basileus hemin ouranou kai ges), so that to pan in the 
first case must again refer to the sensible universe as 
in the second case (as must to holon at 28d5-6, in the 
context of discussing if nous governs "the totality of 
things and this which is called the whole", to sumpanta 
kai Lode to kaloumenon Kolon). In addition, when Plato 
recapitulates the discussion of the four genera at 30a-c, 
he considers them in the context of "the whole universe" 
10 The cosmological interpretation is also held e. g. by Taylor (1926: 
417); Hackforth (1945: 37); Ross (1951: 136-8). 
11 Cf. Waterfield (1980: 303 n. 61). Pace Striker (1970: 72), 
Moravcsik (1979: 94), Benitez (1989: 68), Hampton (1990: 40). See 
also the Timaeus (38a), where Plato establishes a distinction between 
time and eternity and speaks of the word "now" (nun, a5) as a 
determination that applies exclusively to the temporal realm of 
becoming and is alien to the eternity of the Ideas. Cf. Tarän (1979: 
43-5). 
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(ouranos, b5), it being evident that ouranos here has the 
same meaning as to pan at 30c4 and 23c4.12 
For these reasons it seems so far that the passage under 
discussion is cosmological. This interpretation will be 
strengthened if we analyse the instances of the four 
classes. 13 To this I shall now turn. I shall characterize 
the four kinds as they are presented in the text, trying 
to deal with some of the problems that arise, especially 
as regards the status of the cause. Then I shall proceed 
to a comparison with the cosmology of the Timaeus. 
III. THE FOURFOLD CLASSIFICATION 
As we saw, the four classes14 into which the Whole is 
divided are the following: 
12 For a similar cosmological use of these terms in other dialogues 
cf. e. g., for holon, Tim. 33a7, Laws X 903b5, etc.; for ouranos, Tim. 
28b2,34b5,37e2,38b6,52d4, Pol. 269d7, Laws X 896e1,899b8; for to 
pan, Pol. 269c4,270b7,272e3-4, Tim. 28c4,29d7,30b5,37d2,44d3, 
47a7,48a5,69cl, 88d6,92c4, Laws X 903b-c; for kosmos, Tim. 28b3, 
29a2, b2,30b7,31b2,32c6,42e9,92c6, Pol. 269d8, e8,272e5,273b6, 
e6,274d6, Laws VII 821a2. 
13 We shall see, for example, that Plato treats or alludes to the 
mixture and its components as gignomena, something that he would 
however deny of the Ideas. 
14 Again, the question might arise whether these four kinds 
themselves are Ideas, as for example Dies (1941: XCII-XCIV), Striker 
(1970: 49-50,77-81) and D. Frede (1993: xxxviii, xxxix) have 
interpreted. This might be suggested not only because of the use of 
the words eidos or genos (cf. e. g. 23c-d) but also because there is 
classification of a unity into different species involving collection 
and division (cf. sunagein at 23e5 and 25a3, where Socrates speaks of 
collecting the varieties of unlimited together in order to discern 
their common nature; for allusions to the process of division, see 
e. g. 23d). As to the latter point, Trevaskis has however shown that 
not every kind of division needs to be concerned with Ideas (1967: 
124-8). As to the former, it seems quite clear that the terms to 
eidos and to genos need not have the metaphysical meaning of "Idea", 
but can simply have the logical sense of "class" or "kind" into which 
something can be divided. With an analogous meaning Plato speaks e. g. 
in the Timaeus of model, copy and the receptacle as three eide or 
gene of things (cf. Tim. 48e-49a, 50c7-d2,52a) and in the Phaedo 
(79a6-7) of the visible and the invisible as duo eide tön ontön. 
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1. To apeiron. We are told that a distinctive mark 
(semeion, 24e5, cf. 26c9-d2) of the nature of to apeiron 
is to admit of more or less (tes to mallon to kai hetton 
dechomenes phuseos, 25c10-11, cf. 24e7-8: apeira are 
things that become -gignomena- more and less) It 
includes contraries such as hot-cold, violent-gentle, 
quick-slow, dry-wet, great-small, acute-grave, pleasure- 
pain, etc. (cf. 24e-25a, 25c-d, 26a, 27e), since we can 
conceive (cf. noesais 24a8) indefinitely of "colder" or 
"hotter" and so on. Things under this genus have 
therefore the property of not having beginning, middle or 
end (31a) -they are atele (24b8) -, i. e. , they lack a 
precise quantity -poson- (cf. 24c-d). We also read that 
apeira such as hot and cold "are always progressing and 
never at rest" (prochorei kai ou menei... aei 24d4), which 
suggests also lack of fixity and discrete quantity. We 
could then say that apeiron is related to a continuum 
which extends indefinitely in either direction (e. g. 
temperature), and each opposite in a given pair refers to 
a direction in the continuum (e. g. hot-cold) . 15 In that 
respect, we can take apeiron in this context to mean 
quantitative indeterminacy -or indeterminacy in degree-, 
which is to be found on a scale of opposite qualities. 16 
2. To peras. This genus is strongly related to quantity 
(poson) and measure (metrion) -as implied by their 
15 Cf. Benitez (1989: 71-2). 
16 The difference in application of to apeiron in this context from 
its occurrence in the dialectical context becomes clearer now. 
Apeiron in a dialectical context applies to a discrete series of 
sensibles, the number of which is indeterminate; whereas here apeiron 
means whatever admits of more and less on a continuum. Each of the 
infinite possible degrees in a continuum can, in addition, have an 
indefinite number of discrete instances. Neither of these features 
implies the other. For example, there could be only three hot things 
in the universe and still temperature would be apeiron as a 
continuum. Conversely, there could be an indefinite number of oxen in 
the universe without the property of being an ox admitting an 
infinite number of degrees. This does not preclude that one thing can 
be apeiron in both senses, for example pleasure -which is apeiron kai 
plethei kai toi mallon, 27e- and sound -cf. 17b ff., 26a. 
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absence from to apeiron at 24c-d-, and includes all those 
"things which do not admit these things [sc. more or 
less] but everything that admits the opposites of these 
things: first the equal and equality, and after the 
equal the double, and everything that is number in 
relation to number or measure in relation to measure" 
(pan ho tiger an pros ari thmon ari thmos e me Iron ei pros 
metron, 25a6-b2). 17 (For example, we might say, equality 
is the relation 1: 1; the double is the relation 2: 1, 
etc. ) More generally, peras is "whatever stops opposites 
being different from one another, and by introducing 
number, makes them proportionate and harmonious" (hopose 
pauei pros allela tanantia diaphorös echonta, summetra de 
kai sumphona entheisa arithmon apergazetai, 25d11-e2). 
Limit is that with which measure is imposed (26d9). Law 
and order (nomon kai taxin) would then be examples of 
peras echonta (26b). 1-8 We are told that, in contrast 
with apeiron, "quantity" -conveyed by peras- "stands 
still and has stopped advancing" (to poson este kai 
proion epausato) (24d5). 
As we can see, peras is strongly connected with the 
mathematical proportion which is introduced in the 
continuum characterized by the apeiron, and which 
provides stability in contrast with the unceasing motion 
or progression of apeiron. Thus, for instance, when 
proportion is introduced in the pair "hotter-colder" a 
stable temperature results; when introduced in the pair 
"higher-lower" it produces e. g. the interval of a fifth, 
etc. This leads us directly to consideration of the third 
genus, since when peras is imposed upon to apeiron the 
mixture is produced. 
17 Compare the connection between the excess (1ian, 26a7) conveyed by 
to apeiron and the measure (to metrion) that removes the excess in 
the Philebus, with the importance of to metrion as that which 
guarantees beauty and goodness (in this case, in the products of 
techne) in the Politicus, by contrast with excess and deficiency in 
relation to one another (283c-284e, esp. 284a-b). 
18 The second group opposed to apeiron is called peras (27b8) or 
peras echonta (24a2,26b2) indifferently. 
105 
3. The mixture. Socrates calls the third kind , the 
mixture (summeixis) of these", "the offspring of these" 
or "what is common" (koinon) -23d7,26d8,30a10. He also 
alludes to this reality as meikte kai gegenemene ousia 
(27b8-9) or "a generation that comes into being (genesis 
eis ousian) from the measures produced with limit" (26d8- 
9) . 19 
19 As some scholars have suggested, the apparent paradox involved in 
the expression -for those who are familiar with the contrasts between 
genesis and ousia e. g. in Rep. VII 534a and Tim. 29c3-, can however 
be resolved if we note that ousia in Plato does not always allude 
necessarily to the Ideas, but it can have the looser or wider sense 
of "reality" or "existence", being therefore applicable to any kind 
of being. Thus in Tim. 35a Plato speaks both of the sensible and the 
intelligible ousia; in Laws X 895d-896a ousia is used when speaking 
of soul as an example of the reality that corresponds to any name or 
definition. Cf. also Phaedo 79a6: duo eide tön ontön. In this 
respect, the expression genesis eis ousian at Phil. 26d8 could be 
interpreted as meaning that what is generated comes into existence, 
and gegenemene ousia as meaning that the mixture is a kind of 
generated reality. Therefore in these passages genesis need not be 
opposed to ousia but may be related to it as gignesthai may be 
related to einai, despite the fact that, in the other contexts 
mentioned, Plato contrasts genesis with ousia. Cf. Dies (1941: 
XXVIII-XXIX); Hackforth (1945: 49, n. 2); Cherniss (1957: 353); 
Bolton (1975: 87-9). This however cannot be taken to imply that Plato 
has abandoned in the Philebus any contrast or metaphysical 
distinction between Ideas as real being and becoming. On the 
contrary, the distinction is made explicit in Phil. 14c-15a and, 
despite the aporiai posed at 15b, it is emphatically restated at the 
end of the Philebus, 58e-59a, 61d-e. Cf. Cherniss (1957: 350 ff. ), 
Waterfield (1980: 284-5), Benitez (1989: 102-8). Contra Owen (1953: 
322-4). The contrast between genesis and ousia is kept also at 53c- 
54d, though the context doesn't here seem to be metaphysically loaded 
(cf. Waterfield [1980: 287]). 
Nonetheless, I would suggest that, without abandoning that 
distinction, Plato is, at least in the Philebus and the Timaeus, 
ready to bridge the gap between those opposing levels of reality at a 
cosmic level, by positing some intermediate reality which partakes of 
both. In the Timaeus this will be the World-Soul (or the cosmos qua 
having a Soul), which has an intermediate ousia between that of the 
Ideas and sensibles (35a); and genesis is used to describe both the 
chaotic becoming out of which the universe is made (cf. 52d3-4) and 
the sensible and orderly ensouled universe itself (e. g. genesis kai 
to pan tode at 29d7-el and genesis kai kosmos 29e4). The former, 
insofar as it lacks any stability, is in fact directly opposed to 
changeless ousia; and the contrast would still stand for the present 
cosmos, at least insofar as the latter is always changing in some way 
or other. However, Plato also makes it clear that the actual sensible 
universe also shares in some stability which is intelligently 
imposed 
(such as, in the Timaeus, that of the ratios which structure the 
World-Soul and the World-Body, cf. 31b-32c, 35b ff. ). Cf. note 54. In 
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There are many examples of this third kind. Health exists 
by virtue of the right combination (orthe koinonia) of 
peras and apeiron (cf. 25e7-8); music is created when 
limit is added to the high and the low, the quick and the 
slow, which are unlimited (26a2-4); the seasons arise 
when measure and proportion are brought about out of the 
illimitation of cold and warm (26a-b) . And, naturally, we 
have the example of the good life as a mixed life of 
pleasure (which in itself is unlimited) and order (cf. 
26b). But all these examples and many others (such as 
beauty, physical strength, etc., 26b5-6) represent 
particular cases within the more general framework of the 
ouranos or to pan (cf. 30a9-c7), which also and primarily 
exists by virtue of a right mixture of apeiron and 
peras. Indeed, the World-Body is said to be ensouled 
(empsuchon, 30a6), and all ensouled things (cf. to 
empsuchon eidos), Plato says at 32a9-bl, arise as a 
result of apeiron and peras. In other words, apeiron and 
the same fashion we can follow Gadamer's interesting interpretation 
of genesis eis ousian at Phil. 26d8, as I shall be doing at the end 
of section 5.3. For another view that endorses the "respectable view 
of becoming" in Plato's late dialogues -including Philebus and 
Timaeus-, though still within the coordinates of the genesis-ousia 
contrast, cf. Bolton (1975: 84-5) . Note also that, at Phil. 
43a, the 
theory that "hapanta anö to kai katö rhei" is attributed by Socrates 
to Protarchus (who initially appeared as a supporter of hedonism), as 
if hedonism. were committed to an ontological theory of flux; an 
argument, however, from which Socrates wants to escape (43a8), and 
which he concedes only for the sake of argument, to show how even on 
that premiss they must come back to his original suggestion (42d-e, 
which the theory of flux seemed to threaten) that there is such a 
state as having absence of pain and joy in the body (43c-e). Pace 
Mohr (1983: 169); the hypothetical rather than assertive character of 
the argument is noted by Shiner (1983: 177). 
At Philebus 59a-b Plato complains of those who, even if they think 
they investigate nature, spend their lives investigating how things 
in this world gegonen kai paschei kai poiei; though these things lack 
bebaioteta. As Teloh (1981: 185-6) remarks "the problem with bad 
craftsmen is not that they investigate those things concerning the 
kosmos (ta peri ton kosmon), but rather they seek only the mutable 
aspects of such things"; cf. D. Frede (1993: lxiii): the problem 
is 
not in the object but in the way we look at it. Certainly, 
it is 59b- 
d which gives the clue, by attributing bebaioteta to nous: 
If the 
cosmos itself has intellect -as has been argued at 
28c-30d- then it 
should at least to that extent have stability. 
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peras are properly combined both in the cosmos as a whole 
and in each of the things within it . 20 21 
However, we could still wonder what is the cause of that 
right imposition of peras upon apeiron that makes a fine 
mixture. Let us examine the fourth kind. 
4. The cause. The postulation of this kind is implied by 
the generation of the mixture, since "it is necessary 
that all things that come into being should do so through 
some cause" (Phil. 26e3-4, cf. Tim. 28a4-5,28c2-3, 
Phaedrus 245d1-2). This aitia is called to poioun and to 
demiourgoun (26e6-8,27a5, bl-2) and sophia, phronesis 
and nous are included in this class (28a-d, 30c). Its 
functions are, in the first place, to produce (cf. 26e- 
27b) and, secondly, to rule (hegeisthai, 27a5) the 
mixture: so this nous is said to govern (diakubernan, 
28d9) and order (suntattein, 28d9,30c5; kosmein, 30c5; 
diakosmein, 28e3) the mixture or "the totality of things 
and this which is called the whole" (28d5-6). 
What kind of nous is Plato speaking about? In principle 
both the divine Nous that rules over the cosmos and the 
human individual nous seem to be at stake in the 
dialogue: the former is responsible for beauty and 
20 Cf. Philolaos, B1 and B2 DK. The influence of the Philolaic 
concepts of perainonta and apeira on those of peras and apeiron in 
the Philebus seems to be well established, as much as the triton 
genos of the mixture in the Philebus, which includes harmony among 
its instances (31c), reminds us of harmonia as a third factor in 
addition to perainonta and apeira in Philolaos (B6 DK); cf. Burkert 
(1972: 64,86 ff., 254 ff). 
21 By "things" here we do not need to think in terms of Aristotelian 
substances. Plato rather picks up as examples of the third genos 
items such as health, physical strength, etc. which seem to refer 
more to states or conditions than individual objects. But there 
is a 
good reason why he should prefer these examples, since after all the 
purpose of this cosmological background is to provide him with the 
weapons to reach the mixture of nous and pleasure in which happiness 
consists (and this particular case he might well have in mind at 
Phil. 26b); but happiness, we are told at 11d4, is to be understood 
in terms of a hexis and diathesis of the soul. 
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measure in the sensible universe (e. g. in the seasons and 
the revolution of the heaven, cf. 26a6-b3,28e, 30c); the 
latter becomes prominent in human life as being ethically 
responsible for an adequately mixed way of living (cf. 
22d, 27c-28a, 30e-31a). Nonetheless, it seems clear that 
Plato in this passage privileges the Nous which is king 
of the universe as a cause, and as a model for every 
other (individual) cause. This Nous is presented in an 
overt parallelism with microcosm: As we acknowledge in 
each of us the existence of a body which is derived from 
the body of the universe, so too we must suppose that our 
souls are derived from a universal and superior Soul (cf. 
29a-30b). And it is by residing in this -Cosmic- Soul 
that Nous always rules the universe (cf. 30c-d). 
So far it seems pretty clear that the Nous Plato is 
presenting as a cause of the mixture of the universe is 
the intellect in the World-Soul and therefore the Cosmic 
Nous. In fact, Plato also seems to think of the aitia in 
terms of the World-Soul itself at 30a-b, when, after 
asserting that our body has received its soul from the 
World-Soul (a5-8), he passes on to say that to Les aitias 
genos gives to our bodies soul (alO-b2). This, then, 
suggests that the aitia which performs that function is 
the World-Soul. If this is so, we should not be surprised 
that Plato thinks here of the aitia either in terms of 
nous or in terms of soul. In point of fact, we have seen 
in chapter 2 that Plato tends to think of nous as 
possessed by soul (cf. Tim. 46d5-6 for nous as possessed 
by soul in general and Phil. 58d on nous as Les psuches 
hemon dunamis); the same point is here stressed by the 
remark that noun cannot arise without soul (30c9-10, 
sophia men kai noun aneu psuches ouk an pote genoisthen), 
i. e. soul is implied in the existence of nous. Now, 
certainly nous and soul do not completely coincide 
in the 
case of human beings, who also have other -irrational- 
faculties of soul (cf. e. g. 35d). However, they 
do seem 
to coincide in the case of the universe, and that 
is why 
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Plato alternates between saying that the cause is Nous 
and implying that it is the Cosmic Soul. This 
identification seems to be reinforced by the fact that 
the function of arranging years, seasons and months, 
which in the Philebus corresponds to the cause (nous, 
30c5-7), is in the Timaeus performed by the Circles of 
the World-Soul (39c). 
Now, any clarity we may have 
the cause is the Cosmic Nous 
some other statements, which 
suggest that there is a nous 
Cosmic Nous -a problem which, 
in the Timaeus. 22 
reached in concluding that 
or Soul seems obscured by 
could again be taken to 
vhich is over and above the 
we have seen, appears also 
The most difficult passage in this respect is Phil. 30d1- 
3. There, after asserting that reason and mind could 
never arise without soul, the text says that "then in the 
nature of Zeus... a kingly soul and a kingly mind arise 
through the power of the cause" (oukoun en men tei Lou 
Dios ... phusei basiliken men psuchen, basilikon de noun 
engignesthai dia ten Les aitias dunamin, 30d1-3). What 
does "Zeus" stand for in this passage? 
(i) If "Zeus" is taken just at its face value, as a name 
for a traditional god which anyhow Plato conceives of as 
intelligent and ensouled, it could be argued that the 
passage simply means that, the World-Soul being the 
superior cause, even that divinity (Zeus) has derived its 
soul and nous from those of the universe, as we are said 
to do. (After all the same is true in the Timaeus of the 
celestial gods, which seem to derive their soul from that 
of the World -since they have not given rise to a new 
mixture-, something that could also be present in Phil. 
22 In favour of the latter view of the cause in the Philebus see 
T. M. Robinson (1970: 144); Mohr (1985: 174). Against, see e. g. Teloh 
(1981: 187-8); Ostenfeld (1982: 238). 
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30b4-7) . 23 However, in the light of the context it seems 
more appropriate to interpret that: 
(ii) Zeus is here another name for the Universe, 
possessing the World Intellect which is "king (basileus) 
of heaven and earth", about which Plato has just been 
speaking (28c7-8) and will go on speaking by stressing 
that "aei tou pantos nous archei" (30d8) . Thus, "Zeus" 
can be another name that Plato might be introducing -as a 
compromise with, or attempt at integrating, the 
tradition- for the ruling god of the universe. 24 If this 
is so, then the passage could be taken as implying that 
even this World-Soul (represented as Zeus') has been 
created by a superior cause. 
This difficulty cannot however be solved by simply 
inferring that Plato is positing an intelligence which is 
soulless and superior to soul and nous in the kosmos - 
this could not be so when Plato has just stated the 
dependence of Nous on Soul. 25 And it could hardly be 
solved by inferring that there is one ensouled nous which 
is superior to and separate from the intelligence of the 
cosmos. 26 In either case, why did Plato establish the 
analogy between macro and microcosm, and consequently the 
existence of a Cosmic Soul -and Nous- in a context 
devoted precisely to enlightening the nature of the 
cause? 27 Any interpretation of the cause as separate from 
the world will also overlook the fact that Plato 
previously emphasized that the cause exists in (enon) all 
23 For further discussion of this passage cf. infra n. 30. 
24 Cf. Phaedrus 246e for allusions to Zeus as diakosmön panta (as we 
saw in Introd., section 2) and Pol. 272b with 273d-e (infra, ch. 5, 
section 2.7 and ch. 6, section 1.2) for Zeus with a similar 
function. 
25 This line however is followed by Hackforth (1936) and Mohr (1985: 
178, n. 3). 
26 As e. g. T. M. Robinson (1970: 143-4) suggests. 
27 As Ostenfeld (1982: 237-8) suggests, the argument for a Cosmic 
Reason is established via an argument for the World-Soul; and the 
logos starting at 29a6 with the macro-microcosm analogy 
is at 30d 
said to support the assertions of ancient thinkers in defence of a 
ruling Nous introduced at 28c6 ff. 
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things (30b1) -an expression he had used for the four 
elements as enonta in the composition of the universe at 
29a11- or in the universe (en L0 ^i pan ti, 30c4), which 
therefore suggests the inherence of the cause rather than 
its ontological separation. (Cf. also the consideration 
of nous, or the cause, as an element en toi meiktoi bioi 
at 22d. ) 
But then we are still in need of an interpretation of 
Phil. 30d1-3. One -metaphysical- answer that could 
perhaps be given is that, if we suppose that soul is a 
self-mover and principle of motion (a theory expressed in 
Phaedrus 245c ff. and Laws X 896a-b), then soul or nous 
arises by virtue of its own self-moving (and self- 
creative) power. 28 In the case of soul, self-motion would 
imply self-creation insofar as the very essence and 
definition of soul consists in self-motion, cf. Laws X 
895e-896b. Thus, if the soul creates its own motion, it 
creates itself. 
Another -logical- answer could rely on Plato's 
distinguishing four kinds in the universe, the cause thus 
being a genos in which both World-Soul and individual 
nous would be included (cf. nous esti genous Les tou 
panton ai tiou, 3 0d10-el) . From a 
logical point of view, 
the cause as genos seems wider than the two latter cases. 
And so at Phil. 30d1-3 Plato could in this respect be 
saying that the scope of the cause (as genus) is such 
that through it there exists (in the sense that the genus 
encompasses) intellect in the universe -represented by 
Zeus-, as much as in other entities. 29 30 
28 The Philebus doesn't explicitly contain this theory, though it 
says that every impulse (horme) and principle (arche) of living 
creatures belongs to the soul (35d). 
29 Plato gives to tes aitias genos a similarly wide scope at 30a9-b3, 
since it includes both the World-Soul (as responsible for giving soul 
to us and to the heavenly bodies), and also human nous and techne 
(which would at least partly be responsible for our physical strength 
and health, through gymnastics and medicine respectively). 
30 Another awkward passage is Phil. 30a9-b7, which has been taken to 
mean that the cause has devised (memechanesthai) in the four elements 
the nature of the most beautiful and noble things (ten tön 
kallistön 
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Now, a most important point to be noticed about the cause 
here is that Plato sets it as a kingly Nous which rules 
over the universe, in contraposition with irrationality 
and chance (28d). The governance of this Nous is asserted 
by the observation of the beautiful arrangement of 
"sun, moon, stars and the whole revolution" of the 
universe (28e3-5). We are faced here with one of the 
first examples, in the history of philosophy, of the 
cosmological (or "physico-theological") proof which 
infers the existence of god from the orderly arrangement 
of the cosmos; 31 an argument that is complemented by the 
macro-microcosm analogy. Now since god, or the cause, 
operates with an intelligent design (cf. memechanesthai, 
30b6), this contrast between nous and chance is also a 
contrast between teleology and fortuitousness. As we 
shall see, the peras imposed by Nous on the universe is 
tantamount to goodness, since the goodness of a mixture 
kai timiötat(3n phusin, b6-7), taking this nature to refer to the 
World-Soul, and suggesting therefore that the cause is over and above 
it. For this line cf. e. g. Hackforth (1936: 439); who translates b6-7 
as "that which is fairest and most precious" (see also 1945: ad 
loc. ). However, ten tön kallistön kai timiötatön phusin seems to 
refer not to the World-Soul, in the singular, but, literally, to "the 
nature of the most beautiful and noble things", which must be a 
reference to the heavenly bodies, those great parts of the universe 
mentioned at b5. If this is so, there is no difficulty in thinking 
that Nous -as the World-Soul, immanent to the universe- is the cause 
of the nature of the heavenly bodies (which in the Timaeus are ruled 
by and inserted in the Circles of the World-Soul). 
31 In the Laws (X 886a, d4-el) Plato will find this kind of proof too 
difficult to sustain by mere appreciation of the opsis (Phil. 28e3) 
of the heaven, since contemporary materialistic theories could 
attempt to account for that in completely atheistic terms; so 
it is 
vital that he relies on astronomy as a science and more sophisticated 
arguments for his defence of design (see infra ch. 7 section 3.2; cf. 
Laws XII 967c2 ff. for the hint that the eyes can be insufficient in 
this regard). Here in the Philebus the proof advanced might seem 
comparatively naive, though note that it is put in Protarchus' mouth, 
and Socrates, even though encouraging him, still seems to 
feel the 
need of further justification by then advancing the argument 
based on 
the micro-macrocosm analogy which wants to conclude the existence 
of 
a World-Soul (29a-30a). See also the "perhaps" 
(is(3s, 28c8) with 
which Socrates introduces the saying that nous 
is king of heaven and 
earth, immediately acknowledging that they must examine 
this question 
at greater length; by 30c, however, there won't 
be any doubts left 




lies in summetria providing 
its components (64d-e). 
IV. UNIVERSE AND MICROCOSM 
structure and unity between 
We have seen that the postulation of a Cosmic Mind 
appears in the context of a macro-microcosm analogy. This 
analogy postulates all the elements in us as inferior to 
and less pure than those of the universe, where the same 
things, body and soul, exist as pantei kalliona (30a, 29b 
ff. ). As in the Timaeus (42e-43a, 41d-e), so in the 
Philebus, not only do our bodies derive from the Body of 
the Universe, but also our souls appear to derive from 
the World-Soul, and in that respect there is kinship 
between both, though the former are of lesser pedigree 
than the latter, and the superiority of the source 
immediately establishes it as a model for our human 
behaviour. 
The fact that it is not chance that prevails over the 
universe rules out that the latter be ataktös (29a4, cf. 
28c-e); contrarily, the world can be a real kosmos by 
virtue of a rational cause kosmousa kai suntattousa 
(30c5) The rule of noun, then, guarantees for the cosmos 
the prevalance of order, and in that sense the mixture 
between peras and apeiron of which it is constituted 
seems to be reasonably stable. By contrast, the mixture 
in human beings also composed of peras and apeiron (cf. 
32a9-b1) is unstable: its natural balance between those 
two elements can deteriorate and provoke pain, like 
thirst (31d-32b); in this kind of pain arising from the 
body -and corresponding pleasure of replenishment 
(cf. 
42c9-d7,45a ff. ) - it is apeiron, not peras that 
prevails (cf. 41c-d, 52c). 32 However, despite the assault 
of these desires, and despite the fact that many people 
32 For the tendency to excess inbuilt in mixed physical pleasure cf. 
Gosling and Taylor (1982: 137-8). 
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would prefer the most intense pleasures thus choosing a 
kind of life based on the instability of genesis- which 
however has the disadvantage that it brings with it also 
phthora (54e-55a) and hinders thought (63d-e)-, we are, 
in the Philebus, conversely recommended to go for stable 
mixtures: it is by discovering "the fairest and most 
peaceful mixture" (kallisten... kai astasiastotaten 
meixin) 33 of pleasure and mind that we shall learn what 
is good (63e-64a). But it is peras -or, in other words, 
metron kai summetron- which guarantees stability (cf. 
24d); a good mixture is a structured mixture and if it 
lacks proportion it is destroyed as such (cf. apollusi, 
64d11) . 
In this way, we want to make of our lives, subject to all 
sorts of disruptions and fluctuations coming from the 
body (42c-d), a mixture which is stable -like that of the 
universe. Indeed we should, like craftsmen (kathaperei 
demiourgois), make (demiourgein) the right mixture in our 
lives (cf. 59d10-e3), in which our good and happiness 
consist. But this is an enterprise for us to undertake 
(cf. dei, 59e2), by contrast with the demiurgic cause of 
the universe, whose rule is a fact. And the mixture that 
is announced in words is only a prelude to the one we 
should achieve in actual practice. 
If this is so, then the setting of a macrocosmic 
background for human life in the Philebus is not 
accidental. Microcosmic order should be a reflection and 
part of the macrocosmic one. Understanding how the cosmic 
cause works, as kosmousa kai sun to t tousa (30c5) -an order 
that in turn manifests beauty and goodness- can, 
accordingly, help us order our lives towards 
the good. 
This good, lying in measure and proportion, 
is 
choiceworthy (hairetos, 22b, cf. 61a), what 
every 
33 astasiastotaten: literally "the most free from strife"; 
remember 
the strife (diaphora) of contraries conveyed by apeiron which 
is made 
to cease by peras at 25e1. 
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rational being (pan to gignoskon) hunts and desires, 
wishing to catch and possess it (20d) 
. However, Plato 
also allows for the possibility that we might choose 
other things (cf. alla heireith' 22b6; also 55a5-6), even 
though it would be against the nature of the truly 
choiceworthy and outside the scope of rational will 
(akon), often through ignorance (22b6-8). It seems, then, 
that we have an open choice as to what kind of life we 
pursue, and it is important to prevent agnoia: it is 
important that we educate that choice. In this respect, 
reading the Philebus may itself prove instructive: Plato 
has Socrates himself assert, after scrutinizing in what 
exactly the good consists: "the present argument appears 
to me to have been completed, like an incorporeal order 
which is to rule fairly an ensouled body" (kosmos Lis 
asömatos arxön kalös empsuchou somatos, 64b7). And this 
refers to an argument, we must remember, that has 
attempted to establish what is good "both in man and in 
the universe" (en t' anthropoi kai toi panti, 64a1-2). 
We see, then, how despite the apparently few explicit 
connections between macro and microcosm, the Philebus 
does provide, to close examination, elements that 
establish cosmology as a background for ethics, as much 
as, from a different perspective (and more expressly), we 
could find in the Timaeus that our following the orderly 
motions of the universe could directly contribute to 
ordering our souls and in this way bring about human 
happiness. 
In the next section of this chapter I wish to focus in 
more detail on the cosmologies of these two dialogues, 
and see up to what extent the brief cosmological 
allusions of the Philebus can find a counterpart in the 
lengthy treatment of the Timaeus. 
116 
V. THE COSMOLOGIES OF THE PHILEBUS AND THE TIMAEUS 
COMPARED 
As Hackforth points out, the cosmology in each of these 
dialogues shows a fundamental difference in their way of 
exposition: whereas the Timaeus is more mythical and 
narrates how the universe came into being out of a 
preexisting chaos, the Philebus is more discursive and 
just analyses the actual world of our experience into its 
constituents (cf . to nun onta en toi panti, 23c4) . 34 In 
addition, it is evident that the context of the Philebus 
passage is mainly that of an ethical discussion, whereas 
the cosmology of the Timaeus is more lengthy and self- 
contained, and the dialogue form is missing. Thirdly, the 
fourfold classification is inserted in a divisional 
context, where Plato is trying to group subclasses of 
mixture, peras and apeiron into more general definitory 
classes; in the Timaeus the divisional procedure is less 
prominent. Still, I think there are some cosmological 
similarities between these dialogues so that a comparison 
with the Timaeus may prove useful in further highlighting 
the cosmological implications of the fourfould 
classification and showing it to be more than a mere 
cosmology "ad hoc ". 35 
1. Aitia, Demiurge and the World-Soul 
The Philebus makes the aitia correspond to nous 
in a 
manner that reminds us of the "primary causes" 
in Tim. 
46e4, those "aitiai which, by using intelligence 
(meta 
nou), are demiourgoi of fair and good effects". 
In 
relation to this passage I have, 
in chapter 2, 
interpreted the Demiurge as a symbol of the concept of 
primary causation in the Timaeus -understood 
basically in 
an efficient sense-, a function which 
is in turn 
34 Cf. Hackforth (1945: 37). 
35 As has been interpreted by Davis (1979: 132-3), 
Teloh (1981: 188). 
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fulfilled by the World-Intelligence or Soul. Being 
discursive and non-mythical, the Philebus does not 
explicitly appeal to the image of the Demiurge as such. 
However, the cause is called "to demiourgoun" and "to 
poioun" (27b1-2,26e6-8,27a5), which, now in a more 
impersonal and demythologized way, reminds us of the 
character of poietes and demiourgos that belongs to the 
god in the Timaeus (cf. 28c3,29a3). In both dialogues 
this kind of cause is posited to account for everything 
that is generated (cf. Phil. 26e, Tim. 28a, c), and is 
thus called arche geneseos in one case (Tim. 29e4), aitia 
geneseös in the other (Phil. 27b9). While the Timaeus 
distinguishes between this primary or divine kind of 
causation and a level of secondary, auxiliary or 
subservient causes (huperetousai, cf. 68e4-5) for the 
fulfilment of teleology, the Philebus similarly 
distinguishes the cause from "that which serves the cause 
towards generation" (to douleuon eis genesin aitiäi, 
27a8-9), and in both dialogues it is further suggested 
that without nous only random and disorderly effects 
occur (Phil. 28e-29a, Tim. 46e5-6). 36 In both works this 
nous, which as such cannot arise in separation from soul 
(Phil. 30c9-10, Tim. 30b3), has the function not only of 
originating but also governing its orderly product (cf. 
Phil. 26e-27b, 28d-e, 30c; Tim. 28a-29a, 29e-30a, 34b10- 
35a1,42e1-3, etc. ). Also, as we have seen, the cause 
which "orders and arranges years and seasons and months" 
-called wisdom and mind- in the Philebus (30c5-7), 
reminds us of the World-Soul in the Timaeus which, 
through its intelligent revolution, generates nights, 
days, months, years and other periods (cf. 39c). 
Furthermore, the cause seems to have an important 
teleological function, since in the Timaeus it is 
productive of fair and good effects (46e4), whereas 
in 
the Philebus it produces right mixtures by the imposition 
36 That is to say, if, as the context suggests in the Philebus, 
the 
cause is nous, then the product is good, i. e. it exhibits peras 
(cf. 
also infra, section 5.3), and so in this dialogue (as 
in the Timaeus) 
there are factors that are needed as subservient to teleology. 
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of limit, which is, as we shall see, understood in terms 
of beauty and goodness. This teleological function will, 
in turn, be enlightened by the analysis of its 
interaction with to apeiron. 
2. The sensible universe as a mixture 
We have seen that in the Philebus things in the universe 
falling under the class of the mixture are called to 
gignomena (27a11), also called the "offspring" (ekgonon, 
26d8) of peras and apeiron; and that this class also 
includes the universe itself. 37 Similarly, in Tim. 50c7- 
d4 reality is divided into kinds and the sensible realm 
is called to gignomenon and, metaphorically, "ekgonon", 
though this time Ideas are compared to a father and Space 
to a mother. This could lead us to suppose, with some 
interpreters, 38 that peras and apeiron in the Philebus 
correspond respectively with Ideas and Space in the 
Timaeus. I think however that this identification needs 
to be revised. Peras, I shall suggest, performs in the 
Philebus not so much the role attributed to transcendent 
Ideas in the Timaeus but is more comparable with the 
immanent mathematical structure imposed by the Demiurge 
on the sensible universe; whereas, on the other hand, I 
wish to stress the connections between apeiron in the 
Philebus and necessity (ananke) in the Timaeus. The new 
terms of this comparison of apeiron with ananke, rather 
than with chora, will have two sorts of consequences: 
firstly, my interpretation will differ from that which 
has standardly been given by those who attribute some 
cosmological importance to the fourfold classification of 
37 For the universe as mixture cf. supra, section 3.3. In addition, 
let us notice that Nous rules to sumpanta kai Lode to kaloumenon 
hol on (28d), the function of ruling in turn corresponding to the 
cause of the mixture or to gignomenon at Phil. 27a. 
38 Cf. e. g. MacClintock (1961: 49 n. 4); Friedlaender (1969: 324-5); 
Brisson (1974: 102-3); Benitez (1989: 74-80). For apeiron as chöra 




the Philebus; secondly, it will offer an alternative 
solution for those who, having found the comparison 
between apeiron and chora implausible, have been led to 
query the cosmological importance or coherence of the 
passage in the Philebus. 39 
In the following sections I shall attempt to justify my 
view. For the moment, the comparison between apeiron and 
ananke can be supported by a passage in the Timaeus which 
actually calls the universe a mixture, as we saw in the 
Philebus. At Tim. 47e5-48a2 we read that the cosmos was 
generated as a "mixture arising from the combination of 
ananke and nous" (memeigmene. ex anankes to kai nou 
sustaseos; cf. Phil. 23d1: ex amphoin [i. e. peras and 
apeiron] ... summisgomenon). This, on the one hand, 
suggests a correspondence of apeiron with ananke. On the 
other hand, the correspondence may seem broken by the 
fact that the Timaeus speaks of nous, rather than of 
peras, as being mixed with ananke. However, we must 
remember that the Philebus too speaks of nous -as well as 
peras- as being mixed with apeiron; a prominent example 
of this is when Plato speaks of the good life as a 
mixture of intelligence and pleasure (27d, 59d-e). As we 
shall see, this ambiguity may be explained if we consider 
that the presence of nous in the mixture implies the 
presence of peras, and viceversa. 40 
3. Peras as immanent mathematical structure 





think that peras in this passage of 
--- ---1-- -- -- 
1-., -. ý1, ý Troac ac can strictly Sp d. is ily uc 1.11G -L %-k V- LA u- 
paradigms in the way they are presented 
in 
e. g. 29a, 48e). Peras here is mixed with the 
zereas the Idea in the Timaeus "neither 
39 In this line cf. e. g. Teloh (1981: 188) and McCabe (1994: 
250-1 
and 255 n. 73). 
40 See note 44. 
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receives anything else into itself from anywhere else nor 
itself goes into anything else anywhere" (52a2-3). Even 
at the end of the Philebus (59c4) Ideas are called 
"ameiktotata echonta" (cf. Symp. 211e1) 
. 
In addition, Ideas are ungenerated in the Timaeus (cf. 
52a1-2) as well as in the Philebus (cf. to onta aei as 
opposed to gignomena at 59a7), whereas peras is said to 
be created. This is suggested by the recurrent use of the 
verb apergazesthai. Thus, e. g. "in the high and the low, 
the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the 
introduction41 of these same things (sc. the equal, 
double, etc. ) created at the same time limit (peras 
apeirgasato) and constructed most perfectly the whole art 
of music"; and "[these] introduced (engenomena) 42 into 
winters and heatwaves, removed the great excess and 
apeiron, and created measure and at the same time 
proportion (to emmetron kai hama summetron apeirgasato) " 
(26a). In general, the mixture is a "generation towards 
being from the measures created with limit" (ek tön meta 
Lou peratos apeirgasmenon metron, 26d8-9). These passages 
seem to suggest that peras is regarded as something that 
is brought to the mixture and then becomes part of the 
mixture. 43 This introduction of peras creates peras in 
the mixture, and one could wonder what it is that effects 
that introduction. The obvious answer would seem to be 
the cause, even though Plato does not mention it 
explicitly in these passages since here he is discussing 
the third kind and hasn't yet started considering the 
41 Following Fowler's and D. Frede's reading of the text -after the 
MSS. - instead of Burnet's. Cf. Fowler (1925: ad loc. ); Frede (1993: 
22). 
42 Following Fowler's reading ad loc. -after manuscript B- instead of 
Burnet's. Cf. Fowler (1925: ad loc. ). 
43 We can take this vocabulary as simply considering, first, peras 
in abstraction from the mixture, and then, as part of it. If Plato 
were meaning that peras in the first case is the Idea, then we would 
have the problem of how the Ideas could be mixed or introduced 
(engignomena, engenomena 26a3,6), something that, as we have seen, 
Plato denies of Ideas both in Philebus and Timaeus. 
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fourth. 44 If this is so, then the comparison with the 
Timaeus becomes clearer. There we read that the Demiurge 
"produces" (cf. apergazetai) the form (idea) of something 
looking to a model (28a6-8); and in general Plato 
recurrently speaks of the Demiurge with the function of 
apergazesthai the world or its parts (cf. 29a1,30b6, 
37c8-dl, 40a3, etc. ). So peras in the Philebus would be 
nearer to the immanent form that the Demiurge produces in 
something rather than the model he looks to in the 
Timaeus. 
With this I am not denying that Ideas may be relevant for 
the cosmology of the Philebus. They are certainly alluded 
to in the dialogue, as the stable, unmixed and immutable 
being opposed to generated realities (cf. 15a, 58a, 59c, 
61d-e, 62a), and it is they that provide -in their 
identity and eternity- a parameter of stability or 
bebaiotes (59b-c), so that any stability conveyed by 
peras or mathematical proportion (cf. Phil. 24d4-5, 
25d11-e2), as would be manifest most of all in the case 
of the universe, could reasonably be thought to be 
ultimately relying on the former, particularly given 
that Ideas are the object of nous in its most proper form 
(cf. 59c-d) . 45 
44 At some other passages Plato speaks of peras not as being realized 
(apeirgasmenon) but as itself having the function of apergazesthai or 
having a more active role on the unlimited. E. g. at 25e1-2 peras 
"makes the opposites proportionate and harmonious (summetra kai 
sumphöna apergazetai) by introducing number"; and at 27d9 to apeiron 
is said to be bound by the agency of limit (hupo tou peratos) . What 
is the agent then, peras or nous? We could follow Hackforth in 
thinking that whether we say that it is reason or limit that modifies 
the nature of the unlimited matters little, "when we remember that 
all the metra that characterize good meikta are meta tou peratos 
apeirgasmena by the causality of nous" ([1945: 134], cf. Phil. 26d9). 
So, strictly speaking, it should be nous as cause that has an active 
power on the unlimited with the help of the limit it introduces. 
The seemingly active vocabulary that Plato uses of peras before the 
introduction of the cause can also be seen as influenced by 
Philolaos, who speaks of perainonta -rather than peras- with an 
active role on apeira (cf. B1 and B2 DK), and who doesn't include the 
cause in his scheme, as Plato is about to do. 
45 Unlike the Timaeus, in the Philebus there is no mention of Ideas 
as paradigms for the activity of the demiurgic cause. Hackforth 
(1945: 41) and Ross (1951: 138) have however seen recourse to a 
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Another important passage for the comprehension of peras 
and its role is to be found at the end of the Philebus. 
There Plato wonders again about the cause (aitia, 64d4) 
of the mixed life that makes it good, and now finds the 
answer in measure and proportion, which is in turn 
inseparable from beauty and excellence (64d-e). Plato's 
concern here is basically with the cause in the mixture 
(cf. ti ... en tei summeixei ... ai tion, 64c5-6) . So one can 
think that the cause at 64d4, taken as metron kai 
summetron at 64d9, corresponds to peras, which would now 
be considered as formal cause of the mixture, i. e. as the 
structure which makes it a mixture rather than (in 
Fowler's words) an "uncompounded jumble" (akratos 
sumpephoremene 64e1). 46 However, there is a further 
question posed by 65a. There Plato, after having 
identified measure with beauty and excellence (64e5-7), 
states "if we cannot capture the good through one idea, 
paradigm as required by the postulation of an artisan (cf. to 
demiourgoun, 27b1); whereas other interpreters (cf. those mentioned 
in n. 1), alleging absence of explicit evidence, have queried or 
denied transcendent Ideas in the Philebus. Paradeigmatism would 
indeed suggest transcendence. Fahrnkopf (1977: 202-5), against 
Shiner's (1974) support of "revisionism" -the theory that we do not 
tend to find transcendent Forms after the Parmenides- has argued in 
favour of the transcendence of the Ideas in the Philebus in the light 
of 62a-b, where Plato conceives of the possibility of someone knowing 
the divine Circle without knowing human circles, something that would 
be impossible if Ideas were merely immanent to or abstractable from 
sensibles. Other opponents of the revisionist view are e. g. Bolton 
(1975: 84-94), Mohr (1983), Benitez (1989: 4,129-132), Hampton 
(1990: 9-11). 
46 We might certainly be struck by the fact that Plato starts his 
search for the cause of the mixture in the Philebus by positing nous 
as cause, and towards the end offers instead measure and proportion 
as the cause of the mixture. However, even at the beginning Plato 
seemed to be paving the way for his suggestions at the end, by saying 
not only that nous could be claimed to be the "cause" of the mixture 
in which the happy life consists (22d2), but also that nous 
is 
sungenesteron kai homoioteron to that through which the mixed life 
becomes good (22d4-8), something that will at the end of the Philebus 
include measure and proportion (as an aspect of the good, which also 
encompasses beauty and truth), as the cause that makes the mixture 
good (64c, d). To this, the text reiterates, nous will 
be 
sungenesteron and homoiotaton (65b1, c3, d3). So the answer to 
the 
question whether nous is a cause or not would be that 
it is akin to 




let us grasp it with three: kallos and summetria and 
aletheia" (65a1-2). The subsequent lines ^ (1 egomen hos 
touto hoion hen orthotat'an aitiasaimeth'an ton en Lei 
summeixei, 3-4) can be read as saying either: 
(i) "and let us say that this, considered as one, we 
would most rightly give as cause of the things in the 
mixture"; or 
(ii) "and let us say that, among the things in the 
mixture, we would most rightly give this, considered as 
one, as cause". 
The first translation could encourage an interpretation 
of the good as being something other than the elements of 
the mixture -the latter including measure, proportion and 
truth- and so over and above the goodness inherent in the 
mixture; 47 in this way we could take the subsequent lines: 
"and through this, which is (on) good, the mixture has 
become (gegonenai) so". The second one, conversely, 
would be considering the good just as a property inherent 
in the mixture. 48 
It seems difficult to settle this ambiguity. The most we 
can say is that the Good, as Idea different from the 
mixture or its components, might be alluded to at the end 
of the Philebus -after all, the Good had been mentioned 
as one of those items escaping generation and corruption 
at 15a5 (and other items such as Justice Itself are 
mentioned in a similar context at 61d-62a); and it could 
have a causal aspect (cf. dia touto at 65a4). But, in any 
case, Plato certainly speaks of the good as at least 
immanent to the mixture. 49 If we take this in cosmological 
47 As interpreted by Benitez (1989: 62), Hampton (1990: 83-4). 
Hackforth (1945: 136) and D. Frede (1993: 80) also adopt reading (i). 
48 This reading is followed by Fowler (1925: ad loc. ), Gosling (1975: 
65). 
49 Remember the concern with the cause en tei summeixei, 64c5-6, 
which is found in metron, beauty and excellence at 64d-e. Note also 
that the aletheia which appears as an aspect of the good at 65a2 
is 
regarded as mixed at 64e9-10; cf. meixomen aletheian at 64b2. In 
addition, the original question about the good was framed 
in terms 
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terms, we can compare it with Plato's allusions in the 
Timaeus to an immanent goodness of the world that the 
Demiurge tries to realize (46c8-dl ten tou 
aristou... i dean apotelön and Tim. 68e5: God is to eu 
tektainomenos en pasin tois gignomenois). 50 The Timaeus 
also -like the Philebus- stresses the interrelation 
between kalon, agathon and summetron, 87c4-6. Now, if in 
the Philebus peras is connected with to summetron and 
metron (25e-26a, 26d8-9), and these are in turn aspects 
of the good in 64d-65a, we can see that peras has a 
strong teleological import. 51 In this respect, the cause 
as nous would be responsible for the actual fulfilment of 
teleology insofar as its imposition of limit upon the 
unlimited involves giving a good arrangement to the 
materials upon which it works. 
More precisely, peras would correspond to the immanent 
mathematical structure that the Cosmic Intelligence 
introduces, both in the Philebus and in the Timaeus, into 
the indeterminacy of its materials. Thus, we read in 
the Timaeus that, when everything was in a state of 
disorder (ametrös), god gave structure to it with forms 
and numbers (dieschematisato eidesi to kai arithmois, 
53a7-b5). Likewise, we have seen that in the Philebus 
peras is "whatever stops opposites being different from 
one another, and by introducing number, makes them 
proportionate and harmonious" ( summetra de kai sumphona 
entheisa arithmon apergazetai, 25d11-e2) . This could 
in 
turn be connected with the geometrical construction of 
the Cosmic Body from elementary triangles in Tim. 53b ff. 
and the "measures" (summetrias) introduced by god when 
of that which is found in the mixture (cf. 64a1-2: en tautei [sc. 
meixei kai krasei]... ti... pephuken agathon). 
50 The immanence of this good which is being framed in the Timaeus is 
suggested both by the expression "en pasin tois gignomenois" and by 
the fact that at 28c6 god is said to be the framer (tektainomenos) of 
the universe, by contrast with the paradigm to which he looks. Cf. 
also supra, ch. 2, n. 41. 
51 Cf. Gadamer (1991: 139). 
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everything was in disorder (Tim. 69b). 52 Thus it is 
mathematical proportion in the sensible universe which 
makes it intelligible despite its underlying 
indeterminacy. 53 In this way, the sensible universe ceases 
to be mere becoming (genesis)54 and becomes a genesis eis 
ousian, a becoming that approaches the true being by 
virtue of the presence of peras in it. 55 
4. Apeiron and ananke 
Now, if we are to compare apeiron in the Philebus with a 
similar factor in the Timaeus, I think it does not have 
to do with chöra if taken as an en hoi or mere spatial 
framework of phenomena. Chora in itself is a Lode or 
Lou to, Tim. 50a1-2 (this suggesting something stable, 
52 Cf. Ross (1951: 137). I do not think however that these triangles 
and the corpuscles they constitute can be related to the 
"intermediate mathematical objects known to us from Aristotle", as 
Hackforth (1945: 41) contends. In fact, even if we take Aristotle's 
report as trustworthy, the latter are immutable and eternal -cf. 
Metaph. I6 987b14-18-, whereas it is a characteristic property of 
the elementary particles in the Timaeus to be always in motion, 58c, 
cf. 57a-c. 
53 Indeterminacy in an ontological sense implies an epistemological 
one, as is suggested by the fact that the lack of measure would make 
all arts or knowledge insignificant and mere guesswork (Phil. 55e- 
56a). For the importance of mathematics as the basis of the 
intelligibility of the sensible world in the Timaeus, cf. Brisson 
(1991: 33 ff. ). 
54 According to this interpretation "mere becoming" should correspond 
to to apeiron, things of this class being called gignomena at 24e7-8 
(cf. pleasure called apeiron -27e- and genesis -54c-55a) and said to 
prochörein kai ou menein at 24d4, as if suggesting no stability at 
all. Thus becoming is twofold, alluding both to this kind (sheer 
becoming) and genesis eis ousian, which exhibits, in the case of the 
sensible world, fairly stable mathematical proportions (in this 
latter sense the mixture is called gignomenon or genesis at 26d8, e3, 
27a1, b9). For this distinction between two kinds of gignomena in the 
Philebus see also D. Frede (1993: lvii); from another perspective, 
see also Turnbull's view (1988: 1-14, esp. 13-14 on Phil. ) on the 
"two worlds of becoming" in Philebus and Timaeus with Fine's 
response, which basically agrees with the distinction (1988b: 15-6). 
Cf. supra, note 19. 
55 Cf. Gadamer (1991: 138). 
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49e3) 56 and is intrinsically deprived of every quality 
(50d-51a) . 57 
Rather, it can be compared with the contents of chora, 
or, more specifically, the "necessary" properties of the 
four primary bodies considered in abstraction from 
intelligent activity and upon which the Demiurge works by 
imposing quantitative or geometrical determination (as 
happens from 53b onwards). 58 In fact, we can take this 
ananke (47e5,48a1) or wandering cause (48a6-7) as 
related to the pathe of fire, water, air and earth (48b5) 
which fill the receptacle before or in abstraction from 
their arrangement as bodies i. e. those dunameis which are 
said to be "neither similar nor equally balanced" (meth' 
homoion dunameon mete isorropon, 52e2) . 59 Among these 
pathe or dunameis we can count hot and cold (cf. thermon 
56 Even though chora is precosmically described as unbalanced at 52e, 
it is said to be so not per se but because of the uneven motion of 
its contents. 
57 Cf. also Phil. 24d2, where the opposites seem to be distinguished 
from the chöra they occupy -which is said as in the Timaeus (cf. note 
below) to be an en hei. 
58 Some scholars, however, identify space with its contents, by 
taking chöra not only as the en höi -as Plato says, cf. 49e7,50d1, 
6-, but also as the ex hou something is made, so that chöra turns out 
to have not only a spatial but also a constitutive aspect -as 
"matter" in the Aristotelean sense; cf. e. g. Friedlaender (1958: 
250); Brisson (1991: 28-9), (1992a: 33). If we take that line, the 
distinction between ananke and chora is blurred, though I think the 
text gives us good reason to maintain it. The ex hou of which 
something is made, properly speaking, is, in a chaotic world, the 
traces of the four elements, and, in the present kosmos, the 
elementary triangles as stoicheia of everything (54b3, cf. 53c8-dl, 
55a-b) (cf. Vlastos [1975: 69 ff. ]), rather than chora. (Although the 
analogy of chöra with gold -50a-b- and perfume -50e- may 
be thought 
to suggest that chöra is a material of some kind, the point of the 
analogies seems to be, in the one case, the changelessness of chöra, 
49e-50a, 50b5-c2 (cf. M. L. Gill [1987: 45-7]), and, in the other 
case, its lack of form, 50e-51a. ) In fact, at Tim. 
51a6 chöra is 
explicitly said not to be the ex hon tauta gegone -tauta referring 
to 
the four kinds. Note also that chora is distinguished 
from genesis 
even in a precosmic state at 52d2-4. On the other 
hand, an essential 
property of chöra is having no qualities -so that 
it can receive all 
of them, cf. 50d ff. (on this see Keyt [1961: 
299-300]); whereas a 
distinctive feature of the anankaiai dunameis that 
fill in chöra in 
the Timaeus -and of apeiron in the Philebus- 
is to be or have 
opposite properties. 
59 Cf. Cornford (1937: 173-6,181 ff., 202-3). 
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kai psuchron considered as dunameis related to the four 
elements at 32c-33a, and thermon as one of the opposites 
-enantion- from which -ek touton- other things are 
derived at 50a2-4), dense and rare, heavy and light 
(puknos-manos, barus-kouphos, 53a). We can see that there 
is here a first point of connection with the Philebus 
insofar as apeiron there is related to pairs of opposite 
properties without measure, among which hot and cold are 
explicitly mentioned. 
In addition, the contents of chora in a precosmic state 
are described in the Timaeus as those ichne of the four 
primary bodies which behaved without order or measure 
before the generation of the universe (alogös kai 
ametrös, Tim. 53a-b). Similarly, apeiron in the Philebus 
is set in sharp contrast with peras and therefore with 
taxis and me Iron (cf. 26b10, d9) . 60 
In the Timaeus, the precosmic state of these contents is 
depicted as "not being at rest but moving with disharmony 
and disorder" (plemmelos kai ataktös, 30a4-5); likewise, 
apeiron in the Philebus is described as being in motion 
and not at rest (24d4), and the conflict of these 
opposites is made to cease by the introduction of number, 
which makes them proportionate and harmonious (24c1-d7, 
25d11-e2). In the Timaeus these properties seem to be 
dispersed or divided before the activity of the cause 
(cf. 52e-53a), which harmonizes them in order to achieve 
"friendliness" and unity in the World-Body (32c, 31c). 
Similarly, in the Philebus to apeiron is in a state of 
disconnection and division as long as it is not "bound by 
limit" (hupo Lou peratos dedemenon, 27d9). 
In fact, apeiron in 
cosmological meaning, 
insofar as it is meant 
Phil. 23c ff. has not only a 
ut seems to have a wider sense, 
to apply to every aspect of human 
60 Cf. Hackforth (1945: 40); Ross (1951: 137). 
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life which is ateles, such as bodily pleasure. However, 
we must remember that, despite the predominant 
cosmological meaning of ananke in the Timaeus, this 
dialogue does not overlook the analogy between macro and 
microcosm. Thus, in Tim. 42a3-b1 and 69c8-d6 opposite 
(enantiös, 42b1) pathemata such as pleasure and pain - 
arising as a result of the conjoining of a soul to a 
mortal body- are regarded as "necessary" (anankaia, ex 
anankes); and these kinds of irrational affections in man 
constitute the element of "necessity" inherent in human 
nature61 which human nous must control and persuade, in 
the same manner as the Demiurge works on the precosmic 
necessity. 
5. Teleology versus chance 
Some further connections between the Philebus and the 
Timaeus can be established in respect of the 
contraposition between tuche and nous which is present in 
both dialogues. 
As far as the Timaeus is concerned, we have seen in 
chapter 2 that the necessary causes, if deprived of 
intelligence (monotheisai phroneseos), produce random and 
disorderly effects (to tuchon atakton exergazontai, 46e5- 
6); so that ananke in abstraction from nous could be 
regarded as equivalent to tuche. Only under the control 
of Nous will it become an auxiliary cause for teleology. 
Similarly, in the Philebus (28d-29a) Socrates asks 
whether we should say that "the universe is governed by 
the power of the irrational and random and mere chance" 
(ten tou alogou kai eikei dunamin kai to hopei etuchen) 
or whether, on the contrary, "mind and some wondrous 
wisdom order and govern it" (28d5-9). The answer is that 
the universe is not disorderly and therefore it is nous 
61 Cf. Festugiere (1949: 111-3). 
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(and not chance) that governs it. If apeiron corresponds 
to brute necessity, and this to chance, then we could 
infer that also in the Philebus to apeiron is related to 
tuche. Indeed, this correspondence is supported by the 
fact that tuche at 28d-29a is related to ataxia (cf. esp. 
28d7 with 29a4), which, we have seen, is in turn a 
feature of to apeiron. In this way, the action of the 
cause will be to impose order upon the chaotic and random 
indeterminacy of the sensible. 
We can also see that, just as in the Timaeus ananke could 
by itself constitute a hindrance if unchecked by nous - 
though for the most part it was liable to intelligent 
persuasion-, 62 so in the Philebus apeiron shows this 
tendency particularly in the microsphere. Thus, for 
example, pleasures attendant on the satisfaction of 
physical needs, which, as we have seen, are intrinsically 
apeiron (for example the pleasure which follows 
satisfaction of hunger) can be made subservient to 
teleology, insofar as the good life for man cannot be 
achieved without the restoration of the balance of an 
organism which these pleasures accompany. In this way 
that kind of life must include those inevitable pleasures 
(cf. anankaiai, 62e9). But given that this life is 
posited as prescriptive for man, it seems that there do 
also exist, in actual human lives, pleasures which 
exhibit the condition of apeiron, not subdued 
by 
summetria. 
So it can be said that, at a cosmic level, the prevalence 
of Nous over chance, necessity or the unlimited 
is a 
given fact, worthy of the aspect of the 
heaven (Phil. 
28e) . For 
human beings, on the contrary, it is a task; 
and it depends on us whether, in the pursuit of 
the good, 
we succumb to an irrational life of excessive pleasure 
or 
else decide to govern it (cf. 45d-e) 
by means of the nous 
62 Cf. supra, ch. 2, section 1.3. 
130 
which we derive from the cosmic 
kind of ethical problem that the 
have been discussing serves to e: 
background, since -as we have 
important to learn "what is good, 
universe" (64a1-2). 
cause. It is for this 
cosmological passage we 
3tablish the appropriate 
seen- it is equally 
both in man and in the 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have tried to stress the cosmological 
importance and meaning of the fourfold classification at 
Phil. 23c-31a. In this context, the cause has appeared 
preeminently as an ensouled intellect in the universe, 
responsible for the latter's fairness and stable 
proportions by virtue of the imposition of peras, or 
mathematical measure, upon the quantitative indeterminacy 
of to apeiron, as much as the Demiurge in the Timaeus 
appears as a cause responsible for imposing mathematical 
proportion upon the necessary qualities of the precosmic 
materials thus constituting an agent of teleology. This 
cause -and the universe in general as a mixture-, I have 
argued, stands as a model for human beings, who must 
attempt to achieve in their lives, as far as possible, a 
stable mixture of intellect and pleasure in which the 
good for them, i. e. happiness, consists. In this way the 
apparently digressive cosmology of the Philebus stands as 
directly relevant for the ethical purposes of the 
dialogue. In addition, far from appearing as a merely ad 
hoc cosmology, it has proved susceptible to fertile 
comparison with the cosmology of the Timaeus. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GOD AND OPPOSITE CYCLES IN THE MYTH OF THE 
POLITICUS 
We have seen that it seems to be a strong cosmological 
claim in Plato's late dialogues that the world as a 
kosmos is orderly due to the presence of a designing nous 
that orders it (Phil. 28c ff., Tim. 46c-e, 48a; we shall 
see so also in Laws -e. g. XII 966d-e, 967d-e-, cf. infra, 
chapter 7, section 3.2); a nous which is described as 
god, whose governance over the universe is vigorously 
defended against materialistic opponents who conversely 
propose chance, spontaneity, necessity or, in general, 
principles devoid of purpose and intelligence in their 
account of the universe (Soph. 265b-266b, Phil. 28d, Tim. 
46c-e, cf. Laws X 888d ff. and infra, chapter 7, section 
1). So, both claims: that the universe in its actual 
state is beautiful and good, that is to say, orderly, and 
that this order is due to the governance of nous, seem to 
go hand in hand, and more than once the first claim is 
taken as a premiss from which to infer the second, in a 
kind of teleological argument (cf. Phil. 28e, Laws X 
897b-898c, XII 966d-e). 1 
Now, together with this evidence, there is on the other 
hand the Politicus myth, which speaks of periods in which 
god guides the world and those in which he doesn't, and 
so contraposes a Golden Age guided by god with a 
subsequent period when god releases his governance of the 
universe, until everything goes so wrong that god has to 
return to the helm and restore order. The human race at 
this new stage, however, is said to have to resort on 
its own to ways of surviving in a more hostile universe 
1 On the Laws see also infra, ch. 7, section 3.2. In addition, the 
goodness of the world -and therefore its order, since to 
kalon ouk 
ametron, Tim. 87c5- is treated as a factum in Tim. 29a5, as already 
at Phaedo 99c1-2. 
132 
which contrasts with the one depicted in the Golden Age. 
If this is so, and if we compare this with what we have 
stated in the previous paragraph, it would be very 
striking if the Politicus myth were claiming that we are 
now living in a period when god is not exerting his 
governance, as some renowned interpreters of Plato such 
as Cornford and Skemp, and with them the majority of 
interpreters of the dialogue, have supposed. 2 And perhaps 
they may have been led to do so by some obscurities which 
make the Politicus myth particularly difficult to 
interpret. On the other hand, Brisson has more recently 
challenged that interpretation by suggesting that the 
period in which we now live is neither one of complete 
guidance by god, nor one where the corporeal element or 
chance prevails in the universe, but an intermediate 
state in which nous and ananke coexist, though with a 
predominance of intellect which would make the Politicus 
compatible with analogous pictures given in the other 
dialogues (cf. e. g. Tim. 47e-48a). 3 I agree with 
Brisson's basic suggestion, and I undertake to defend in 
detail the thesis that, according to a literal reading of 
the myth, we are living in a period of guidance of god. 
Nonetheless, I also want to draw attention to passages in 
the myth which seem open to either interpretation, and I 
shall attempt to see if they too can be incorporated 
into 
a coherent picture. 
I mentioned that there have been advocates of either 
view, that the present cycle according to a 
literal 
reading of the myth is one of absence of god and 
that it 
is conversely under the guidance of god. The 
former and 
widespread view has seen the Politicus as 
dealing mainly 
with the opposition between two cycles, that of 
Cronus 
and that of Zeus, by taking the two as going 
in opposite 
2 Cf. e. g. Cornford (1937: 206-7); Skemp 
(1952: 114); Dies (1935: 
xxxiii); Rosen (1979: 75-6); Miller 
(1980: 39); Scodel (1987: 77, 
79); Ferrari (1992); Hirsch (1992); Dorter (1994: 
192-3). The idea 
seems also suggested by Owen (1973: 352) and 
Guthrie (1978: 182). 
3 Cf. Brisson (1974: 478-96) and (1992b). 
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cosmic directions and the latter as one of those periods 
of absence of god, when the universe is left to itself 
.4 
But curiously enough none of the adherents of this view 
seems to have attempted to sketch a reading which takes 
account of the evidence of the whole myth. They often 
tend to fasten on one or other passage of a much more 
complex myth which could also contain counter-evidence 
for their claim. On the other hand, there are some 
details of the myth that could challenge the alternative 
interpretation. It is therefore worth examining both 
cases, for and against a rule of god in the present 
period, and from there trying to draw conclusions that 
could help us understand why the matter is as complicated 
as it seems to be, sometimes almost resisting literal 
consistency. The latter circumstance would of course not 
be surprising for someone who is used to the style of the 
Platonic myths as opposed to logoi or argumentative 
discourse in the strict sense, but still could, in this 
particular case, draw our attention to a special openness 
which, instead of being a defect, could perhaps be a sign 
of the richness of the Platonic myth we are considering. 
In fact it looks as if the main body of the myth 
suggests that we are currently in a period of god's 
guidance (268e8-273e4), but by the end, in its appendix 
(273e6-274e1), some evidence can be taken as suggestive 
of the opposite view. In trying to account for this, I 
shall start by defending the reading of the main body of 
the text (268e8 ff., esp. 269c4-273e4) as presenting a 
view of the present universe as being in one of those 
cycles ruled by god. While doing so I shall attempt to 
show why at some points the contrary reading of the myth 
fails to make sense or interpret correctly some crucial 
4 The very recent translation 
(1995: 12-3) actually conside 
interpretation which has two, 
wish to defend, believes that 
the same direction as that 
divine care at all; in this 
from the traditional view. 
and commentary of the Politicus by Rowe 
rs three cycles instead of the standard 
though Rowe, far from the view that I 
our age of Zeus, though still following 
of Cronus, is one which is not under 
latter sense then he has not departed 
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parts of the text. After that I shall consider the 
appendix of the myth and try to account for it in the 
light of my overall reading of the text. 
I shall proceed by following mainly the sequential order 
of the text and inserting my view into a description of 
the overall picture of the cosmic cycles in the myth. 
This procedure is independent from any adherence to a 
literal reading or not. 5 Rather, it is a preliminary step 
to any further discussion about the advantages and 
disadvantages of taking such reading literally. Though in 
both cases it at least suggests, in accordance with the 
other cosmological dialogues, that in our present period 
god's designing mind prevails in the universe. 
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
The following pieces of evidence can be taken as crucial 
clues in suggesting that Plato is intending to give a 
picture which makes our cycle one ruled by god. 
1. Plato proposes to integrate ancient lechthenta in the 
myth, among which there is the phenomenon concerning "the 
change in the setting and rising of the sun and the other 
stars, so that, from where it rises now, in that same 
place it set at that time, and it rose from the opposite 
place; and it was then when, bearing witness in favour of 
Atreus, the god changed it [i. e. the course of the sun 
and stars] to its present form" (ho theos... metebalen auto 
epi to nun schema, 269a1-5). Here it is the god (Zeus, 
more specifically, in the legend which is being referred 
to) who changes the course of the heavenly motions, ' 
5 For a literal interpretation cf. T. M. Robinson (1967); Mohr (1978) 
and (1985: 141-57). Against, cf. Cornford (1937: 207); Festugiere, 
(1949: 129-30); Cherniss (1954: 29 n. 44); Brisson (1974: 478-96); 
Ostenfeld (1982: 118); Naddaf (1993: 123); Rowe (1995: 13). 
6 Cf. Euripides, Electra 699-730; Orestes 996-1012, mentioned by 
Vidal-Naquet (1978: 136), for the reference to Zeus. It is striking 
that Rowe (1995: 187 ad 269a7) associates this phenomenon with what 
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something that will be characteristic of god's action at 
the beginning of the cycles of god's guidance in the 
myth, as opposed to those in which he merely lets go of 
the universe when it is left to itself in its reverse 
march (cf. e. g. 270a, 273e). 7 The present form of the 
motion of the universe would therefore have its cause in 
god and would be suggestive of his presence. 8 
2. At 272b2-3 the present era (ton nuni) is characterized 
as that of Zeus, in a way that conforms to 1. Nothing can 
be made of the fact that the Eleatic Stranger alludes to 
the age of Zeus as "this [life] which is said to be in 
the presence of Zeus" (tonde d' hon logos epi Dios 
einai), as if he were not himself endorsing that saying. 9 
For the guise of the myth is to incorporate popular 
legends (cf. lechthenta, 268e8), not to reject them: "All 
these things, and also many others, arise from the same 
phenomenon..., but because of the large amount of time 
[that has passed] some of them have been lost, and others 
are told scatteredly (diesparmena), each separate from 
the other. But which is the phenomenon that is the cause 
of all these things, nobody has said, and should now be 
happens in the past age of Cronus (rather than the present age of 
Zeus). This claim may square with his denial that god guides (and 
therefore rules, cf. p. 192-3 ad Pol. 271d3-4) the direction of our 
present cosmic cycle; however, the claim is directly contradicted by 
the evidence, which speaks of the god of the legend changing the 
heavenly bodies to their present form. 
7 It cannot be held, as Dorter (1994: 193) implies, that it is "some 
more fundamental god" than Zeus or Cronus who both turns the universe 
in the age of Cronus and reverses its direction in the present age, 
given the text's denial that the same god could turn the universe in 
opposite directions (269e6-7,269e9-270a1). 
8 Some of those who consider that we are presently living in a period 
without the guidance of god, cannot but accuse Plato of contradiction 
(as done by Scodel [1987: 80]) in the face of the evidence of the 
legend, which conversely shows god turning the universe to 
its 
present direction. Since that interpretation suggests that 
the 
universe is guided by god in the opposite cycle to the present one, 
the picture of the legend becomes doubly contradictory, given 
that 
the text denies explicitly that two different gods with opposing 
thoughts turn the universe in opposite directions (270a1-2). A non- 
contradictory reading, as I am attempting to set out, 
is obviously 
preferable. 
9 As contended by Scodel (1987: 80) and Rowe (1995: 
193 ad loc. ). 
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asserted" (269b5-cl). In addition, it would not seem 
right to disbelieve in this context, since in this regard 
the Stranger expresses complaints about the fact that 
many logoi like that about the gegeneis "are, 
incorrectly, now disbelieved by many" (logon hoi nun hupo 
pollön ouk orthos apistountai, 271b2-3). 
3. With its emphasis on the close connection between 
macro and microcosm, the text states that the direction 
of ageing of individuals follows the direction of the 
cosmos (271b7-8; cf. 273e11-274a1,274d6-7). In the age 
of Cronus it is said that souls fall into the earth as 
seed (272e3), with the implication that they follow the 
normal process of growth and death, like a plant. 
Similarly in the age of Zeus there is normal conception, 
generation and nurture of living beings (274a), which 
suggests that both the era of Cronus and that of Zeus 
follow the same direction of microcosmic events (from 
youth to old age, as opposed to contrary periods which 
would involve a reversal of the ageing process, from old 
to young) and so therefore should the macrocosm. '° 
Having, not exhaustively, highlighted these as basic 
points one could attempt to make the following consistent 
reading of the structure of the myth and the overall 
picture of cosmic cycles that it presents. 
10 It is quite telling in this respect that the reversal of the 
ageing process is mentioned as the biggest phenomenon accompanying 
the cycle opposite to the present one (or, more literally, 
"accompanying the reversal of motion of the universe, at the time 
when the phase opposite to the present one takes place", 270d3-4, cf. 
270d-e). Those interpreters who wish to contend that our era follows 
and is opposed in respect of direction to the one of Cronus are 
therefore led to postulate that in the latter era people were 
born 
from the earth as old and then grew young (cf. Vidal-Naquet 
[1978: 
137] and Dillon [1992: 29]), or, conversely, that the growing younger 
of the old belongs to our present era (as contended 
by Scodel [1987: 
79]), though they do so at the cost of overlooking the evidence above 
mentioned. 
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II. THE STATES OF THE COSMOS SUCCESSIVELY PRESENTED IN THE 
TEXT 
1. Creation of the universe. God is described as the 
"begetter", "demiurge" and "father" of the cosmos (cf. 
e. g. 269d9,270a5,273b1-2), which indicates his creation 
of it -presumably after a precosmic state of ataxia due 
to the prevalence of the bodily condition of the universe 
prior to its creation (cf. 273b-c). 
2. Overall description of the alternate cycles 
At 269c4-d2 we read that: 
a. sometimes (tote men) god himself "guides and helps the 
universe revolve as it goes" (sumpodegei poreuomenon kai 
sunkuklei) 269c4-5. Cf. 270a3: sometimes (tote men) it 
[=the universe] is guided by a different, divine cause 
(hup' alles sumpodegeisthai theias aitias). 
b. at some other times (tote de) he lets the universe go 
(aneken), so that it "spontaneously goes back round in 
the opposite direction" (palin automaton eis tanantia 
periagetai), 269c5-7; this march is described as anapalin 
ienai (269d2) . Cf. 270a5-7: tote de the universe 
is let 
go (cf. anethei), and "goes itself by itself, released at 
such a moment as to go backwards" (di' heautou auton 
ienai, kata kairon aphethenta toiouton, huste anapalin 
poreues thai) . 
In view of expressions like anapalin ienai at 269d2, and 
anapalin poreuesthai at 270a6-7, we could call the latter 
the "reverse cycles", in the sense that the universe 
moves in a reverse direction. " 
11 So we shall call "forward" those periods guided by god, and 
"reverse" those in which the universe is left to itself, without the 
the guidance of god. In any case, what is crucial is not to speak 
in 
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It is important to notice the role of god in this latter 
phase. He is not said to die or disappear, but to release 
control of the universe (cf. aneken 269c5, anethei 270a5, 
aphethenta, 270a6, aphemenos, 272e4, aphesis 273c5) and 
to leave it or go off to his place of outlook (cf. 
apeste, 272e5), so that he stops having any direction 
over the course of the universe (since there cannot be 
two gods nor the same god turning it in opposite 
revolutions, 269e8-270a2), and does nothing, except 
observing passively what is going on from his place of 
outlook (272e5). 
3. Present motion 
Now, at 270b7-8 the Stranger summarizes the double 
picture, by saying "sometimes (tote men) the universe 
moves in the direction in which it now circles (eph' ha 
nun kukleitai); at some other times (tote de) it goes in 
the opposite direction (epi tanantia)". Here he does not 
define which cycle is reverse or which is forward (both 
are opposite as such), though, to go on with the order of 
exposition he has chosen above, at 269c-d and 270a, by 
which he first presents the forward cycle guided by god 
and secondly the reverse cycle, one could in principle 
suppose that "the direction in which the universe now 
circles", mentioned at 270b, corresponds to the forward 
cycles, i. e. the periods of god's guidance. (Cf. tote men 
at 269c4 and 270a3, referring to periods of god's 
guidance, parallel to tote men at 270b7, referring to the 
current revolution. ) We could also take the legend 
preceding the myth as supporting the view that the 
present cycle is guided by god. For there it is god who 
is said to change the course of the sun and the other 
stars to its present direction (269a1-5), and his turning 
the universe is a characteristic of those periods of 
terms of forward or reverse, but in terms of cycles in which the 
world is or is not actively guided by god. 
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god's intervention in the myth (cf. 269c5,269e5-270a5). 
It is also important to recall that according to the 
legend the god in question is traditionally Zeus, 12 under 
whom, in turn, we are said to be living in the myth 
(272b2-3) . Further evidence will help to confirm this. 
4. Contrary motion to the present: reversal of the ageing 
process -accompanying reversal in the universe 
In fact the text goes on to say that, in the motion 
contrary to the present one, a lot of changes take place. 
First, there is destruction of animals (270c11-12), 
something that will afterwards be described as what 
immediately follows the release of the universe by god 
(273a3-4), and which can therefore suggest that the 
motion we are considering is one of reversal. Secondly, 
and most importantly, there is the growing younger of the 
old, until they disappear (270d-e). This reversal of the 
ageing process is said to accompany (sunepomenon) the 
reversal of the universe (Lei Lou pantos aneilixei), 
whenever the phase contrary to the one which is now 
established begins (hotan he Les nun kathestekuias 
enantia gignetai trope) , 270d3-4. It 
is essential to bear 
in mind that in the myth the microcosmic events follow 
the same direction as that of the cosmos, as we can 
gather from the general rule at 274d6-7 that "we imitate 
and accompany (sunepomenoi) the whole cosmos for all 
time" (cf. 274a1: all other things "imitate and accompany 
the state of the universe", and 271b7-8: "generation 
circles back in the opposite direction to follow the 
revolution"). 
5. The reversal of the reversal: the gegeneis and the 
(forward) age of Cronus 
12 Cf. supra, n. 6. 
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We are told that "it is a consequence (hepomenon) of the 
old going to the nature of a child, that from those who 
are dead and lying in the earth, there again people are 
constituted and return to life (ek ton teteleutekoton au, 
keimenon de en gei, palin ekei sunistamenous kai 
anabiöskomenous), since generation circles back in the 
opposite direction to follow the revolution" (271b4-8). 
We can wonder whether the coming to life again from the 
earth at 271b6-7: 
A. takes place within the same period of reversal as 4.; 
or 
B. represents the start of a new period (namely, the 
forward age of Cronus, which will be mentioned more 
explicitly from 271c4 onwards). 
A. would imply that during the period of the reversal in 
which the old grew young, people were born from the earth 
(gegeneis) as old and again grew young -since generation 
follows the direction of the revolution, 271b7-8. This 
interpretation would account for the infix ana (back) in 
the first word of the expression "sunanakukloumenes 
(circles back) eis tanantia tes geneseös" at 271b7-8.13 
But, if there are gegeneis during this age of reversal, 
which are born from the earth as old, they should be 
distinguished from the gegeneis of the age of Cronus, 
since it is implied at 272e3 that the latter are born 
from seeds (spermata), and therefore follow the normal 
process of growth from young to old, like a plant. 
B. would claim that being born from the earth after the 
growing young of the old constitutes a new cycle both for 
humans and also for the cosmos -cf. again "the generation 
13 Of course the ana here could also be interpreted to 
be just 
relative to the immediately previous cycle, not necessarily 
indicating a reverse cycle. But, if this is so, it seems to 
be an 
unusual case in the myth of Plato using that wording 
loosely in 
respect of direction of motion, after having been very careful 
in the 
introductory passages (cf. anapalin ienai 269d2, anapalin poreuesthai 
270a6-7, aneilixis, 270d3) to use ana only to refer to reverse cycles. 
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circles back in the opposite direction to follow the 
revolution" (271b7-8). And this process would then 
correspond directly to the age of Cronus and the gegeneis 
mentioned there (271c ff. and cf. 272a-b for the 
connection between gegeneis and the age of Cronus). In 
this case, there would be no gegeneis before the age of 
Cronus, and the first gegeneis (born from seeds) would 
belong to that age. 
My reading allows for either interpretation, 14 since I can 
draw the same conclusion about our present period as a 
forward one from both: 
Under A., the age of Cronus, which here would start at 
271c8, would be opposite to the reversal described in the 
previous lines of text, since, as we said, in the age of 
Cronus, the gegeneis grow from young to old, and in the 
previous reversal, from old to young. And therefore, 
according to the principle that the microcosm follows the 
macrocosm (274a, d, mentioned also in this context at 
271b7-8), these would represent opposed cycles. So, if 
the age of Cronus is opposed to the reversal at 4. - 
because of the opposite directions of ageing-, and if the 
latter is in turn opposed to the present one (as is 
stated at 270d3 ff. ), 15 then the present one is forward or 
guided by god. 
Under B., the age of Cronus would start at 271b4 and 
therefore all the gegeneis up to this time would be born 
from young to old and, as such, they would be opposite to 
the previous reversal in which the old grew younger, the 
latter being in turn opposite to the present revolution 
14 Though my preference is for interpretation A., according to which 
the period of reversal needn't be as short as the length of a 
human 
life (specifically the length of the oldest human life at the time 
when the reversion begins) -particularly after the 
text has 
emphasized that the reverse cycle takes place pollas periodön 
muriadas, 270a7- and which could render the use of 
'ana' more 
consistent, as suggested in note 13 above. 
15 he tes nun kathestekuias enantia... trope, d4. 
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(recall again 270d3-4). So again we infer that we are now 
in a forward cycle. 
So, we can see that under both of these interpretations 
the age of Cronus in 5. appears as opposed to 4., and 
then we have another reason for thinking that 3. is true, 
i. e. we are living in a forward period, or one guided by 
god, since the -forward- age of Cronus is a reversal of 
the direction of the universe in 4., which is in turn 
described as opposite to the current phase. 
This conclusion has the philological advantage of suiting 
the reading of all the manuscripts at 271d4 -so that we 
do not need to amend the text as Burnet does: it is 
intelligible then to say that in the age of Cronus god 
took care of the universe hos nun16 (even though the 
epimel ei a he exerts now is different from the one in the 
age of Cronus, cf. infra section 7). 
In this ideal age of Cronus, then, both men and all the 
fruits sprang spontaneously from the earth; there was no 
need for agriculture; there were no wild animals, no 
wars, no families or states since all the parts of the 
universe were under the close care of gods; and there was 
a warm climate obviating the need for fire (271d-272b). 
It is in all these ways that the age of Cronus is hekista 
the current revolution (cf. 271d1); but not in respect of 
the direction of the revolution. 17 
16 Let us notice that, as some scholars have suggested, it may be 
necessary to restore a connective here -and so read, e. g. hös nun 
(kai) kata after Hermann, followed by Dies (1935: ad loc. ); an 
omission that might be explained by a kind of haplography, given the 
similarity between kai and the first letters of kata. 
17 Cf. peri Lou panta automata gignesthai Lois anthröpois at 271d1, 
which seems precisely to qualify the scope of the hekista in the same 
line. We should take in like manner the allusion to the age of 
Cronus as enantia to ours at 274e11, which is made in a context meant 
to emphasize and contrast the shepherding fulfilled by god at 
that 
time and the -more modest- political care carried out 
by humans in 
the present epoch. 
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The Stranger then proceeds to ask which of the two ages 
was happier, whether that of Cronus or "this [life] which 
is said to be in the presence of Zeus (epi Dios), "18 which 
is , the [life] of the present era" (ton nuni), 272b1-4 . The assertion that we are living under god confirms 3., 
namely that this period is one of those in which the 
universe is not just left to itself, and this will again 
be supported below. 
6. Reversal after the age of Cronus: increasing cosmic 
disorder 
Now, we still need to fill in a gap between the ages of 
Cronus and Zeus, since according to the cosmic structure 
of opposite cycles presented at 2. there should be a 
reverse cycle between them. And this reverse cycle seems 
to be precisely the one depicted at 272d6-273d4. There 
the Stranger describes what happens at the end of the age 
of Cronus: "when the time of all these things was 
finished, and change was due to come about, and moreover 
all the earthborn race had by that time been consumed, 
since each soul had given all its births by falling into 
the earth as seed as many times as had been assigned to 
each, then the pilot of the universe so to speak released 
the tiller and went off to his place of outlook, so that 
fated and inborn desire turned the universe backwards 
(palin anestrephen)" (272d6-e6). This reverse cycle is 
characterized by initial cosmic convulsion and 
destruction of animals (273a3-4) -parallel to the 
destruction of animals occurring at the beginning of the 
reverse cycle described at 4., cf. 270c11-12; restoration 
of order for the very briefest period after the release 
(273a5-7, c5-6), 19 and then increasing cosmic disorder 
18 epi + genitive= in the presence of (or in the time of). Cf. 
LSJ ad 
"epi ". 
19 Rowe (1995: 13) in fact suggests that the last two circumstances 
described (respectively the convulsion and the restoration of order) 
occur in two opposite cycles: the first one would depict the reversal 
following the golden rule of Cronus and the second would mark 
the 
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which results in the danger of the destruction of the 
universe (273d3-4). There is also in this reverse cycle - 
as in the one at 4. -, a reversal of the ageing process so 
that men and other animals grow younger rather than older 
(see the reference back to this cycle at 273e6-9). 20 But 
it is when the universe is on the brink of destruction 
that god intervenes and then we have: 
7. Forward cycle : The age of Zeus 
We are told that at that very moment "god who had ordered 
the universe, seeing that it was in trouble, and worried 
lest, having been storm-tossed and dissolved by 
confusion, it should sink into the limitless sea of 
dissimilarity, sits back again at his tiller, and after 
turning (strepsas) all that was sick and dissolute in the 
previous period when the world was by itself, he puts it 
in order (kosmei) and, setting it right again 
start of our new, present cycle, the "age of Zeus". The latter would, 
according to Rowe, go in the same direction as the golden period; the 
difference is that, instead of being ruled by god, the universe would 
follow the rule of its own intelligence (phronesis). This 
interpretation postulates then two successive periods when the 
universe marches by itself (without god) in opposite directions; 
something, however, that seems precluded by 269e7 ff., which 
precisely denies, amongst various possibilities, that the universe 
should turn itself in opposite directions. In addition, Rowe's 
justification for his postulating not only a reverse, but also a 
forward cycle without god, namely that if the universe "always went 
in the reverse direction when left to itself, its claim to 
rationality [phronesis] would look weak", is unconvincing, since, 
while it is true that the bodily determines the direction of the 
motion of the universe in the reverse cycle (as he himself notes) - 
i. e. its anapalin ienai, 269d2 ff. -, we must also note that 
the 
world's intelligence is mentioned there specifically 
in the context 
of the cycles which move opposite to those of god's guidance, and 
its 
relevance is to explain the circularity of its motion 
(periagetai 
zöion on kai phronesin eilechos, 269c9-d2) -at least as 
far as the 
beginning of the reverse cycle is concerned, when memory of god's 
teaching is still fresh (cf. infra, ch. 6, n. 2). 
20 In this passage we are told that when the universe was reversed 
again into its present path of generation (meaning the present 
age of 
Zeus), that "produced new things opposite to the ones 
before. For 
those animals which were due to disappear through smallness 
grew 
larger". This means that in the previous period animals were growing 
younger. 
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(epanorthon), makes it (apergazetai) immortal and 
ageless" (273d4-e4). 21 
The action of god sitting back again at the tiller 
suggests the start of a new forward cycle, since his 
absence from the tiller was characteristic of the 
opposite period after the age of Cronus (272e4 ff. ) 
. 
This, as we can see, is confirmed by the assertion that 
god turned round (strepsas) all that was sick in the 
previous period (proteräi periodöi) that the world 
underwent by itself (kath' heauton, 273e2; cf. di'heautou 
as characterizing the march of the universe in reverse 
cycles at 270a5). And the text goes on to say that the 
universe is turned (cf. strephthentos) along the road 
towards its present generation (ten epi ten nun genesin 
hodon, 273e6-7). In addition, god is here said to restore 
the world's immortality (cf. athanaton auton kai ageron 
apergazetai, 273e3-4), something that characterizes god's 
action in the -forward- period when he guides the 
universe, as we learn from 270a3-5: "Sometimes the 
universe is guided by a different, divine cause, 
acquiring life again and receiving restored immortality 
(lambanonta athanasian episkeuasten) from its creator; at 
other times it is let go". 
Which is this god in this new era? It should be Zeus, the 
one in the presence of which we are now (cf. epi Dios, 
ton nuni at 272b2-3). So we should read the passage that 
follows (273e-274e) as continuous with this one and 
within the age of Zeus. The whole idea this passage seems 
to convey is that the present era of Zeus, by contrast 
with the earlier era of Cronus, is not characterized by 
21 On Rowe's interpretation, this passage marks the beginning of a 
new age of Cronus, which he takes as following directly our present 
period as one of god's absence, both these periods, 
however, having 
the same -forward- direction. (Cf. Rowe 
[1995: 13,197 ad 274c1-2]. ) 
But this description does not sit well with the overall structure of 
cosmic cycles presented in the myth, according to which periods 
of 
god's guidance are always in the opposite direction 
to periods of 
god's absence (cf. supra, section 2.2). 
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such a great divine care that would prevent the existence 
of politics and human beings being their own rulers. As 
we shall see shortly, Plato seems to be willing to 
suggest here that politics takes place neither in an 
ideal universe where god's nous would have that kind of 
power, nor in its opposite under the predominance of 
ananke, 22 but in our actual world where nous and ananke 
coexist. Perhaps that is why in this era there are wild 
beasts, the weather is cold enough that man requires fire 
(274b-c), and so on. 23 As Brisson has proposed, we can 
think of this era as a synthesis between the ideal order 
of the age of Cronus and the disorder that is depicted as 
prevailing in the reverse cycles, 24 in the same manner as 
in the Timaeus our actual world is said to be a synthesis 
of nous and ananke. But, just as in the Timaeus Nous 
still rules over ananke and prevails within the 
composition of the kosmos (47e-48a), here again we should 
think that god rules, since he is still at the helm of 
the universe (273e1), and exercises guidance (agoge, 
274b1). He also gives orders to the universe (cf. 
prostattein at 274a5 and a7), even though the universe is 
ordered to be independent (274a5). This suggests an 
active role for god and not just a passive one as in 
those reverse periods when he withdraws his hand from the 
helm and limits himself, at the very most, to "observing" 
what is happening from his place of outlook (272e). The 
same active role of the deity is suggested by the 
allusion to the gifts of the gods (such as fire, skills 
and seeds) at 274c5-d2, who come and help the defenceless 
22 For ananke cf. infra, ch. 6, n. 14. 
23 Note however that these are just terrestrial disorders -in the 
same way as ananke manifests itself mainly in the Timaeus at a 
terrestrial level (cf. supra, ch. 2, n. 47)-, which can be subsumed 
in the overall agöge that I shall mention. There is here no 
suggestion of the astronomical disorder that characterizes the 
periods without guidance of god, and which would mean the governance 
of the bodily or of ananke over the whole universe (Pol. 273c-d). The 
latter -though not the former- seems incompatible with 
intelligent 
design, as we can see from the Philebus (28d-e), Timaeus (46c-e, 
47e- 
48a) and Laws (X 888e ff. with 891c-892a, XII 966e-967a; cf. 
infra, 
ch. 7 section 1). 
24 Cf. Brisson (1974: 490-2). 
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condition of man, giving the necessary "teaching and 
education" (didaches kai paideuseös, 274c6-7), 25 in a way 
that is not so close to royal shepherding, but still 
provident enough and is far from the passive role of god 
in the reversions. God is then present even though we are 
said to be deprived of the guidance of the particular 
gods who used to tend us in different parts of the 
universe (274b5-6 and d3-4, cf. 271d-e), 26 something that 
is however crucial to allow for politics in the sense of 
men guiding themselves. 
We see then that the structure of the forward cycles is 
not repetitive. The age of Cronus depicts an ideal 
situation which contrasts with the real one. And it is 
important that these two ages, while both being ages of 
god, should have different characteristics in the context 
of the whole dialogue, since in the light of them Plato 
will criticize the first definition of the statesman 
given before the myth -i. e. shepherd as breeder of human 
bipeds or the human flock-27 (a characterization which 
rather belonged to god in the apolitical era of Cronus), 28 
and put forward a new one in the light of the myth - 
statesmanship in terms of human concern, the latter being 
more adjusted to the facts (cf. 274e-275a, 276c-d). 
25 Cf. the previous suggestion that god gives didache during the 
forward cycles at 273b2, which the world is said to remember at the 
beginning of a reverse cycle. Rowe (1995: 197 ad 274c6) admits that 
"it is surprising to find gods giving gifts to us human beings" in a 
period when according to him we are not under god. On my 
interpetation, that there is a divine presence in this period, the 
giving of such gifts is no longer surprising. 
26 Note that it is the care of these gods that men seem to be 
explicitly said to be deprived of. Cf. the plural theön at 274d3 and 
nemontos hemas daimonos at 274b5-6, which must be a reference to each 
of the daimones who enemen [us as] a particular kind of 
flock at 
271d6-el. 
27 Cf. 267d, where politics is a nomeutike or koinotrophike concerned 
with the human agele. 
28 Cf. particularly 271d6-el, where the zöia are divided 
by flocks 
among gods who tended them, and the allusion to people under 
Cronus 
as his trophimoi at 272b8. 
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8. Some further details about the age of Zeus 
At 273e6 ff. we are told further details about what 
happened "when the universe was turned along the road 
towards its present generation" (strephthentos tou kosmou 
ten epi ten nun genesin hodon), namely, "the ageing 
process again stopped, and produced new things opposite 
to the ones before. For those animals which were almost 
due to disappear through smallness grew larger, and those 
bodies newly born from the earth with grey hair again 
died and descended to the earth" (e7-11). In this latter 
sentence the new things of this cycle are contraposed to 
those happening before: the normal present process of 
growth is contrasted with the previous growing smaller 
and disappearing; as to the second clause, the text 
cannot mean that the gegeneis belong to this period (for 
that is ruled out at 274a2-4), but they must belong to 
the previous age, following on the above mentioned 
contraposition. 
Are these latter gegeneis those of the age of Cronus, so 
that in fact our present age of Zeus has not been 
separated from the age of Cronus by a reverse cycle but 
is itself the reverse cycle following the age of Cronus? 
Apart from the separate evidence we have given against 
this, 29 it could hardly here be so, for in the age of 
Cronus the ageing process of the gegeneis goes from young 
to old -as we have seen from the 
image of the seed-, and 
so does the ageing process in the age of Zeus (cf. 273e8- 
9,274a -with the reference to conception, 
birth and 
nurture), so that the direction of the age of Zeus could 
not be contraposed to that of the age of Cronus. It makes 
rather more sense to interpret that the gegeneis of 
the 
29 Note also that the text refers to the reverse cycle 
following the 
age of Cronus as completely in the past, as we 
learn from the remark 
that, with regard to the universe's remembering the teachings 
of its 
father, "at the beginning it did so more accurately, towards the end 




cycle immediately preceding this one are not those of the 
age of Cronus, but belong to an intervening reverse 
period between the ages of Cronus and Zeus in which 
people are born from the earth as old. In this way I 
think we must read 273e10-11 (ta d' ek ges neogene somata 
polia phunta palm apothneiskonto eis gen kateiei) : 
"those bodies newly born from the earth with grey hair 
again died and descended to the earth". 30 Being "born 
from the earth with grey hair", i. e. old, is contrary to 
being born from the earth from "seed" (cf. Spermata, 
272e3), which would suggest a normal process of growth 
from young to old, like a plant. If this is so, then we 
have gegeneis not only in the forward age of Cronus but 
also -of a different kind- in the following reversal. 31 32 
III. THE APPENDIX OF THE MYTH AND THE CASE AGAINST 
I have above attempted to present a coherent reading of 
the text according to which we could make sense of its 
referring to the present era as that of Zeus, implying 
that we are living under a period of god. In addition, a 
reading of the appendix of the myth (273e6-274e1) has 
30 Plato has not invented this device of people being born with grey 
hair, since it is to be found in Hesiod, Op. 181, where it is said 
that the race of iron will be destroyed when men are born with grey 
hair. 
31 This would also be no surprise for one who adopted interpretation 
A. at section 5., in which we saw a similar kind of gegeneis in a 
similarly regressive cycle at 4., which must be the cycle preceding 
the age of Cronus. Brisson (1992b), for his part, has suggested that 
this could equally well refer to the cycle preceding our age -so that 
there might be no reverse preceding the age of Cronus-, since in both 
cases the direction is the same. However, there is an important 
textual clue that would make the two reverse cycles distinct, namely 
the allen applied to destruction of animals at 273a3, which would 
suggest that the latter is different from the one at 270c11-12. The 
two passages should therefore correspond to different cosmic reverse 
periods. 
32 In the light of this, we can give an explanation of the passage 
271a7-b1, where we are told that the gegeneis "were remembered by our 
first ancestors, who were neighbours to the end of the previous cycle 
during the succeeding time". The gegeneis which are recalled here 
by 
our ancestors need not be those of the age of Cronus but could 
be 
those of our immediately previous -reverse- cycle. 
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been given that could fit into that picture. However, it 
is at this last stage of the text that the ambiguity 
becomes greater and therefore an alternative reading 
possible. 
To say that in the present cycle we are deprived of the 
care of the regional gods, but not of the overall care 
exerted by god in the universe, can in principle make 
sense of the greater part of the text of the myth, 269c- 
273e, and the actual suggestions of god's care in our 
era. However, the appendix can also be seen to contain 
some counterevidence for this kind of interpretation. Let 
us quote the most challenging text in that direction: 
"And everything that contributed to human life arose from 
those things, once the care of the gods, as has now been 
said, left men, and they had to lead their own existence 
and take care of themselves by themselves (di' heautön), 
like the whole cosmos (kathaper holos ho kosmos), which 
we imitate and follow for the whole time... " (274d2-7). 
If we follow strictly the macro-microcosm parallelism 
that has been stressed throughout the myth, it would be 
hard to say that only men are deprived of their caring 
gods but not the universe; the text just quoted rather 
suggests the contrary. Even if one interprets that the 
kathaper holos ho kosmos refers to an analogy between 
human beings and the cosmos only in respect of the care 
of themselves that they have to have, not to their being 
left by the gods, 33 one could nonetheless expect the 
paralellism to have a wider scope than that and suggest 
that, if the care of the gods left men, it should also 
have left the universe. But after all it is not said that 
the gods withdraw every sort of care, not even for human 
33 After all even at 273c2-3, referring to a forward cycle, 
it is the 
universe itself which breeds the zöia, with the assistance of 
the 
pilot; though still the epimeleia that the universe has to 
have of 
itself at 274d5 could be reminiscent of the epimeleia kai 
kratos that 
the universe has of itself at the beginning of the reverse cycle at 
273a7. 
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beings, but only that of each of the gods nemontos hemas 
(274b5) during the age of Cronus (cf. 271d6-el) 
. The gods 
are still present as bestowers of gifts like the technai 
to humanity, which are granted together with the 
"necessary teaching and education" (met' anankaias 
didaches kai paideuseos, 274c6-7). 34 Didache was exactly 
the kind of thing given by god in the periods when he 
guides the universe and which the latter has to remember 
when left to its own (cf. 273b2). So, if the gods are 
still present, though more detachedly, in the present era 
by giving us gifts, teaching and education oriented 
towards facilitating a more independent life on the part 
of human beings, so one could expect god to be in charge 
of the universe with a similar function. It would then 
make as much sense in the latter as in the former case to 
find the text saying that: 
"In the same way as the 
master of its own march 
autokratora einai tes 
were the parts ordered 
by themselves so far 
guidance. " (274a4-bl). 
cosmos had been ordered to be the 
(kathaper toi kosmoi prosetetakto 
-iautou poreias), so and similarly 
to conceive, procreate and breed 
as it was possible, by similar 
We find a similar situation in the Timaeus when the 
Demiurge instructs (again, the verb prostattein, 36d4-7) 
the heavens how to move; this seems to be what the 
heavenly bodies learn (38e6) and they continue doing so 
even after, according to the mythical literal picture, 
the Demiurge ceases his direct work on the universe and 
the World-Soul and the heavenly bodies have to take up 
ruling functions in the universe (41a ff., 42d-e; cf. 
34 This is an important point, since nothing in the structure of 
the 
reverse cycles seems to leave room for gods to come 
back and actively 
give teaching to the universe or its parts (e. g. 
human beings), as 
they are said to do at 274c5-d2. On the contrary, 
it is stated that, 
no god being at the helm of the universe, there are no 
longer lesser 
gods having intervention (272e ff. ), so that, 
if we find the latter - 
as we do- in our epoch, the former should also 
be present. 
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34c4-5), in a way that shows 
the latter to end up being 
universe than the external 
initially suggested. 
the orderly foundations of 
much more internal to the 
figure of the Demiurge 
We see, then, that the appendix to the myth of the 
Politicus could be taken as suggesting two sides of the 
question, with hints, on the one hand, reminiscent of the 
regressive cycles and with some others which, on the 
other hand, support the contrary situation. And perhaps 
this apparent tension can be resolved if, as suggested 
above, one interprets the present cycle not as repetitive 
of the age of Cronus but as an actual synthesis of the 
rule of nous and a state of the world merely left to 
itself, as much as in the Timaeus the world is a sustasis 
of to dia nou dedemiourgemena and to di 'anankes gignomena 
(47e-48a). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, by following the movement of the text, I hope to 
have shown a coherent reading of the letter of the myth 
of the Politicus according to which the present cycle in 
which we are living is an orderly one under the care of 
god and not one of increasing cosmic disorder, as has 
usually been assumed at the cost of charging Plato with 
unsolvable contradictions. Our present cycle proved 
parallel and not opposite to that of Cronus in respect of 
direction, even though some differences can be found in 
other senses and are indeed required for Plato to be able 
to make his political point by means of the myth at all. 
In this way I hope to have established that, even on a 
literal reading of the text, the Mind of god must still 
be presupposed to be the foundation of the present cosmic 
order, and in this respect the Politicus picture does not 
conflict with similar claims in other dialogues. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COSMIC AND HUMAN DRAMA IN THE POLITICUS' 
We have already seen in the previous chapter how, in the 
picture of opposite cycles presented in the myth of the 
Politicus, the contraposition between the era of Cronus 
and that of Zeus is relevant for the political purposes 
of the myth, which, as the Stranger states, aims at 
correcting the first definition of the statesman. Now, 
apart from that, we can wonder how literally the myth 
should be taken, and whether it does not still deserve 
other levels of analysis which could complemetarily 
enrich and enlighten its function in the dialogue. It is 
prima facie clear that the guise of the myth is 
cosmological, but how much cosmological significance does 
it have? Positions on this point have often been extreme, 
and so the myth has sometimes been treated either as a 
digressive and separate piece of cosmological doctrine, 
or as a rather lengthy tale fashioned for the political 
purposes of the dialogue but deprived of great 
cosmological importance. In this chapter, on the 
contrary, I wish to undertake a more integrated analysis, 
by stressing the cosmological content of the myth and, 
against that background, exploring further its ethical 
and political implications. In this way I attempt to show 
the intimate connection of cosmology with anthropology 
and politics in the myth, so that, far from being a 
digression, this story turns out to be crucial for an 
understanding of the general political purpose of the 
dialogue. I shall argue for the thesis that: (I) despite 
the mythical device of creation and cosmic cycles, any 
allusion to disorder or cosmic drama in the whole 
universe should not be taken literally (though we shall 
1 This chapter is based on a preliminary version read at the Third 
Symposium Platonicum, Bristol, August 1992 and subsequently published 




see that the myth does contain some important 
cosmological elements); but (II) these stand for human 
and social disturbances; in other words, it is mainly in 
human affairs that confusion and ethical disorder arise. 
I. THE COSMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MYTH 
1. The implausibility of a literal interpretation of 
cosmic drama 
Let us start by summarizing the picture of opposite 
cosmic cycles that we saw in more detail in the previous 
chapter. God is described as the creator of the universe, 
and there are times when he himself guides the world and 
makes it go in a forward revolution. But at some other 
times god lets the universe go and it turns backwards. 
This rotation in reverse starts by being regular, thanks 
to the world's phronesis and remembrance of god's 
instructions. But, as time passes and memory grows dim, 
the influence of the corporeal element of the world's 
constitution becomes greater and the motion of the 
universe becomes therefore increasingly disorderly, to 
such an extent that god has to come back to restore order 
(cf. 269c-d, 272e ff .). 
This picture, if taken literally, would suggest the idea 
of cosmic drama, which we can take as a conflict between 
good and evil, or their respective causes -i. e. 
intelligence and the corporeal- which not only coexist 
but seem also to prevail alternatingly in the whole 
universe, making it exhibit either purposive or random 
behaviour. 2 However, I do not think that this picture of 
2 For the bodily as a cause of evil, in turn understood in terms of 
disorder, cf. 273b4-d4. Such disorder does not lie in design 
but in 
its absence, e. g. in illness or ignorance -caused by the 
bodily-, as 
is the case when the world becomes "forgetful" of god's 
instructions 
and full of "diseases" (273c6, e2) . Cf. Prot. 
358c6-7, Gorg. 480b1, 
488a2-4,509e5-7, Rep. I 351a5, Soph. 228b8-9, c7-8, el-5, Tim. 86b- 
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opposite cosmic cycles of order and increasing disorder 
should be taken literally. 
We must be sensitive to the way the Eleatic Stranger 
introduces the story to Young Socrates: it is a paidia 
(268d8), a "game for children"; he invites Young Socrates 
to listen to the story "like chidren, for you are 
certainly not many years removed from children's games" 
(268e5-6). It seems, then, that in this manner of 
presenting the myth, Plato is presumably not intending 
his readers to believe his story uncritically. His 
playful tone, on the other hand, contrasts with the 
serious tone of the Timaeus, 3 where the narrator stresses 
the difficulty of finding the maker of the All (28c) and 
prays for the help of the gods in his big undertaking 
e, Phil. 22b, Laws V 731c, IX 860d for evil lying in absence of 
intention, ignorance, or illness. 
At Pol. 273b-e we can also see how the bodily rules in the reverse 
cycles. In fact, to sömatoeides -which participates in great ataxia 
before the kosmos is established- is inherent to the universe's 
"ancient nature" (to tes palai pote phuse(5s suntrophon, 273b4-5), 
also called "the state of ancient disharmony" (to tes palaias 
anarmostias pathos, 273c7-dl). And we can see that, as memory of god 
grows dimmer, this state of disharmony "increasingly even rules 
(mallon kai dunasteuei)", and towards the end of the cycle "is 
flourishing" (exanthei) (273c7-dl). We must notice also that this 
process starts early in the cycle, since the text suggests that the 
period in which the world's memory is accurate and everything runs 
kallista is very short indeed (cf. 273c5-6). And even if, for that 
very short period, the memory of the world can be said to rule, the 
bodily condition of the universe is still responsible for its innate 
(emphuton) tendency to move in a reverse direction (to anapalin 
ienai, 269d-e; cf. epithumia at 272e6), even though the reverse cycle 
starts by being circular due to the world's phronesis (periagetai 
zöion on kai phronesin eilechos, 269c7-d2). Now, since the bodily 
is 
in itself full of ataxia, the fundamental tendency of the reverse 
cycle is towards disorder. And, as we have just seen, towards the end 
of the cycle this disorder caused by the bodily prevails to such an 
extent that the universe is on the verge of destruction 
(cf. 
diaphthoras kindunon, 273d3). So even any rule exerted by the world's 
memory seems very precarious in comparison with the underlying 
force 
exerted by the corporeal. 
3 Note that, when at Tim. 59c7-d2 Timaeus refers to 
his own 
engagement with generated realities as a paidia, he stresses 
however 
that this paidia is "moderate" (metrion) and "sober" 
(phronimon). 
For the serious tone of the Timaeus in general cf. Lloyd 
(1968: 81- 
4). See also the claims of truth that Timaeus makes 
for his discourse 
at Tim. 30b8,38a1,56b4. 
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(27b-d, 48d-e) 
.4 Even if the Timaeus picture is, on 
different grounds, not to be taken literally in all its 
details either, it seems that in that eikos logos of the 
Timaeus Plato is engaging in a more serious enterprise 
than when "raising" in the Politicus a big mass of muthos 
(277b4-5) to illustrate the king. 
This being so, and given the mythical character of the 
story, we are entitled to think that, if the picture of 
cosmic reversals does not appear in any other context, 
and furthermore it is contradicted in more argumentative 
passages, then we have a prima facie reason for not 
taking it literally. Successive complete cosmic 
reversals, in fact, do not appear elsewhere, 5 even less 
the fact that they end in ataxia. Furthermore, there seem 
to be positive reasons to reject the idea that Plato 
could have believed in them, and we could pose the 
question in the context of how Plato himself seems to 
understand astronomy in discursive passages. In the 
Republic, for example, astronomy is conceived of as a 
strict intellectual discipline, and, despite the sensible 
aspect of the heavens which makes them fall short of the 
absolute stability of intelligible entities, 6 Plato 
4 This fact becomes all the more suggestive when we note that, unlike 
the Politicus, invocation to the gods in support of the theories 
expounded is present not only in the Timaeus but also in Philebus 
(25b) and Laws X (893b), i. e. in the three major pieces of 
cosmological theory that we find in the late dialogues apart from 
the Politicus. 
5 Neither in the Republic (X, 616b-617d), nor in the Timaeus myth, 
nor in the Laws (VII 822a-b), even though all these passages deal 
with astronomy either discursively or mythically, and even though 
reverse -or at least opposite- direction is mentioned e. g. 
in the 
Timaeus as a characteristic of the planets moving in the Circle of 
the Other which, however, revolves simultaneously with and is 
embraced by the Circle of the Same (cf. 36c-d, 39a-b). 
6 The parallattein predicated of the heavenly bodies (i. e. to en 
autoi (=ouranoi], 530a6-7, the referent of tauta at 530b2) doesn't 
suggest in itself anything like the picture of deterioration of the 
heavenly motion that we find at the end of the Politicus myth, but 
it 
must be taken in its context: it would be absurd to think that "these 
things turn out to be always in the same state (aei hösautös) and 
do 
not vary at all with respect to anything" (oudamei ouden 
parallattein), 530b2-3. Note the qualifications oudamei ouden: 
it is 
rather expectable that sensible things as such should be subject 
to 
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nevertheless stresses that the heavens are "the most 
beautiful and accurate" of sensible things (529c8-dl, cf. 
530a3-7) and must be used as an example (paradeigma, cf. 
529d7) in understanding the intelligible proportions that 
govern the movement of the heavenly bodies. As Mourelatos 
has put it, "in the heavens we have the best visible 
concrete realization" of the abstract object of its 
corresponding science.? These heavenly bodies, however, 
could hardly serve as an example if their motions were 
liable to become disorderly in the radical way that the 
Politicus myth proposes, 8 nor would the fatal evils that 
end up prevailing in the universe during the reverse 
cycles in the Politicus befit Plato's appraisal of its 
extreme beauty and accuracy in the Republic. The Laws, 
for its part, stresses that the heavenly bodies follow 
always the same circular track (VII, 822a7), and treats 
as impiety the contrary belief (821c-d) .9 Let us recall in 
change at least in some respect, the whole point of the propaedeutic 
sciences being to elevate the soul from genesis to ousia. The word 
parallattein reappears in the Politicus (269e), but it conveys in 
itself no connotation of deterioration: conversely, it is said to 
belong to retrogradation (anakuklesis) as the least possible 
parallaxis of the world's motion; the motion would still be circular, 
stable and along the same path (cf. hoti malista en toi autöi kata 
tauta mian phoran kineitai). If parallaxis can be thought of as 
retrogradation, as the Politicus evinces, note that the Timaeus also 
predicates retrogradation (epanakuklesis, 40c5) of the heavenly 
bodies (cf. even parallaxis at 22d1); though it will happen within 
the same periphora and not in different cycles as the Politicus 
proposes (cf. n. 5 and Knorr [1990: 315]). 
7 Cf. Mourelatos (1981: 29). 
8 That disorder ends up affecting the whole heaven is suggested at 
Pol. 273a ff. At 273a1-3 the text mentions a seismos in the cosmos as 
an immediate result of god's release of the helm; after that calm and 
order briefly follow but at 273c we are told about the chalepa kai 
adika occurring in the heaven or universe (en ouran(5i, cl, which 
cannot just mean the earth) which "it itself possesses and 
communicates to the zöia [within it]" (c2) . These 
disorders increase 
as time passes, so that in the end the ouranos, "mixing together 
small goods with a great mixture of the opposite things, reaches 
danger of destruction of itself and of the things within 
it" (273d1- 
4), so that we do not reach complete chaos but get very near to 
it at 
the time of god's intervention. All this, however, is 
incompatible 
with continuing astronomical order. 
9 This would in turn be consistent with the astronomical picture 
in 
the Timaeus, which presents the circular routes of the Same and the 
Other as the only ones traversed by the heavenly bodies, 
however 
complex the movements of some of them may be. Remember also 
that the 
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this context that both in the Republic -VI 508a4- and the 
Laws -VII 821b6,821c7- the heavenly bodies are regarded 
as gods, 10 and that, according to the Republic -II 381b-c- 
any change of the gods to the worse would be viewed as 
contradictory to their goodness. So it seems clear, from 
the discursive treatment that astronomy receives in 
dialogues other than the Politicus, that Plato regards 
the sensible astronomical system as continuously 
orderly. " And, if there is consensus in situating the 
Politicus between the Republic and the Laws, it would 
seem unreasonable to suppose that Plato temporarily 
changes his mind by allowing the movement of the stars to 
pass from order into almost complete disorder in a 
dialogue where, furthermore, no discursive ground can be 
found for such a claim. 12 
Discursive evidence, then, seems not only to be silent 
about opposite cosmic cycles in the fashion of the 
Politicus but also to go against its postulation. We must 
also bear in mind that, in the rest of the corpus, where 
Timaeus myth starts and ends with an exaltation of the sensible 
universe as the most beautiful of sensible things (29a5,92c6-9) as 
had already been done in the astronomical passage in the Republic. 
10 See also the reference to the universe and heavenly bodies as gods 
in the Timaeus in ch. 3, section 1 (for the universe as god in the 
Laws cf. infra, ch. 7, section 4.2) . It 
is revealing, by contrast 
with these other dialogues, that the universe and the heavenly bodies 
are not called gods in the Politicus. Plato seems to be consistent in 
his reasons for not doing so, if on a literal picture the world can 
here exhibit behaviour that is other than intelligent and good. 
11 This point I think can be maintained regardless of whatever 
difference in detail can be found in Plato's treatment of astronomy 
in Republic and Timaeus and Laws. For discussion of this issue - 
particularly as far as the role of observation is concerned- see 
e. g. Heath (1913: 139-40), Shorey (1935: 186), Dicks (1970: 
106), 
Vlastos (1980: 1-16), Mourelatos (1980: 33 ff. ), (1981: 16-7,24 
ff. ), Kung (1985: 23), Lloyd (1991: 333-4,348). 
12 Note also that Heath (1913) does not even mention the Politicus 
in 
his detailed consideration of Plato's astronomical views 
in the 
dialogues, whereas Dicks (1970: 115), in his very brief allusion 
to 
the Politicus myth, stresses that it "adds little to our 
knowledge of 
Plato's astronomy" and is "highly fanciful". Nor 
do we find any 
consideration of the Politicus passage in the analytic studies 
on 
Plato's astronomy compiled in Anton (1980). I shall 
be suggesting 
below, however, that, astronomical details aside, the cosmology of 
the Politicus reveals itself as more than sheer fancy. 
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cyclical events are mentioned at all, they are not 
referred to the whole universe but just restricted to 
Earth -in the form, e. g., of fires, deluges and 
catastrophes sometimes or periodically affecting Nature 
and destroying civilization, particularly in Plato's 
later work; cf. Tim. 22a ff., Crit. 109d ff., Laws III 
677a ff. -, and even so, they appear mainly in legendary 
or narrative contexts. So, even if Plato is elsewhere 
thinking of cosmic cycles, it would be within those 
restrictions, i. e. within our mortal domain, where that 
residue of ananke not completely controlled by nous seems 
to manifest its effects the most in the Timaeus. 13 But 
these potential disruptions in Nature could never compete 
against the more comprehensive order, so that in any case 
it is nous that reigns over the universe on the whole 
(cf. e. g. Tim. 48a, Laws X 903b, 904b). 
2. The philosophical meaning and status of god 
On this basis I do not think that the "cosmic drama" in 
the Politicus, or the opposition between directions of 
the universe determined respectively by nous and to 
sömatoeides, should be taken literally as serious 
cosmological doctrine. This, however, does not mean that 
the Politicus myth lacks elements of cosmological 
importance. On the contrary, we can find here notions 
which prove to be the subject of more detailed or 
argumentative analysis in other late dialogues. Thus, 
e. g., the universe is conceived of as a zöion, with a 
body and an intelligence of its own (Pol. 269d1, cf. Tim. 
30b4-5, Phil. 29e-30a). In addition, god appears as a 
"divine cause" (theia aitia, 270a3) that accounts 
for 
whatever order, goodness and beauty exist in the universe 
(cf. 273b-c, e3), whereas "the bodily" (to somatoeides, 
273b4; analogous with ananke in the Timaeus, also 
13 Cf. supra, ch. 2, n. 47. 
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mentioned at Pol. 269d3,270cll)14 is the aition of its 
potential or actual disarrangements (Pol. 273b-d, esp. 
273b4; cf. Tim. 46e5-6). And this opposition between two 
kinds of causes reminds us of the parallel distinction 
between divine and necessary causes that we analysed in 
the Timaeus (46c-e, 68e-69a). 
Now, if we focus more closely on the nature of god, we 
shall find that he is mythically presented as a 
demiourgos (270a5,273b1, as in the imagery of the 
Timaeus), and Plato resorts to tradition when making him 
(as we saw in the previous chapter), bear in different 
cosmic cycles the respective names of Cronus and Zeus. 
But in reality this distinction is not sharp: Cronus is 
called demiourgos kai pater at 273b1-2 and Zeus theos ho 
kosmesas [ton kosmon] at 273d4, and these expressions 
appear to refer to the same entity. It would then seem 
that god does not have a distinct personality, 15 despite 
his mythical disguises, though the main feature that 
prevails in him even when deprived of these is his 
function of being a "divine cause", something that also 
characterizes god in the Timaeus (29a, 46c-e, 68e), 
Philebus (where he is also traditionally called Zeus, 
30c-d) and Laws (X 899b) . 
According to the mythical picture, we have seen god 
performing two functions: First, he is the creator of the 
14 Cf. reverse motion as something ex anankes at 269d2-3 and 
aftwerwards referred to the bodily at 269d9 ff. and 272e ff. (esp. 
273b4-5). In addition, "the bodily" in the Politicus is analogous to 
ananke in the Timaeus insofar as the latter is related to the 
opposite properties or ichne of the four primary bodies (Tim. 48a-b, 
cf. 52d-53b). Both of them, if uncontrolled by nous and not unified 
in a kosmos, are the cause of merely random effects, threatening to 
sink the world in "the limitless sea of dissimilarity" (Pol. 
273d-e, 
cf. Tim. 46e; Cornford [1937: 202 ff]). Note in this respect 
the 
association between apeiron, division and dissimilarity at Pol. 
273d6 
-and anarmostia at 273c7- and apeiron as conveying 
division and 
discord between opposites in the Philebus (as suggested at 
25e1,27d9 
and analysed supra, ch. 4, section 5.4). 
15 Let us also bear in mind that god appears not only as one, 
but as 




world as an ordered whole (gennesas, 269d9; cf. 
sunarmosas 269d1, suntheis 273b7, kosmesas 273d4); though 
this creation of order seems to occur not only once but 
in a sense periodically, since god is also the restorer 
of order under threat of chaos (cf. 273d-e, esp. kosmei 
at 273e3). Secondly, and above all, god is also a ruler 
or leader who takes care of the universe during its 
orderly periods (cf. 269c5,270a3,271d-e, 272e4, 
273c3). 16 But if, as I have argued, it makes more sense 
to think of no periodical creation or restoration of 
cosmic order in time, but of a continuously fair and 
orderly universe, it would seem that, by being the cause 
of that order, god should be creating and sustaining the 
world -by his care of it- always and not just 
periodically (since, as the Politicus myth shows, his 
merely periodical presence does not suffice to guarantee 
constant order). These two features: being a principle of 
order and ruling over it, would be characteristic of the 
"divine cause" represented by god in the Politicus, as 
much as they reappear as distinctive of god and/or the 
cause not only in the Timaeus, but also in the Philebus 
(27a-b) and the Laws (e. g. X 896a-c). 
Furthermore, there seems to be good reason to suppose 
that in the Politicus myth god is a nous. The text in 
fact attributes intellectual activities to god (gnontes, 
272e8, and imparting didache at 274c6), and practical 
functions of ruling, like the tending of flocks, that 
have already been treated previously in the dialogue as a 
kind of episteme (cf. 267a-b). In addition, there are 
several hints that support this notion in the light of 
other dialogues since, firstly, god is called a 
kubernetes (Pol. 272e4), and this is the very word Plato 
uses in the Phaedrus to speak of intellect as the pilot 
16 In other words, god in the mythical picture has not only a 
"cosmogonic" or generating role but also a "cosmonomic" or organizing 
one -to put it in the terminology of Verdenius 
(1954: 251). In the 
Politicus the latter seems more emphasized than the former, which 
is 
in turn much more detailed in the Timaeus. Cf. Brisson (1974: 
35-54). 
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of soul (247c7). Secondly, in the Politicus god exhibits 
the essential feature of "turning itself always" (auto 
heauto strephein aei, 269e5) 17 and this feature is 
twofold, since it involves (i) circular motion and (ii) 
self-motion. On the one hand, we know from the Timaeus 
(34a) and Laws (X 897c, 898a) that circular motion is the 
property of nous. On the other hand, we learn from the 
Phaedrus (245c-e) and Laws (895e-896a) that self-motion 
is the definition of soul. This suggests that the god or 
Demiurge in the Politicus is a kind of noetic soul. This 
conclusion seems independent of whether we take this nous 
as separate or not from the universe, 18 though, to be 
utterly consistent, we should rule out the former 
interpretation, since the text makes it clear that there 
cannot be constant order in the universe if it is 
separated (chorizomenos) from god (Pol. 273c-d); so that 
when there is divine guidance -as I have argued to be 
always the case- god is not separated. At any rate, we 
are able to say that god, as nous, is a mediator in the 
ontological structure of the Politicus: He is both 
inferior to the immutable Ideas, which are "the most 
divine of all things" (tois pantön theiotatois, Pol. 
269d6) -with which he would nevertheless share 
invisibility and intelligibility-19 and superior to the 
17 This very feature of motion prevents us from taking god as a 
symbol of the Ideas, which, on the contrary, are immutable and 
superior even to god's nous. The passage referring to the Ideas is 
269d5-6: to kata tauta kai hösautös echein aei kai tautop einai Lois 
pantön theiotatois prosekei monois, by contrast with change 
(metabole, 269e1) pertaining to the universe by virtue of its 
participation in body (cf. infra, note 36). For a characterization of 
the Ideas in similar terms to those of the Politicus see Phaedo 78c6, 
d2-3 (in contrast with metabole at d4), Tim. 29a1, Phil. 59c4. For 
discussion about whether the Forms are present in passages of the 
Politicus other than the myth cf. e. g. Guthrie (1978: 176-80) and 
Mohr (1977) versus Owen (1973); Rowe (1995: 4-8) versus Skemp (1952: 
72-7). 
18 In favour of an interpretation of god as non-transcendent in the 
Politicus, cf. Cornford (1937: 206 ff. ); Festugiere (1947: 20-1,43- 
4), (1949: 104-5,120 ff., 145); Ostenfeld (1982: 236). Against, cf. 
T. M. Robinson (1967: 61); (1970: 134); Brisson (1974: 83-4,479 ff. ); 
Mohr (1982: 42-3,45-7). 
19 These are features of every soul as such. Cf. Tim. 46d6, Laws X 
898d9-e2. The invisibility of soul is also asserted in Phaedo 79b12- 
15. 
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material realm he organizes -with which he shares the 
property of motion (Pol. 269d-e). And this mediating 
function may have a teleological aspect if we take this 
nous to have a cognitive relation to the Ideas (as in the 
Timaeus) and, as a self-mover, to be in turn an efficient 
cause or principle of motion (as suggested by Pol. 269e5- 
6)20 and thus act upon the sensible realm according to 
the order of Ideas. In this way we could explain how he 
is responsible for bringing beauty to the sensible 
universe (273b6-7). 21 
3. The cosmological meaning of opposite cycles 
So we see that there are elements of cosmological 
importance in the myth of the Politicus which relate it 
to other late dialogues dealing with cosmology, even 
though, as I have argued earlier, the imagery itself of 
opposite cosmic cycles or cosmic drama seems to be 
unfeasible. Let us recall, however, that by denying the 
existence of cosmic drama in the Politicus I am not 
denying the existence of all sorts of disturbance in 
Plato's universe. I am just questioning that disorder 
might affect the whole heaven or universe. However, it is 
a matter of fact that confusion exists in human and 
political life -as we shall see further on-, and there 
may also be disarrangements in the natural domain, even 
within the framework of an orderly universe. The very 
myth of the Politicus tells us that there are "small 
evils" (smikra phlaura) -due to the influence of the 
primordial condition of the universe, in turn related to 
its corporeal element- coexisting with "great goods" 
(megala agatha) even under the guidance of god (273b-c, 
esp. 273c2-4). 
20 We are there told of god that "to turn itself always is hardly 
possible except for the one who leads all things that are 
in turn 
moved" (toi tön kinoumenön au pantön hegoumen(5i). 
21 Cf. the relation between metron, beauty and goodness at Pol. 
284b1-2. 
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So, rather than having a successive opposition between 
prevailing good and evil, or their respective causes, we 
could think, with some interpreters, 22 that the Politicus 
mythically represents in a separate and abstract way the 
predominance of two factors (namely, nous and the 
corporeal) which in fact coexist in the cosmos as a 
sunkrasis of them (Pol. 273b4; cf. Tim. 48a2); a 
sunkrasis in which Mind prevails over the cussed 
corporeal element. The coexistence of these two factors 
is made explicit, for example, at 273b6-c2: "From its 
constructor [the universe] has acquired all good things; 
but from its previous state it itself possesses ... 
whatever miseries and injustices arise in the universe" 
(cf. also Pol. 269d8-el: The universe has shared in many 
blessed things from its begetter, but it also 
participates in body). In addition, I can also here agree 
with the suggestion23 that disorderly cycles in the 
Politicus -as much as the precosmic chaos in the Timaeus- 
are just hypothetical postulations, showing how the world 
would be if god were not present in it at all times, or - 
in the words of the Timaeus- if ananke were completely 
left to itself without the direction of nous. 
What has been said in the previous paragraph can then be 
taken as the prima facie cosmological meaning of the myth 
of opposite cosmic cycles, which can count as a first 
possible interpretation of that kind of imagery. However, 
I think that this interpretation, though correct as far 
as it goes, does not exhaust the purpose of the myth. 24 So 
22 Cf. Cornford (1937: 207); Brisson (1974: 490-2). This kind of 
interpretation had already been offered by Proclus (In Tim. III 
273, 
25 ff. Diehl). 
23 Cf. Cherniss (1954: 29 n. 44); Festugiere (1949: 129-30); and 
those mentioned in the note above. 
24 Also, this interpretation by itself would fail to explain why, 
if 
that were the only message Plato were trying to convey, 
he needed to 
postulate the complicated picture of different successive 
forward and 
reverse cycles, and not -more simply- just one moment of prevailing 
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far we have not proved that this story is not a 
cosmological digression in the dialogue, nor have we 
exhibited its relation with Plato's anthropology and 
political thought. I now wish to show that the disorderly 
cycles can be regarded not only as a symbol of 
hypothetical states of the world as a whole, but also as 
a cosmic projection of actual human and social disorder. 
So I pass on to examine the ethical and political 
importance of the myth and its relation both to cosmology 
and to the political context of the dialogue. It goes 
without saying that these different levels of analysis, 
far from being exclusive, are complementary to one 
another. 
II. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MEANING OF THE MYTH 
1. The exaggeration of the macro-microcosm parallelism 
One of the most pervasive notions throughout the myth is 
that of a close parallelism between macro and microcosm. 
Thus, we have seen that all changes in the universe 
involve changes in us who dwell in it. For example, both 
the "development" and "reverse process" of human age 
follow the forward or backward motion of the universe 
respectively (cf. e. g. Pol. 270d-e, 271b7-8,273e-274a). 
Likewise, the picture of opposite cosmic cycles serves 
Plato as a framework for views on palingenesis, which 
recall the argument of compensation of opposites to prove 
cyclical immortality in the Phaedo (cf. anabioskesthai 
in 
Pol. 271b6-7,272a1 and Phaedo 71e13-72a2). On the other 
hand, during the age of Cronus god has personal charge 
of the universe as well as of man; whereas 
in the era of 
Zeus, when the world becomes autokratos, so 
does man, 
with the subsequent need for political organization, 
which was absent under Cronus' herdsmanship 
(cf. Po1. 




271d-e, 273e-274d). 25 In sum, all of this shows how we 
"imitate and follow" the whole universe for all time 
(274a1, d6-7). 
I daresay that this emphasis on the intimate relation 
between the human being and the cosmos makes Plato 
exaggerate the details of this parallelism, in a manner 
that contrasts with the differences he stresses in other 
late works (such as the Philebus and the Timaeus). This 
would explain why the world is so anthropomorphically 
described in the Politicus. Yet this exaggeration is not 
insignificant when we come to regard the cosmos not only 
as the stage but also as a symbol of human and political 
behaviour. To this I wish to turn, after recalling the 
overt political function that Plato states the myth to 
have. We shall then see how the concern of god in it can, 
at the same time, be taken as a model for the politician 
to follow, in a way that can show the cosmos itself as a 
projection of the polis or even individual human life. 
2. God as a model for politicians. The universe as a 
projection of the polis 
As we saw in our previous chapter, the political purpose 
of the myth is in fact the most evident one. Its explicit 
aim is to correct the first definition of politics (as 
the collective rearing or breeding of humans), the main 
flaw of which, the Stranger says, is to have mistaken the 
shepherd of the age of Cronus, who was a god, with the 
25 To this effect, it is interesting to see how Plato has taken over 
and reconciled opposite views on the origins of civilization within 
the synthetical unity of an original story, by 
inscribing them in 
different cosmic periods: on the one hand, the old religious 
legends 
about the "fall" of man from an ideal state (age of 
Cronus) and, on 
the other hand, the modern theories of sophists and physicists 
about 
human "progress" from an initially defenceless condition 
(age of 
Zeus). Cf. Skemp (1952: 110). 
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politician of the present age, who is a man. We should 
therefore think of politics not in terms of breeding, but 
in terms of human concern for the world (cf. Pol. 274e- 
275a, 276c-d). 26 In other words, the function of nurturing 
humans (spoken of in the first definition) would at the 
very most belong to god as depicted in the ideal era of 
Cronus (when no political organization was needed but we 
were under the close care of regional gods) but not to a 
human being in the less ideal age of Zeus in which we 
live. In this way, the fictitious contraposition between 
two eras, those of Cronus and Zeus, becomes relevant to 
illustrate why we need politics in a more hostile 
universe where men are left more independent. 27 We live in 
a world where the fact that Nous has to coexist with 
ananke makes itself manifest in the need for humans to 
organize and take care of themselves, which would be an 
example of such limitation (cf. anankazein at 274c4). 
However, the fact that politics cannot be defined in 
terms of a god-like close tending of human beings (like 
that depicted in the age of Cronus), does not mean that 
the latter cannot be taken, ideal as it is, as a 
paradigmatic example that human rulers should attempt to 
follow. 28 It is perhaps in this sense that the Stranger 
speaks of having introduced the myth in order to provide 
a paradigm for the king (277b3-5). In this way the ideal 
image of the age of Cronus would not be altogether 
26 In addition, another mistake in the first definition was not to 
specify in what way the politician rules the whole polis, since many 
other men (such as peasants, grocers, doctors and gym trainers, 267e- 
268c) could claim that it is to them, much more than to the 
politician, that the function of breeding or nurture belongs (275a-b, 
276b). This mistake, again, the Stranger says, could have been 
avoided by speaking of concern instead of rearing. Cf. 275c-276d. 
27 And it is in serving this political purpose that it becomes 
meaningful and necessary that Plato introduce the two different 
cycles of Cronus and Zeus. In this way we can provide an answer 
to 
the problem posed in note 24. 
28 Cf. Miller (1980: 51): "To be aware of what the god was in the age 
of Cronus is to know what man, within his limits as 
different from 
the god, must strive to be for himself in the age of Zeus". 
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deprived of political importance. This in turn accords, 
in its basic point, with a parallel passage in Laws IV 
(713c-714a), which also stresses the political moral of 
the myth of Cronus: During that age, in fact, we were 
governed not by men but by god or daimones, that is, more 
divine and superior beings who provided peace, good order 
and justice. God did what we do now with tame flocks: we 
do not have oxen ruling over oxen but we, who are a 
better race, ourselves take charge of them (cf. Pol. 
271e7 for the same thought that man is theioteron than 
the other animals). In like manner, now we ought to 
imitate (mimeisthai dein, Laws 713e6) the life of Cronus 
and administer both our homes and our cities by following 
not what is mortal but all that is immortal within us, 
namely nous (for an immortal part of the soul in the Pol. 
cf. 309c). Coming back to the Politicus, we can thus see 
how god would represent a kind of ideal model for human 
leaders to imitate. 
Now, even if it is true that the age of Cronus seems to 
be -usefully- fictitious in its ideal conditions 
for 
human life and in the notion that the kings and rulers of 
human congregations were gods so that there was no need 
for human rulers, it is certainly not fictitious in 
stating the guidance that god exerts on the overall 
universe. This, as we have seen, can be taken as a 
characteristic of god as such at any time -however 
he is 
mythologically described-, and the same applies to other 
functions that he performs in the myth and which will 
strikingly also belong to the true politician 
in the 
third and final definition of the statesman. 
So, for example, both god and the scientific ruler 
have 
nous and epimeleia devoted to keeping order and 
to seeing 
to justice and to the happiness of the whole; 
both try to 
save the world or the polis from corruption, physical 
in 
the case of god, moral and physical 
in the case of the 
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statesman. Thus, god, as we have seen in the myth, has 
intelligent care of the universe (271d4), exerts basileia 
(269a7) and is responsible for its blessed qualities 
(269d7-9), by contrast with the chalepa kai adika that 
the universe increasingly undergoes without his guidance 
(273c-d); god preserves the universe from diaphthoras 
kindunon (273d3). Similarly, politics, in its normative 
definition, is declared to be superior to other arts in 
its care (epimeleia) of the human community (276b7-cl, 
cf. 305e3). It is an art belonging to the intelligent 
king (phronimos basileus, 292d6, cf. 294a8), a sophos kai 
agathos aner (296e3), with unerring nous, who, by always 
administering justice, is able to save (soizein) the 
polis and make it better (297a5-b3, cf. 293d8-9); 29 in 
other words, someone who, by possessing these qualities, 
can through his rule secure happiness in the city (301d1- 
6, cf. 311c5-6), by contrast with the evils (kaka) that 
"occur and will occur" in poleis which, by having no 
intelligent rule, are thus liable to destruction through 
ignorance (cf. 301e6-302b3; esp. 302a6-7: diolluntai kai 
diololasi kai eti diolountai; compare with the -cyclical- 
risk of the universe being dialutheis at 273d6). 
In addition, the political techne tries to keep due 
measure and thus realize good and beautiful effects 
(284a-b), as much as god in the myth, in his guiding 
function, realizes order and beauty in the universe 
(273b6-7, el-4). Even both god and the true politician 
bring opposites into harmony: 30 whereas god imposes order 
upon the limitless, or opposite bodily properties which 
left unchecked would plunge the universe 
into utter 
destruction (cf. 273d-e), the scientific ruler has to 
29 Contrast with the bad government that exists when people 
rule who 
follow their basest desires (epithumiön), which leaves no means 
of 
salvation (söterias mechane) for the polis at 
Laws IV 714a (also Pol. 
301b10-c4 with 302a5-b3), and compare this with 
the brink of 
dissolution that the universe reaches due to the governance 
of 
sumphutos epithumia (Pol. 272e6 with 273d3). 
30 Cf. Miller (1980: 109), though his comparison 
is drawn in rather 
different terms from mine. 
170 
weave the opposite characters of his collaborators within 
the society (309a8-b7). Both try to prevent or cure the 
"illnesses" that result from opposition (273e2-3,307d 
ff. ). Furthermore, as in the Republic, so in the 
Politicus Plato recurrently makes use of the similes of 
the pilot and his ship in portraying the ruler and his 
polis (Pol. 296e4-297a5,297e8-12,302a5-b3; cf. Rep. VI 
487e ff., VIII 551c); 31 and these are the very same images 
he employs with regard to god and to the world in the 
myth (cf. Pol. 272e4-5,273c2-el). 
Now, we must remember that the characteristics we have 
mentioned as belonging to the ruler are set as normative 
for him, and that the dialogue stresses that this kind of 
human techne is about the most difficult to acquire 
(chalepotate, 292d4), much as it constitutes the only 
true politeia -of which, furthermore, all the other ones 
are better or worse imitations (293e). In this way we can 
see further how god serves as a paradigm for any true 
31 Likewise, in the Republic the philosopher-king has been called 
precisely a demiourgos of justice and all kinds of virtues in his 
fellow-citizens (cf. VI 500d). This analogy with the Republic stands 
in spite of all the explicit differences between these dialogues. 
These differences I take to include mainly: (i) the possibility that 
the true statesman need not necessarily be the ruler in charge of the 
society but could instead be his adviser (cf. Pol. 259a-b, 292e9- 
293a1); (ii) the insistence upon laws as a deuteros plous or "second 
best" in case we do not find in reality the ideal personality of the 
true statesman, described in the third definition (cf. Pol. 293e ff., 
300c ff. ). This second feature being more adjusted to facts, the 
Politicus comes closer to the doctrine developed in the Laws, though 
neither of these dialogues rules out the ideal notion of a gifted 
statesman whose superior skill would be capable of doing without 
legislation (cf. Laws IX 875c-d). Furthermore, Saunders has noted 
that in the Politicus the art of the statesman still relies on 
philosophical skill, since it is hard to see how he can "carry out 
his task of weaving" (cf. 311b-c) "without performing many 
'divisions', notably of kinds of men and the offices they are to fill 
[311a]" (Saunders [1992: 485 n. 10]). This suggestion is strengthened 
by Plato's insistence that true politicians are alethös epistemonas 
kai ou dokountas monon (293c7), and his assertion at 292d4 that the 
politike episteme is the highest (megiste) and most difficult 
(chalepötate), (dialectic in turn having as its aim the highest 
objects -megista-, 285d4-286a7). For the association 
between 
philosophy and politics in the Politicus see also Dies (1935: LII- 
LVII, LIX). For a different view, see C. Gill (1979: 152). 
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politician (a paradigm which can therefore guide our 
political enquiry), as is already suggested by the 
assertion that the ideal kind of human government must be 
distinguished from all the other inferior ones "as a god 
from men" (303b4). 
In addition, all the comparisons we have established 
serve to suggest that god's nous in the Politicus myth 
may -at a deeper level that does not dismiss the 
cosmological one- be a superhuman symbol, or a cosmic 
projection, of the ideal ruler, as much as the world may 
stand for the polis itself, which is prone to forget its 
leader's teachings and fall into total confusion if 
and/or when an intellect does not govern it (cf. 301c6- 
302b3). It is worth while insisting that in this case 
complete disorder is not just a hypothetical state of 
affairs (as above interpreted as regards the cosmos) but 
an actual risk or situation lived through by societies 
according to Plato (ibidem). The same stands if we 
analyse the myth from an individual point of view, apart 
from the political one. In fact, the polis embodies on a 
larger scale the same tendencies as human individual 
conduct (remember the correspondence between man and 
society in Rep. IV 434d-e, and cf. Pol. 307e-308a). 
3. The universe as a symbol of human drama. God as a 
model for human beings 
From this perspective we can understand why the world's 
behaviour and structure in the politicus myth look so 
unusually anthropomorphic. In fact, when we read of the 
corporeal element in the world's constitution (to 
sömatoeides, 273b4) which causes it confusion and 
disorder (thorubos kai tarache, 273a5) and even 
forgetfulness in the Politicus (leihe, 273c6), what comes 
first to our mind is the exactly similar way 
in which 
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Plato speaks of human soma in the Phaedo as a source of 
thorubos kai tarache that prevents man from contemplating 
Ideas (66d6-7). 32 On the other hand, to somatoeides in the 
Politicus is inherent in the world's "ancient nature" 
(tes palai pote phuseös, 273b5); an expression that 
reminds us of a kindred passage in Laws III about the 
"ancient Titanic nature" (palaian Titaniken phusin) 
displayed by people out of self-control (701c2). Again, 
in the Politicus the universe has a sumphutos epithumia 
responsible for the reversal of revolution ending up on 
the brink of chaos (cf. 272e6 ff.; horme 273a2); and, 
even though in this case epithumia may be interpreted 
just as "tendency", 33 we cannot help thinking of an 
"inborn desire" of the world which reminds us of human 
baser instincts, referred either to soma or to the lower 
parts of the soul in Platonic writings (cf. e. g. Phaedo 
66c, Rep. IV 439d, Tim. 70d-e, 88a8-b2) . In any case, 
soma (or to sömatoeides), palaia phusis and epithumia are 
opposed to nous, symbolized by the Demiurge and/or the 
World-Soul on a macrocosmic scale. In this guise, the 
world's behaviour in the Politicus would represent a 
conflict between reason and unreason, intelligence and 
bodily desire, and even remembrance and forgetfulness 
which in effect characterizes human nature. 34 
32 Cf. also Phil. 63d-e for the most intense pleasures -connected 
with the body- as provoking tarache, ameleia and lethe in human life. 
33 Cf. Brisson (1974: 486-7 n. 9). 
34 In addition, the behaviour of the world as depicted in the reverse 
cycles shows striking resemblances with the behaviour of the human 
infant soul in the Timaeus. In the Politicus (273a-e), the reverse 
cycle starts with initial cosmic convulsion (seismos, 273a3), 
restoration of order for the very briefest period after the release, 
until everything starts going increasingly worse and the world 
becomes full of diseases (nosesanta, 273e2) as memory of the 
teachings of the Demiurge grows dim (273b2-3, c6). Likewise, 
in the 
Timaeus (43a-44c), the infant soul starts having strong convulsions 
(cf. seiousai, 43d1) when it is implanted in a mortal body, then 
its 
revolutions settle down and the individual becomes emphrön, 
but, if 
an adequate paideia is missing, the individual's rationality will 
deteriorate and he will return to Hades anoetos, suffering 
ten 
megisten noson (44b-c). 
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In this way we can also see that the relation between the 
world and god in the Politicus is analogous to that 
between man and god in other dialogues. Thus, we find 
that the cosmos in the Politicus has the capacity to 
remember and to forget god's teachings (273b, c) -which 
probably consist in how the world ought to behave, 35 
according to the pattern of Ideas. Thus god has a perfect 
rotatory motion (cf. Pol. 269e5) to be imitated by the 
universe. 36 And this is especially noteworthy seeing that 
in other dialogues it is conversely man that is liable to 
forget or to recollect Ideas (cf. e. g. Phaedo 72e ff., 
76a-77a, Phaedrus 249b-c); or, even more, it is man that 
is liable to forget or to recollect (and imitate) god 
(cf. Phaedrus 252d-253c; and Tim. 41e1-2 with 47a, 47b-c, 
where the god is the universe itself) 37 which can in turn 
constitute an intermediate stage towards the knowledge of 
Ideas (as we have seen with regard to the Timaeus, e. g. 
90b-d; cf. supra, chapter 3, section 2.2). From this 
standpoint, the relation of the world to the deity in the 
Politicus may be depicting man's attitude towards god and 
the importance of his remembering god's instructions. 
Thus, all these comparisons between macro and microcosm 
in the Politicus and in the light of other dialogues 
35 Cf. Tim. 36d4-7,38e6 for the heavens learning their prescribed 
motion from the Demiurge. 
36 In Pol. 269d5-e6 Plato starts by suggesting, in a strongly 
axiological way, the immutability of the Ideas, and it would seem 
that it is by having this pattern in mind that he then treats -with a 
tone of regret- the lack of changelessness of the world (due to 
its 
participation in body), though the best it can achieve is circular 
motion. This, however, is depicted as liable to reversal, 
in 
contrast, again, with the perfect and unidirectional circular motion 
of god, which would therefore seem to stand as directly paradigmatic 
for the universe's own motion. 
37 Recollection of the cosmic god would be suggested in the Timaeus 
insofar as it it said at 41e2 that the Demiurge "showed the nature of 
the universe" (ten Lou pantos phusin edeixen) to the 
human soul 
before its earthly existence, and at 47a7 it is again the nature of 
the universe (tou pantos phusis) that we can now 
investigate with the 
help of sight. Cf. Kucharschi (1966: 319 ff. ). 
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serve to illustrate the anthropomorphical guise of the 
world in the myth, even though we have been led to 
acknowledge that the picture could hardly be taken 
literally as far as the whole universe is concerned. In 
point of fact, the "cosmic drama" referred to in that 
story stands for "human drama", i. e. an ethical conflict 
which is in general absent from the world and prevalent 
in man, considered either individually or collectively. 38 
If the cosmological foundations of the Politicus myth are 
as outlined above, we are right in saying that, in spite 
of the literary details, the universe (especially the 
heaven) is a pattern of order that human beings ought to 
imitate (cf. Phil. 29a-30a; Tim. 47b-c, 90d). 39 (And in 
this -ethical- sense the "imitation and following" of the 
universe by humans -Pol. 274d6-7- would be normative 
rather than descriptive. ) So, whereas in the universe 
absolute chaos is just a hypothetical state, since nous 
always governs ananke for the most part, sheer disorder 
does exist in human life and may pervade the whole of 
it, and it depends on man to make nous rule or else be 
subdued by ananke. In other words, the world is what man 
and the polis ought to be. This too is the main 
difference between man and god: whereas nous defines god 
invariably and essentially, human rationality on the 
contrary is not something "given" but a task that remains 
to be achieved. Nothing could be more telling on this 
point than that passage in the Politicus where, after 
describing the advantages that people in the carefree age 
of Cronus delighted in, Plato queries whether these men 
were happier than those of the present era of Zeus or 
38 In this regard, it wouldn't be surprising that Plato chooses to 
depict human situations at a macro-level which, by being placed at 
greater distance from the human observer, can be seen by him with 
more clarity (as was the case with the polis and the 
individual in 
Rep. IV) and, we could add in this case, a dreadful clarity: 
it shows 
how the whole cosmos would be if the same principles that can 
lead 
human behaviour to chaos were operating without restraint 
in the 
universe. In fact Plato is not far from suggesting the cosmic 
importance of human behaviour (including political behaviour, cf. 
Laws X 906a-c, esp. c5-6), as we shall see infra, ch. 7. 
39 Cf. supra, ch. 3, section 2.2; ch. 4 section 4. 
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not. Surprisingly, there is no categorical answer to this 
question, and by means of this Plato rejects the most 
salient feature of the Hesiodic Golden Age, namely 
happiness as something unquestionably enjoyed by the 
human race (cf. Op. 106 ff., esp. 115 ff. ) . 40 By contrast, 
Plato's answer in the Politicus is conditional: if the 
nurslings of Cronus made use of their leisure time and 
their ability to dialoguize for the sake of philosophy 
and the improvement of wisdom (phronesis), then they 
were immensely happier than those of our age; otherwise 
they were not (cf. Pol. 272b-d). This is the same as to 
say that intelligence, philosophical life, and the 
happiness entailed by them, are not just a mere gift but 
a task or ethical challenge for man to undertake; a 
challenge which he cannot avoid even in the most 
idealized era of humanity. 41 Or rather, to put it in 
other words, that "Golden Age" onto which so many human 
beings project our happiness is not something lost but an 
inner capacity of ours, and it depends on our choice to 
fulfil it. 42 
III. CONCLUSION 
In sum, even though my analysis of the cosmological bases 
of the myth has tended to deny any predominance of 
irrationality in the world as a whole and therefore the 
existence of alternating cosmic cycles (very far from 
what a literal interpretation would suggest), we can in 
any event understand the anthropomorphic picture of the 
world in the Politicus in the light of the ethical and 
political purpose of the myth. The world has appeared as 
the stage onto which Plato has projected human 
40 Cf. Solmsen (1962: 185 ff. ). 
41 The fact that Plato leaves the possibility of philosophy open 
during the era of Cronus goes against those who claim that philosophy 
could not exist during that cycle but only in ours, such as Scodel 
(1987: 79), Brisson (1992b) and Howland (1993: 26). 
42 Cf. Rep. X 617e4-5: aitia helomenou"theos anaitios. 
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disarrangements; although, strictly speaking, it cannot 
be but a pattern for human behaviour to follow. So, in 
the same way as nous reigns over the universe, it must 
also govern the microcosm if order is ever to exist in 
man and politics. In this way, we can see how the myth 
provides the macrocosmic background for ethics and a 
touchstone to seek the true definition of the statesman. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SOUL, TELEOLOGY AND EVIL IN LAWS Xi 
The tenth book of the Laws has often been considered as 
presenting Plato's views on cosmology and theology in a 
more "exoteric" way in contrast with the more esoteric 
style of the Timaeus. And there are some indications 
that could support this view. Whereas the Timaeus 
mentions that to find the Creator of the universe "is 
difficult, and, having found it, it is impossible to 
communicate it to everyone" (28c3-5), Plato is in Laws X 
intending to establish a "proemium" (prooimion, 887a3, 
cl) or rational foundation for his laws against impiety, 
which are supposed to be known by all. In this proemium 
Plato has the Athenian Stranger argue for three 
propositions: (i) that the gods exist (887c-899d); (ii) 
that they take care of human affairs (899d-905d); (iii) 
that they cannot be bribed by sacrifices or prayers 
(905d-907b). 2 The underlying assumption is that learning 
these facts about the gods will also help to prevent 
impiety which, like any kind of vice, is often due to 
ignorance (885b, 886a-b). 
Now, if this is so, what most surprises us is that Plato 
does not however have qualms about introducing in this 
apologetic discourse a reference to an evil soul as an 
alternative candidate to a good soul ruling over the 
universe, in the middle of an argument intended to 
demonstrate the existence of god (896e). This has 
provoked the most varied reactions, from Ancient 
Platonists attributing to Plato a dualism that would 
appear manichean to our eyes, to recent interpreters who 
1 This chapter is based in outline on an earlier version published 
in 
The Review of Metaphysics 48 (December 1994), 275-98, under 
the title 
"Teleology and Evil in Laws X". 
2 The three propositions are summarized at 885b4-9 and 
907b5-7. Cf. 
Rep. II 365d-e. 
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have denied that Plato is at all concerned with the 
World-Soul in the Laws. It has also been very much 
debated whether the general account of Laws x is 
consistent with the Timaeus. This requires us to examine 
the status of soul and its connection with evil in Laws 
X, against the background of Plato's cosmological account 
in earlier dialogues. 
I shall try to show that Laws X is to be taken as an 
emphatic assertion of cosmic teleology -based on the 
supremacy of soul- which follows the spirit of the 
earlier dialogues and which involves an explicit 
rejection of any kind of evil Soul ruling over the whole 
cosmos. This rejection, however, does not do away with 
the existence of an "evil kind of soul", nor does it do 
away with the problem of evil in general, about which 
Plato seems to be worried probably more than ever, 
though, at the same time, he wishes more than ever to be 
convincing about the existence of teleology. In what 
follows I shall present his argument for the existence of 
god and show how the problem of evil arises within it. 
The discussion of evil will then take us further into an 
elucidation of its status and cause within a finalistic 
arrangement of the universe, and I shall argue that in 
Laws X it would appear that it is mainly human beings who 
are responsible for every sort of evil. 
I. THE PRIORITY OF SOUL OVER BODY 
Why does Plato need to "prove" that god exists? It is 
obvious that this need arises when god's existence is no 
longer evident or a matter of consensus, as it used to be 
(885e-886a), but has now been controverted by modern 
theories. It will no longer be sufficient to point to the 
"sun, moon, stars and earth as gods", because many people 
would say "that these things are earth and stones" and 
bulks of inanimate bodies (886d-e, cf. XII 967c). The 
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materialists responsible for this belief claim, according 
to Plato, the priority of body over soul (891c) and posit 
nature (phusis, 889a5, b2), chance (tuche, ibid. ) or 
chance by necessity (tuche ex anankes, 889c1-2) as the 
main cause of everything: The random motion, collision 
and admixture of opposite properties of water, earth, 
fire and air -like hot-cold, wet-dry, soft-hard- gave 
rise to the heavenly bodies and the universe in general 
(889a-c). And all this, they contend, "not by 
intelligence... nor by any god or art but... by nature and 
chance" (ou de dia noun... oude dia Lina theon oude dia 
technen alla... phusei kai tuchei, 889c5-6). 
It is these materialists, then, who provide the 
scientific support for atheism. Plato purports to attack 
them by conversely establishing the priority of soul over 
body. To phusis understood as chance and necessity he 
opposes his own principles, namely god and design 
(techne) and intellect (nous) as things akin to soul 
(889b-c, 892a-c). The latter, Plato wants to argue, 
should be prior as the first cause of generation and 
corruption of everything and, if by "nature" the 
materialists mean "the productive source associated with 
the first elements" (genesin ten peri to pröta, 892c2-3), 
it should be soul (psuche) and not fire or air that 
deserves to be first "by nature" (phusei) (892c3-7), 
since soul is the first source of all things (prote 
genesis [pantön], 896a6-8). 3 
Against this background, we see that it is vital for 
Plato to establish a connection between god and soul 
understood as purposive intelligence (cf. techne and 
nous). The struggle between theism and atheism becomes 
then a struggle between teleology and chance (or random 
3 Note the connection between soul as pröte genesis and soul as aitia 
of all change for all things at 896a-b. Similarly phusis can 
be 
understood as natura naturans -rather than as natura naturata -being 
therefore a synonym of arche -cf. phusis as an ex 
hes at 891c and 
England (1921: 26 ad loc. ). See Naddaf (1992: 492,500). 
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mechanism) as the key factor in explaining the universe. 
And proving the existence of god turns out to be 
equivalent to proving, first, the priority of soul to 
body, and, secondly, that soul in charge of the universe 
is intelligent and therefore good. This then is Plato's 
next task. 
At 893b the Stranger starts his argument for this 
priority of soul over body with the following steps: 
1. Of all things (panta) , some are in motion, some are at 
rest (893b8-cl). 
2. It is in a place (en choräi tini) that the static 
things rest and the moving things move (893c1-2). 
3. Among the things that move we can distinguish ten 
kinds of motion, the last two of which are two kinds of 
motion under which every other kind of motion falls: 4 
- "That motion which can move other things, but is unable 
to move itself" (894b8-9). This is to be understood not 
as another kind at the same level as the preceding eight, 
but as the way in which every kind of corporeal change 
takes place, that is as a mechanical series, 5 in which 
each member is "constantly moving another thing and being 
moved by something else" (894c3-4). 
- "That motion which can always move itself and other 
things" by means of corporeal changes (894b9-cl). 
The priority of self-motion over mechanical motion is 
asserted on the grounds that every chain of motion should 
stop at a first mover. This, by definition, cannot be the 
kind of motion that has in turn been moved by something 
4 For motion Plato uses kinesis or metabole (cf. e. g. 894c3-4,7, 
894e4-895a3,896b1) meaning not only locomotion but every kind of 
motion. The first eight may be summarized as follows: rotation, 
locomotion, division, mixture, increase, decrease, corruption and 
generation (893c-894a). For a detailed explanation of the different 
kinds of motion in the Laws and a comparison with the Timaeus see 
Skemp (1942: 100-7). Let us add that the account of the ten motions 
in the Laws should not be taken to contradict the six rectilinear 
motions that characterize ananke at Tim. 43b. For these could 
be 
included, in the scheme of the Laws, as different kinds of 
locomotion, according to their different directions. 
5 Cf. Moreau (1939: 62). 
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else (cf. 894e4-7). If we imagine, we are told, that 
everything were at rest, it would have to be self-motion 
that would appear first (895a6-b1). Thus, self-motion 
(ten auten heauten kinousan [kinesin] 895b1) turns out to 
be the principle of all motion (arche kineseon pason, 
895b3) and the condition of possibility of all the 
corporeal changes. 6 It is therefore the first (p-rote, 
895b4) not only in the logical -and metaphysical- order 
but also in dignity (presbutate, 895b5) and efficacy 
(kratiste, 895b6, praktike diapherontös, 894d2), whereas 
the motion that is moved by something else and in turn 
moves other things is secondary (deutera, 895b7). 
The argument then proceeds to note that we attribute life 
to self-moving objects (895c), and gives to self-motion 
(ten dunamenen auten hauten kinein kinesin, or to heauto 
kinein) the name of "soul" (psuche) -the former being the 
definition (logos) of the latter- (896a1-4), while 
secondary motions are referred to "the motion of an 
inanimate body" (somatos apsuchou metabole) (896b7-8). 
Thus, soul, being self-motion, is the cause (aitia) or 
arche kineseös of everything, having priority over body 
and thereby ruling (archouses) over it kata phusin (896b- 
c, cf. 892a) : As the very word "arche" conveys, the 
notion of being a principle seems here indissociable from 
that of having rule. Soul is, in the first place, the 
cause of its own psychic motions, such as "tempers, 
moods, wishes, reasonings, true opinions, concerns and 
6 It is certainly an assumption of the argument that, even if we need 
to stop the regress in the explanation of motion at a first mover, it 
should be itself in motion (cf. 894e7-895a3) and not for example 
unmoved (as Aristotle will claim). But Plato seems to have his 
grounds for preferring motion, particularly after the problems raised 
in the Parmenides as to how the Ideas by themselves could have any 
influence or dunamis on the sensible world (cf. e. g. 133c-134a). Soul 
is evidently expected to have efficient power over the mutable (cf. 
its "efficacy" and "strength", 894d1-2; its "power" -dunamis- at 
892a3); but how could this be so if it were itself immutable? Note 
that even Aristotle would seem to require the mediation of a first 
mover in motion between his first unmoved mover as final cause and 
other things: kinei de hös erömenon, kinoumenöi de Calla kinei 
(Metaph. XII 7,1072b3-4). 
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memories" (896c9-dl). Consequently, it is the cause of 
every kind of secondary motion of the corporeal (894e- 
895a), which in turn gives rise to the sensible qualities 
of things (cf. 897a7-bl). If soul is prior to body, then 
the properties of soul (ta psuches) will also be prior to 
those of the corporeal (ta tou somatos), such as length, 
width, depth and strength (896c-d). Therefore, we might 
infer, nous, techne and nomos, which at 892a-b had been 
settled as akin to soul, should also be prior phusei. 
As we can see, this account so far shows many points of 
contact with the Timaeus. The distinction between primary 
and secondary motion, referred to soul and body 
respectively, is parallel to that between primary and 
secondary causes in the Timaeus (46c-e; 68e-69a), as much 
as the rule of soul over body is affirmed in both (cf. 
Tim. 34b-c). Primary motion operates by making use of 
secondary motions in the Laws (cf. kata at 894b10 and 
chromene at 897b1), and there is a similar relation 
between primary and secondary causation in the Timaeus 
(68e, esp. chrömenos at e4). Even though the Timaeus does 
not explicitly say that the first kind of causes (i. e. 
souls) are self-movers, it seems to be implied by the 
context: secondary causes are those "which occur by other 
things being moved and in turn moving other things by 
necessity" (46e1-2), so that we can infer that primary 
causes are those which move themselves.? 
The account of soul as self-motion is also parallel to 
that in the Phaedrus (245c-246a) .8 This 
definition of soul 
7 Cf. supra, ch. 2, section 1.3. 
8 There would seem to be a prima facie incompatibility between the 
Phaedrus and the Laws, if we consider that, while being arche 
kineseös in both dialogues, soul is called ungenerated in the 
Phaedrus (ageneton, 245d3) and generated in Laws X (genomene, 892a5, 
gegenemene, 892c4) . However, this needn't 
be a contradiction if we 
take it that both things could be true of soul in different ways: 
even if the Phaedrus stresses that soul is temporally ungenerated, 
in 
the sense of having had no beginning in the past 
(cf. Brisson [1974: 
336-7]), the Laws would be allowing that it can still 
be called 
"generated" insofar as it is constantly self-creating: The soul's 
definition consists in self-motion (so that if soul creates 
its own 
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was, as we saw, in the Phaedrus established in close 
connection to the body which is moved by soul. "All 
body... which itself from itself has motion from within, 
is animate, since this is precisely the nature of soul" 
(245e4-6); this in turn matches the further assertion 
that "all soul takes care of all the inanimate" (246b6). 
The consequences of this definition of soul as self-mover 
are therefore of utmost importance. As Skemp has 
remarked, "the passage seems to imply a close union of 
psuche and söma... In spite of what seems a sheer 
dichotomy ... it is clear that Plato thinks of the two as 
conjoined in reality". 9 The same results could be applied 
to the Laws, since, despite Plato's efforts to 
distinguish soul and body in order to make the former 
prior, it is from the very beginning established in 
universal terms (cf. premiss 2) that "whatever 
moves.. . moves in a place" (893c1-2); this will apply to 
every kind of motion, including the tenth, which is 
psychic motion. This means that the motion of soul takes 
place in space (chora, cf. Tim. 52a8, d3). 10 Soul, though 
invisible (898d9-e2, cf. Tim. 36e6,46d6), seems to make 
itself manifest in the body it moves; that is why Plato 
says in loose terms that "when we see a soul" in self- 
motion it creates itself) and it is the cause of motion of all things 
that "exist, have come to be, and will exist" (tön to ontön kai 
gegonotön kai esomenon, 896a7-8) among which we should then count not 
only bodies, but soul itself (cf. 894b9-10: soul can move hauten aei 
kai hetera). Otherwise it would be unintelligible to find soul 
described both as gegonos and at the same time as the "first cause 
of generation of all things" (proton geneseös aition hapantön), as we 
do at 891e5-7. Note also the polemical value that talking of soul as 
generated first with regard to body, and therefore as having more 
dignity (presbutate) than it (892a-b), might have in a context which, 
unlike the Phaedrus, is overtly devoted to opposing materialistic 
theories which conversely postulate bodies as born first, and soul as 
born in the second place (Laws X 891c). Cf. Vlastos (1939: 397). The 
merely hypothetical character of any temporal generation of soul as 
preceding that of body is highlighted at Laws 895a6-b1, 
in an 
argument where the postulation of an original state of rest without 
motion, as propounded by some, is considered tolma by Plato. 
Pace 
Vlastos (1964: 414); T. M. Robinson (1969: 251 ff. ); Stalley (1983: 
174). 
9 Skemp (1942: 6). Cf. also supra, Introd., section 2. 
10 And therefore, in the corporeal that fills in space, 
if one bears 
in mind Tim. 58a4-7 suggesting that there is no void. 
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moving -corporeal- objects, we say that they live 
(895c11-12). Soul also appears as "inhabiting" and 
"administering" a body (cf. 896d-e). 11 
II. THE EVIL SOUL : PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION 
We have seen that the argument has so far (893b-896d) 
tried to prove the priority of soul over body as a 
priority of first motions over secondary motions, the 
former being the principle of the latter. However, this 
doesn't yet seem to be enough to prove the existence of 
god. For soul in itself is morally ambivalent, i. e. it 
can be good or bad, rational or irrational, whereas the 
notion of god requires that god's soul be purely rational 
and good. 12 The ethical ambivalence of soul is remarked 
upon in the next step of the argument, where it is 
presented as the "cause of the good and evil things, fair 
and foul, just and unjust and all the contraries, if we 
are to posit it as the cause of all" (896d5-8) . At the 
same time, whereas the argument seems so far to have been 
speaking of soul in general, qua soul, a hint is 
subsequently made at the cosmic import of soul (as the 
11 Certainly, Plato seems to leave the soul-body relation as regards 
the gods much more open at 898e-899a, where he allows for three 
possibilities, namely that the soul of the sun conducts it (agei, 
898e5) (i) from inside the sun's body, as the human soul does with 
our body; (ii) from outside, by means of another body moving the 
sun's body by force; (iii) without a body but with some marvellous 
powers. We can suppose that the reason for leaving this question 
among others -cf. note 18- open is that to solve this problem 
is not 
crucial for his argument against atheism. However, Plato would seem 
here to be very puzzled about (iii) -cf. dunameis huperballousas 
thaumati, 899a3, and the concessive tone of eich' hopös eich' hopei 
at 899a9-, particularly after he has just been arguing that soul agei 
all things in heaven by making use (chrömene) of the corporeal 
(896e8-9 with 897a4-b1). By contrast, (i) is supported 
by the 
parallelism between macro and microcosm established 
in the Philebus 
(29a-30a, esp. 30a3-7); cf. Tim. 30b4-5 for psuche en sömati. 
12 As will be stated in Laws X 899b5-7,900d2,5-7,901e1-902b3 and 
902e8. For the same suggestion in other dialogues see supra, ch. 
2, 
n. 52. For intellect as the cause of good effects, 
in turn 
understood in terms of order, cf. notes 19 and 20 below. 
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notion of god requires, cf. e. g. further at 902b8-9), by 
the suggestion that "soul, which administers and inhabits 
all things which are moved everywhere, also administers 
the heaven (ouranos)" (896d10-e2). 
Now, it is at this stage that we have to face a 
difficulty arising from the previous arguments, for: 
(i) on the one hand, soul is the principle of all 
contraries (including good and bad); 
(ii) but, on the other hand, an incautious application of 
(i) could lead us to violate the principle of non- 
contradiction, which Plato had applied to causality at 
Republic IV 436b8-9: "It is evident that the same thing 
will not admit to produce or undergo contrary effects in 
the same sense, with respect to the same thing and at the 
same time. " 
How, then, can one thing such as soul be the cause of all 
the contraries at Laws 896d? The passage of the Republic 
already mentioned concluded that if we find that that 
happens, "we shall know that it was not the same one 
thing but more than one" (436b9-cl); and on this basis 
Plato proceeded to distinguish different parts, faculties 
or "kinds" (eide, gene) within the individual soul (436c 
ff. ). The principle settled in the Republic seems to be 
implicit in this discussion in the Laws, and an attempt 
to keep to it would justify the conclusion that it cannot 
be just one soul (or kind of soul) that is cause of all 
contraries, but it should be more than one (pleious, 
896e4): "Let us postulate not less than two: the 
beneficient soul (tes euergetidos) and that which is 
capable of producing the opposite results (tes tanantia 
dunamenes exergazesthai, 896e5-6), " afterwards called 
"the evil soul" (ten kaken, 897d1). 
Now, the cosmic import of soul seems again emphasized 
in 
the following passage, crucial for our discussion, which 
runs as follows: 
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"Soul leads all things in heaven and earth and sea by its 
own motions, the names of which are: wish, reflection, 
concern, counsel, opinion true or false, joy, grief, 
boldness, fear, hate, love, and whatever motions akin to 
these, or primary motions, take over the secondary 
motions of body and lead everything to increase and 
decrease and separation and combination, and to the 
things derived from these: heat and cold, heaviness and 
lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and 
blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those things 
which soul makes use of, both when, having acquired 
reason which is always rightly god in the case of gods, 13 
it leads all things rightly and happily, and when 
conversely, associated with unreason (anoiäi sungenomene), 
it produces all the effects contrary to those" (896e8- 
897b4). 
Several problems result from different interpretations 
that might be given of this text. I shall first present 
them before offering my own solution. 
1. Is Laws 896e-897b speaking only of Soul at a cosmic 
level? 
This reading could be suggested by the first lines 
stating that "soul leads all things in heaven and earth 
and sea", something that might recall the World-Soul to 
any reader of the Timaeus. But if so, we cannot help 
being struck by the way Plato presents it. As to the 
psychic motions here referred to, we find that soul can 
not only have right opinions but also false ones, and not 
only nous but also anoia. If Plato's intention 
is to show 
that the soul or souls at a cosmic level are gods, 
that 
13 The first words of 897b2 present philological difficulties. 
We can 
read, amongst various possibilities, either "theon orthös 
theois" 
(Burnet), or"theion orthös theos ousa" (Dies [1956: ad 
loc. ]), which 
would call soul rightly god when having acquired 
divine reason. My 
translation follows Burnet's reading, but I shall also 
be making 
reference to that of Dies. 
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attribution would conflict directly with god's features 
of rationality and goodness, which are however reaffirmed 
in an unqualified way later in Laws X (cf . e. g. 899b5-7, 
900d2,902e7-8) Let us also remember that in the Timaeus 
the World-Soul is essentially rational, having intellect 
and right opinions, but never false ones (see e. g. 36e, 
37b-c), and the same rationality of the Cosmic Soul is 
affirmed in the Philebus (28d-e, 30a. -d) . 
Some of the other psychic states mentioned here can also 
seem striking though are perhaps less problematic. For 
example, Plato had not in the Timaeus spoken of hate and 
love, though this could be understandable as predicated 
of more humanized gods ruling over the cosmos -like the 
Olympians-, who in the Republic (X 612e), according to 
Plato's purified version, are said to love the just and 
hate the unjust (cf. also here at 901a). Plato had 
already in the Philebus identified the World-Soul with 
the soul of "Zeus" (30c-d), so there should be no wonder 
if he is now thinking of the power/s ruling over the 
universe in similar terms. (Indeed Plato will further on 
call the latter "the gods who dwell in Olympus", 904e4. ) 
"Fear" and "grief" and "joy" could be fitted into the 
same kind of anthropomorphic picture. The Demiurge feels 
joy in the Timaeus when perceiving the similarity of the 
copy with the model (37c7) . In the Politicus we read 
that 
god becomes "worried" (kedomenos) lest the world might 
fall into dissolution and destruction (273d5); at a 
further passage in Laws X Plato wonders whether we can 
compare god with peasants who await with "fear" the usual 
barren periods for the production of plants (906a2). 
There is on the other hand no need to explain states such 
as wish, reflection, concern, and counsel, which 
recurrently characterize the provident Demiurgic activity 
in the Timaeus (e. g. 29e-30b, 34a8,75b8; cf. also 
epimeleia at Pol. 271d4). Now, even though these states 
of mind in the Laws could be explained as 
an 
anthropomorphic way of presenting god, or 
the ruling 
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soul/s of the universe, there still remains the 
difficulty about "false opinions" and, what is worse, the 
postulation at the end of an evil soul, or a soul invaded 
by folly. 14 
2. Is Laws 896e-897b speaking only of human soul? 
The above picture seems to be so contradictory to Plato's 
view of the World-Soul and the souls of the heavenly 
bodies as completely rational in the Timaeus and 
Philebus, that this has led some interpreters to think 
that Plato is not speaking of a cosmic soul at all in 
this passage, but just of human individual Souls. 15 On the 
one hand, it is certainly true that subrational or 
irrational affections (pathemata) like love, fear, 
boldness, pleasure and pain correspond in the Timaeus to 
the mortal part of the human soul and result from the 
implantation of the immortal soul in mortal bodies (42a- 
b, 69c-d), and that false judgements have to do with the 
same fact (44a with 43a ff. ). In addition, anoia is at 
Tim. 86b analysed as a disease of human soul, due to 
physiological disturbances, and at Tim. 92c the 
possibilities of nous or anoia determine the different 
transformations of human being into animal or viceversa. 
But, on the other hand, the main problem with this 
interpretation when applied to this passage of the Laws 
is that, if it were just human souls that Plato is 
speaking of here, it is hard to understand how he says of 
14 False opinions can in fact be the cause of soul's misbehaviour. In 
the Timaeus (86b) Plato had treated anoia as a disease of the soul 
which has two kinds, namely madness (mania) and ignorance (amathia). 
We can see how the evil soul in the Laws fits both descriptions, 
since it is said both to lack wisdom (897b8-cl) -and therefore be 
ignorant- and to produce crazy effects (cf. manikös, 897d1). Also 
here, then, one could say that evil cannot lie but in lack of 
knowledge (which may be due to sheer ignorance, or to disorders 
ailing the soul, cf. also Gorg. 480b1, Rep. IV 444a-e, Soph. 
227d- 
228e), and it is according to this knowledge or ignorance of truth 
that soul sets phenomena either in orderly or disorderly motion. 
15 Cf. e. g. Rist (1964: 107). This possibility is also considered 
by 
Grube (1980: 147). 
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them that only they "lead all things in heaven and earth 
and sea" (896e8-9) -or, as he will say afterwards (897b7- 
8), are "in charge of heaven and earth and the whole 
revolution. " 
Thus, on the face of it, neither of these interpretations 
of the passage under discussion seems to be convincing. 
However, I wish to argue that these are not the only 
possible ways of resolving the problem: 
-As to the scope of "soul" at Laws 896e-897b, I shall try 
to show that it need not refer exclusively either to 
cosmic soul or human soul, but Plato may also be keeping 
the more general sense of psuche as soul qua soul. 
-As far as the ontological status of the evil soul is 
concerned, I shall point out that the text explicitly 
shows that there is no evil soul in charge of the whole 
universe, so that in this respect the latter is just a 
hypothesis which Plato postulates in order to reject, and 
this will be an important step in bringing to a close the 
argument for the existence of god which we have been 
considering. This however will not dismiss the existence 
of a kind of evil soul as such, which will require 
further investigation. 
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
1. The scope of soul at Laws 896e-897b 
The fact rather seems to be that, in the passage starting 
at 896e8, Plato has certainly fused two senses in which 
he speaks of soul. On the one hand, he is keeping the 
general and abstract sense, qua Soul, 16 in which he 
had 
16 This view of the passage, restricted just to soul qua soul, 
is 
taken e. g. by Moreau (1939: 69), Solmsen (1942: 141), Cherniss 
(1954: 
26, n. 29), also T. M. Robinson (1970: 148-51); though I think 
it is 
only partially correct, since Plato is adding here a second sense as 
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been speaking before, in the passage concerning the 
priority of soul over body, 894b-896d. This sense would a 
fortiori include any kind of psychical motion, like false 
opinion, nous or anoia. And, on the other hand, he is 
introducing "psuche" as concretely referring to soul or 
the "kind of soul" (cf. psuches genos, 897b7) ruling over 
the universe. '7 The latter can include not only the World- 
Soul but also the heavenly bodies, as Plato will later on 
suggest (898d) . 
18 
So, if we interpret this passage 
that Plato is speaking both of 
soul at a cosmic level here, we 
the difficulties involved in 
mentioned above, the one being 







itional, and say 
general and of 
incur either of 
partial views 
the passage at 
World-Soul, it 
I will now show. On the other hand, I do not think there is any 
allusion to the World-Soul before 896e -as is however claimed by 
Gaudin (1990: 178,183)-, nor any identification of soul with reason 
or mind at 893c-896e, as supposed by Craig (1980: 8,13). 
17 It is 896d10-e2 that marks the fusion, since Plato there suggests 
that soul should be considered not only as administering all things 
that are moved anywhere (which I take to be soul qua soul) but also 
the heaven (ouranos), thus giving "soul" a more specific connotation, 
suggesting the World-Soul. 
18 In fact, when Plato asks which "kind" of soul rules the universe 
(897b7), and further concludes that it is good soul, "either one or 
many" (mian e pleious, 898c7-8, cf. psuche e psuchai 899b5), we could 
think at first sight that for him the question about the unity or 
multiplicity of souls ruling the universe is left open (as 
is claimed 
by the first four authors quoted in note 16). The reason for this may 
be that to decide the problem is not crucial for the point Plato 
is 
making in this kind of exoteric discourse, namely that the masses 
should believe in god, be it one or many. However, a careful reading 
of the text suggests that in fact both levels of 
divinity -the 
singular and the plural- are maintained here, and that 
he is thinking 
of both the World-Soul and the heavenly bodies, as 
in the Timaeus 
(without either excluding the Olympians as their 
traditional 
counterparts, cf. Laws 904e5). At 898d3-4 Plato will say with 
regard 
to the sun, moon and other stars, that psuche periagei 
panta kai 
hekaston; in other words, that soul conducts the whole astronomical 
system (as a World-Soul) and each heavenly 
body individually, which 
should also have its own soul (cf. 898d9-10 on 
the soul of the sun). 
This would in turn be consistent with the question 
about what "kind 
of soul" rules over the universe, since 
both World-Soul and the soul 
of each heavenly body are shown in the 
Timaeus to be of the same 
"kind" or nature. Thus the mian e pleious of 
898c7-8 turns out to be 
a mian kai pleious. Cf. also Cornford 
(1937: 108), Festugiere (1947: 
21). 
191 
would be awkward to think of it as associated with anoia 
or having false opinion, the other one being that, if 
only human souls were meant, they could not be said to 
rule everything in the universe. The point rather seems 
to be that, when Plato speaks of false opinion or anoia, 
he is mentioning states of soul as such, and the question 
from here onwards will be to decide which state of soul, 
nous or anoia, prevails in the universe as a whole. In 
this way he will pass on to delimit the scope of soul to 
soul in charge of the universe, as we shall now see. 
2. The status of a ruling evil soul at a cosmic level 
In the next step of the argument (at 897b7-cl) the 
Stranger wonders: "Which of the two kinds of soul is in 
charge of heaven and earth and the whole revolution 
(poteron psuches genos enkrates ouranou kai ges kai pases 
tes periodou)? The one which is wise and full of virtue 
(to phronimon kai aretes pleres) or the one which lacks 
both things? ". He does not give a direct answer, but 
poses a conditional alternative which appeals to the 
study of heavenly motions: If the whole route and motion 
of heaven and everything in it is akin to the motion, 
revolution and calculations of reason -that is, if it is 
regular (kata tauta, hosautos) , 
in the same place, around 
the same point and in the same direction (pros to auta), 
according to a single proportion and order (logon kai 
taxin) 898a8-bl-, then it is the best soul that leads and 
cares for the whole cosmos. 19 If, conversely, the 
universe's motion is mad and disorderly (manikös kai 
ataktos) , 
it is the evil soul. (897c4-dl) 
To this alternative the interlocutors agree that it would 
not be pious to say anything but that it 
is the soul 
19 We can see that Plato thinks of good effects 
in terms of orderly 
effects. For the same connection between goodness and order cf. 
Tim. 




which is full of all virtue that drives the whole 
revolution of the universe (898c6-9). This conclusion in 
fact supposes a second premiss, namely that the motion of 
the universe is orderly. Though this premiss is only 
implicit here, it is explicitly posed as the basis of a 
similar kind of "physico-theological proof" both in the 
Philebus (28e-29a) and in Laws XII 966d-e, where the 
existence of a governing Intellect is inferred from the 
good order of the cosmos. 20 In the Laws it is astronomy 
in the light of its recent discoveries -which show for 
example that planets do not "wander" but follow a single 
regular track, cf. Laws VII 821a-822c, esp. 822a4-8- 
rather than superficial and commonsense arguments, which 
supports the belief in gods ordering the universe (cf. 
also XII 966d-967e). 21 This is how Plato can then reassert 
in Laws X that it is one or several souls22 that are good 
in respect of every excellence and therefore gods, which 
conduct all the stars and cause years, months and seasons 
(899b) 
. With this Plato concludes his demonstration of 
proposition (i) concerning the existence of the gods 
after having shown, first, the priority of soul over 
body, and secondly, that the kind of soul in charge of 
the universe is absolutely good. 
From this perspective, what has the status of the "evil 
soul" proved to be so far? It is clear from the argument 
at 896d-898c that an evil kind of soul ruling over the 
cosmos was just a mere hypothesis, which Plato posed as 
an alternative to the good soul at the beginning but just 
in order to reject it. However, we should not think, with 
some interpreters, 23 that this is all we can say about the 
20 In the latter text it is said that two things lead us to believe 
in the existence of the gods, first, the priority of soul over 
body 
and, secondly, "the order (taxis) of the motion of the stars and all 
the other things under the control of nous which 
has ordered 
everything" (966e2-4). We see here again an example of the recurrent 
suggestion that order is due to nous or to god, as we 
have seen 
supra, ch. 2., n. 37. 
21 Cf. Moreau (1939: 72,76); supra, ch. 4, n. 31. 
22 See note 18. 
23 Cf. Festugiere (1949: 125,129-30) and Dies (1956: LXXVII). 
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evil soul at 896e-897b, for the argument does not dismiss 
the existence of "evil soul" as such. What the conclusion 
clearly shows is that it is not an evil soul (but an 
excellent kind of soul) that rules over the universe, 
taken as the whole astronomical system (cf. ouranou 
periphora, 898c3). In this respect, the crazy and 
disorderly motions referred to at 897d1 (cf. 898b5-8) 
would just depict how the universe would be if it were 
not god, or a good kind of soul, that guides it. 24 
IV. SOME ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON THE EVIL SOUL AT A COSMIC 
LEVEL. THEIR IMPLAUSIBILITY 
1. Successive cosmic rule of nous and anoia 
However, it could still be argued that Plato has a view 
of the universe in which the ruling soul could 
successively exhibit nous or anoia in different cosmic 
cycles. 25 This would still be respecting the law of non- 
contradiction as applied to causality, since the same 
soul would be producing contrary effects -namely order 
and disorder- though at different times. But then, it 
could be said, the proof for the existence of god would 
just be valid during the orderly cycle in which we live, 
without discarding that in a different -disorderly- cycle 
the universe could be ruled by an evil soul. The picture 
of successive cosmic cycles, orderly and disorderly, had, 
as we have seen, been mythically presented by Plato in 
the Politicus. According to this picture, the Laws could 
be remitting to a single animic source both the orderly 
and disorderly cosmic motion described in the former 
dialogue; though in the preceding chapter I have already 
24 Similarly, I have interpreted a-cosmic disorder as a hypothesis 
in the Timaeus and Politicus. Cf. supra, ch. 2, section 1.2; ch. 
6, 
section 1.3. 
25 This reading could be suggested by the phrase noun 
proslabousa ... anoiai sungenomene at 
897b1-3, if we take the 
participles not only conditionally but temporally. 
This "cyclical" 
view was suggested to me by Prof. Conrado Eggers Lan. 
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argued against the notion of cosmic cycles as such in the 
myth of the Politicus. We could now add the problems that 
would result from applying a similar picture to the 
Laws. For if the ruling soul can pass from "acquiring" 
nous and being "god" (the latter feature being suggested 
by Dies' reading of 897b1-2, and confirmed in any event 
by the conclusion at 899b -cf. 898c) to being invaded by 
folly -which would imply not being god at that time-, 
then "god" would be just an accidental property of soul 
which comes into being and perishes according to soul's 
association with nous or anoia respectively, something 
that contradicts the very notion of god as immortal (cf. 
XII 967d). Let us also notice that the "cyclical" 
hypothesis would be equally implausible on a view which 
attempted to posit nous not as a faculty immanent to 
soul, but as a separate entity as god. For if nous is 
separate and has no intervention in the universe during 
periods of disorder -as a literal reading of Pol. 272e 
ff. would suggest- then this would contradict proposition 
(ii) in the Laws about god's essentially and always 
(905e2-3,900d2-3) taking care of the whole universe. 26 So 
we must suppose that for Plato the universe is 
continuously ruled by a good soul or god. 
Now, does this mean that there is no evil at all in the 
universe? Clearly not, for Plato recurrently goes on 
speaking of the existence of evil in the universe even 
after he has argued for the existence of the gods (903d- 
906c). But then, if we keep to the principle according to 
26 In addition, at Laws X 901c-903a it is denied that the gods could 
fail to take care of the universe through laziness, ignorance or lack 
of power. The first two grounds were used by Proclus to deny that god 
could have started ordering the universe at one point in time and not 
earlier (cf. In Tim. I 288,17-27 Diehl). The same evidence could be 
used against any postulation of cyclical states of the universe 
without divine care. Cf. also the arguments given below against the 
postulation of an irrational faculty in the World-Soul, which could 
apply also to this "cyclical" interpretation if we consider that the 
possibility that soul becomes associated with nous or anoia at 
different times could be explained by the fact that soul has an 
irrational faculty. 
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which an evil kind of soul is the cause of the bad 
effects in the universe (cf. 896d5-e6), we should admit 
that there exists an evil kind of soul. This kind of soul 
will not rule over the whole astronomical system -as the 
argument has just shown; that is why in that respect 
soul's association with anoia was just hypothetical. 
However, false opinion was categorically -and not merely 
hypothetically- postulated as a state of soul at 897a2. 
And we could say that both false opinion and 
irrationality become actual states of sou127 when we come 
to explain the existence of evil that is still present, 
especially at the sublunar level, within an orderly 
universe ruled by god. What, then, is the status of this 
actual evil kind of soul? 
2. Simultaneous cosmic interaction of nous with anoia 
The issue can be explored further by distinguishing 
between moral evil, which, I shall argue, Plato thinks is 
caused by morally evil -human- souls, and natural evil, 
such as floods or droughts. It is the latter which is 
more difficult to explain, and not so intuitively 
ascribable to the agency of human beings. And perhaps for 
this reason some interpreters have remitted the cause of 
natural evil to some sort of soul at a cosmic -non-human- 
level, even though that cosmic cause, as we know, will 
not rule over the universe as a whole. However, I think 
that this view cannot be sustained in the context of the 
Laws; I shall present it and show its difficulties before 
offering my own interpretation concerning the problem of 
evil here. 
That view could take at least two different forms -each 
of them answering to ambiguities in the text. And we 
could also here present them as different ways to solve 
27 Here we can make use of the ambiguity of the participle 
in the 
phrase anoiai sungenomene at 897b3, which can be read 
both 
conditionally and temporally (cf. note 25). 
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the contradiction that, as we saw, would emerge if only 
one soul, at the same time and in the same respect, were 
the cause of all the contraries. We have seen that it 
cannot be the same soul producing good and evil at 
different times, but we could still think that: 
2.1. We are dealing with two distinct -and coexisting- 
souls, the one good and the other one bad -as might be 
suggested by Laws 896e4 (pleious); or 
2.2. it is the same soul that can be associated both with 
nous and with anoia (as the singular psuche at Laws 896e8 
might suggest), but in different respects. We could thus 
think that there are different faculties or parts within 
the World-Soul which produce contrary effects (as might 
be suggested by the term genos at 897b7). 28 
2.1. The first view, of two coexisting souls in the 
cosmos, producing good and bad effects respectively, was 
the view held in its strongest form by Plutarch in 
antiquity, and more moderately by some recent 
interpreters. The strongest view, as Plutarch put it, 
postulates two coexisting gods, the one good and the 
other one bad, competing for the governance of the 
universe and even sometimes alternating in its rule; 29 
though this view seems already rejected by the arguments 
above, showing that Plato does believe the universe to be 
ruled only by a good soul and to be continuously -and not 
just cyclically- so. However, the notion of a cosmic 
battle could also be suggested by the striking passage, 
at Laws X 906a, where we read of an athanatos mache 
28 Remember that the term genos, as well as eidos, is often used in 
the Republic for the different aspects or kinds (e. g. eide, 437d3, 
440e8,9, genos 441a1-3, c6) within the one soul. The same terms are 
also used in the Timaeus for the different "parts" of the soul 
(e. g. 
genos 69d5, eidos 69c7,89e4,90a3). 
29 Cf. De Iside et Osiride 370b-371a. There he compares the evil soul 
with Ariman in Persian dualistic religion and with what the Greeks 
call "Hades". In De an. proc. 1014d-1015f he considers the evil soul 
as a soul of matter, though as the irrational precosmic principle 
from which God, by introducing intelligence, created the World-Soul. 
Cf. Cherniss (1976: 136-40). 
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between good and evil perpetually taking place in the 
universe, though, as I shall try to argue, in this case 
it is clearly human beings who are the protagonists of 
this drama. In addition, god is essentially good for 
Plato (see e. g. Laws X 899b5-7,900d2,901e1-2) and, in 
other dialogues, cosmic disorder in general tends to be 
ascribed not to the agency of god but to his absence (cf. 
Tim. 53a7-b4, Pol. 273c-e). Finally, let us remember that 
this kind of dualism is also rejected in the Politicus 
myth: "we should not say that... two different gods, with 
opposing designs, turn the universe" (269e8-270a2). 30 
We are then left with the milder view of the evil soul, 
according to which it cannot be said to be god or have 
equal power to the good soul, but rather act as a- 
mostly- subordinate animic principle of matter, which 
could yet sometimes produce undesirable effects. 31 
However, I find this view difficult to sustain in the 
context of the Laws. For this interpretation would be 
endowing the universe with an internal principle of 
motion capable of producing evil effects, so that the 
universe would be the cause of good and bad in different 
respects. Yet Plato says that the universe itself is a 
god (Laws VII 821a) 32 and that god is only the cause of 
good, in an unqualified way (see again Laws X 899b5-7, 
900d2) If this is so, it would seem that the universe 
cannot contain two principles at a cosmic level causing 
good and bad respectively but must only be the cause of 
good. 
30 Cf. Festugiere (1947: 12 ff. ). Pace Jaeger's (1948: 132) claim 
that the evil soul in Laws X is a tribute that Plato pays 
to 
Zoroaster. 
31 Cf. e. g. Dodds (1965: 21), followed by Guthrie (1978: 
97 n. 1). 
This possibility is also allowed by Grube (1980: 147 n. 
1). 
32 Cf. ton megiston theon kai holon ton kosmon at a2. 
I translate 
"the greatest god, namely, the whole universe", taking 
the kai as 
epexegetic, given that Plato is speaking here 
in an astronomical 
context and refers to the "sun and moon" as great gods 
(megalön 
theön) at 821b6, something that suggests that the greatest god 
is the 
whole universe. For the universe as megistos 
theos cf. also Tim. 
92c7. 
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2.2. Now, some interpreters have also viewed the evil 
soul as an irrational faculty of the World-Soul, liable 
to unreasonable behaviour by which it brings about 
unwanted results. In that case it would be partition in 
the World-Soul, 33 similar to that in the human soul, that 
would account for the possibility of its being associated 
with either nous or anoia. However, this view is liable 
to the same kind of objection as above. For if it is the 
World-Soul (and, I should add, also the heavenly bodies, 
which share its same nature) which has different 
faculties and therefore is said to be the cause of good 
and bad but in different respects, then, again, we could 
not say of the whole of the World and the heavenly 
bodies, but only of their nous, that they are gods, 
since, as Plato repeatedly stresses in the Laws, gods are 
the cause only of good. And yet Plato does say explicitly 
in the Laws both that the whole universe -including 
therefore its whole soul- is a god (Laws VII 821a2, cf. 
also X 897b2 on Dies' reading), and that the heavenly 
bodies' souls, taken either individually or collectively, 
are gods (X 899a-b). So, given that the goodness of the 
gods lies in their rationality (cf. e. g. Laws X 900d), 
and that the gods are absolutely good, 34 the World-Soul 
and that of the heavenly bodies must be essentially and 
exclusively rational, without any irrational faculty. 
Thus, none of these attempts to give evil a cosmic source 
seems to have been successful. In what follows, I shall 
try to argue that, in the context of the Laws, it is - 
33 As suggested by Hackforth (1952: 75-6); cf. also Robin (1908: 
164). I myself defended this view as an explanation of natural 
disorders within the orderly cosmos in "El problema del 'alma mala' 
en la ültima filosofia de Platon (Leyes X, 893d ss. )", Revista de 
Filosofia 3 (1988), 143-63, though I now find it more problematic. 
34 See in particular 900d5-9, where söphronein is an essential part 
of virtue as belonging to the gods, and the opposite of söphronein 
is 
part of evil; if this is so, such lack of self-control (as would 
occur if an inferior faculty of soul could sometimes 
become 
insubordinate) could never possibly befit the gods' nature. See also 
902a6-b3, where it is denied that gods, while knowing what 
is best, 
could yield to pleasure and pain, as people say is the case with 
the 
least worthy of men. 
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only- human beings who seem to be responsible for evil, 
and I shall analyse its place within a finalistic 
arrangement of the cosmos. 
V. HUMd1N SOULS AS RESPONSIBLE FOR PARTIAL EVIL. THE 
TRIUMPH OF TELEOLOGY 
We should then turn our attention to the section which 
follows Plato's argument for the existence of the gods, 
where he now purports to prove that they care for human 
affairs and cannot be bribed (899d-907b). There we find 
that the only kind of concrete evil souls which Plato 
speaks about are human souls (903d, 904a-e, 905d ff; cf. 
899d-e, 900e with 902b4-5). In addition, he says that, 
whereas excellence (are te) includes moderation 
(sophronein), nous and courage, their opposites (ta 
enantia), e. g. cowardice -and, it would also follow, 
aphrosune and anoia- belong to evil (kakia) (900d5-e2); 
and he adds with regard to these things that "whatever is 
bad (phlaura), belongs to us (prosekei hemin), if to 
anyone" (900e6) This is an important remark, and should 
make us think that the anoia mentioned at 897b3 as 
associated with soul, if it is present in the universe at 
all, belongs to human soul. 35 Of course it could prima 
facie seem striking that Plato would attribute anoia to 
human souls at 897b3, in a context where "soul" was said 
to govern or administer everything in the universe 
(896d10-897b4). However, Plato seems ready to allow that 
human souls have a share in the government of the 
universe (as is claimed for "soul" at 896e8) -though to a 
lesser degree than that of god. For we read further on at 
903b-c that "the one who cares for the universe has 
arranged all things towards the preservation and 
excellence of the whole", the parts of which also have 
35 Similarly, there is an allusion to folly (aphrosune) as something 
that corrupts us at 906a7-8, as we shall see later. 
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rulers (archontes) of every action and passion even on 
the smallest scale (903b4-9). Amongst these rulers we can 
certainly read an allusion to lesser gods accompanying 
the main divinity (cf. Pol. 271d, 272e, Tim. 41a-d, 42d- 
e, Phil. 30d; and which in Plato's own cosmic religion 
could be the heavenly bodies ruled in turn by the World- 
Soul) But Plato clearly adds that "one of these portions 
[which have archontes] is also yours, and, however small, 
tends towards the whole and always looks to it" (903c1- 
2). Thus it would seem that human beings too are 
archontes of the small portions (moria) that are allotted 
to them in the universe, since they have causal 
responsibility (aitia) for the changes -whether good or 
evil- that they provoke (904b8-c2, c6-7 with 904b2-3). 36 
Their souls could therefore be implicitly included in the 
scope of "soul" conducting the universe at 896e8, and in 
this way the government of their small portions -for 
example whole cities, families or their own lives- could 
turn out to be bad. 37 
I have said that Plato speaks only of human soul as a 
concrete source of evil. In point of fact, he tries to 
show how god has arranged everything so that goodness 
might prevail and evil be defeated in the whole (nikosan 
areten, hettomenen de kakian 904b4-5). But it is clear 
that Plato is speaking here of evil in the context of 
human affairs (anthröpina pragmata, 902b4), or of souls 
joined sometimes with one body, sometimes with another, 
which can be better or worse and, accordingly, achieve a 
better or worse destiny (903d3-8). It is whatever is bad 
in -our- soul that tends to harm (blaptein). And it 
is we 
36 Let us remember, in the light of 896b-c, that the notion of soul's 
being an arche in the sense of aitia is inseparable from that of 
archein as ruling. 
37 The pleious of 896e4 would thus refer to 896d10-e2 as a 
conjunction. Although only one kind of soul (the good one) 
administers the heaven, human souls, including bad ones, are 
responsible for administering their part of hapanta to pantei 
kinoumena. 
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who have the responsibility (aitia) for good or bad 
behaviour, according to our will (boulesis) (904b8-c2, 
c6-7), though the consequences of this behaviour are 
established "according to the order and law of destiny" 
(kata ten tes heimarmenes taxin kai nomon, c8-9; cf. 
904c9 ff. ), these laws having in turn been established by 
the gods (904e-905a, cf. Tim. 41e, 42d). These passages 
are useful in showing the relation of evil with 
teleology, and can be taken as a clue to distinguish two 
levels of ethical teleology (or teleology operating in 
the human sphere), which we may call individual and 
cosmic. Individual human behaviour oriented to the good 
depends, as we shall see, on the right use of our 
capacity intentionally to initiate causal chains 
(remember again aitia and boulesis at 904c) -this good 
orientation being a task for us to achieve; whereas at 
the same time there is cosmic teleology as the given 
framework of cosmic justice for any kind of action. This 
system of cosmic justice, based on the principle of like 
to like, guarantees that, , if you become worse, you go 
towards worse souls, and, if you become better, you go 
towards better souls", so that "both in life and in every 
death you do and suffer what it is appropriate that like 
should do towards like" (904e5-905a1). 38 
In this respect, it is very interesting to see how, even 
though the allus ion to god's concern for human affairs 
suggests his personal intervention, the actual 
achievement of cosmic justice is in fact much easier 
(903e3,904a3) and so to speak "automatic". 39 As 
Friedlaender and Dodds have remarked, at the passage just 
mentioned (Laws X 904c-905a) reward or punishment are not 
so much parts of a myth as special cases of a universal 
law (namely that like should go with like). The law of 
38 That the consequences of these conditional decrees for the 
destiny 
of human souls apply in life clearly shows that for Plato ethics 
does 
not necessarily depe nd on eschatology -though it 
doesn't exclude it 
either. For the same suggestion cf. Gorg. 470e9-11,478d7-8,527b-e, 
Rep. X 621c-d. 
39 On this point cf. Saunders (1973: 234,237) and (1991: 
204,206). 
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cosmic justice turns out to be a law of "spiritual 
gravity", for every soul both in life and after death 
gravitates naturally towards the company of its own kind, 
and in this lies its punishment or reward. 40 This means 
giving a cosmic background to Plato's eschatological 
views and to his belief that the punishment for the 
wicked is having to live with the wicked (see also Laws V 
728b), or that wrong-doing brings its own punishment (as 
we might infer from Laws X 899d-e, 905b-c) 
. 41 In this 
respect, god controls the consequences of actions which 
have their cause (aitia) in our own Soul. 42 
40 Plato says that our king "devised where each part should be placed 
so that goodness might win... in the whole" (904b4-5) and the places 
(tinas topous, 904b8) that souls of different sort should occupy; the 
more wicked they are, the lower they will fall until they reach the 
profundities of the places below the surface of the Earth (904c-d), 
whereas good souls go in the opposite direction to some other better 
place (904d-e). So we can see that the universe is topographically 
structured so as to provide a framework for eschatology; for a 
similar suggestion in the Timaeus see Osborne [1988: 104-9]). 
41 Cf. Friedlaender (1969: 438), Dodds (1951: 221) (who also quotes 
Plotinus -IV 3 24- as a development of this idea of cosmic justice, 
cf. 233 n. 76). 
42 I think god should still here be taken to be mainly the World- 
Soul, despite the fact that there are several personal allusions to 
god in this section of the Laws (899d-907b). For example, we are 
reminded of the Demiurge of the Timaeus when god is compared to those 
artisans who, the better they are, the more perfectly they realize 
both small and large things (902e), making the part for the sake of 
the whole and not viceversa (903c) . God 
is also compared to a pilot 
(905e8), as in the Politicus (272e4) . In addition, the god or gods 
who establish the conditional decrees of destiny are indifferently 
referred to in the plural as theoi hoi Olumpon echousin, giving them 
a traditional face (904e4), or in the singular, as our "king" (904a6, 
cf. Phil. 28c7) or as "the one who cares for the whole" (903b4-5, 
904a3-4), or even as the "draughts-player" (903d6). But, despite all 
these "personal" allusions, it is clear that this god who takes care 
of the universe cannot be other than the god, 
i. e. the good soul 
(World-Soul or the souls of the heavenly bodies), whose existence and 
governance has been argued for previously, given that 
the three 
propositions which Plato is trying to prove 
in this book build on 
one another (cf. e. g. 900d, where the epimeleia of 
the gods for human 
affairs that needs to be demonstrated remits 
directly to their 
epimeleia for the macrocosm that has just 
been mentioned within the 
argument for the existence of god at 898c). In addition, 
having seen 
how "automatically" cosmic justice works, we can suppose 
that this 
(World) Soul in fact operates much more impersonally 
than the 
personal allusions suggest. 
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This emphasis on human responsibility is worth noting. 
In the preceding section (893b-899d) Plato had spoken of 
soul as the cause (aitia) of everything, both good and 
bad, and argued that it is the gods that are the cause of 
the goodness or order exhibited in the revolution of the 
universe. This we may call an argument for natural 
teleology, based on the regularity of the astronomical 
system, which is a given fact. Now, in the section 
beginning at 899d, when dealing with evil, the notion of 
aitia is again remitted to soul, specifically in the 
sense of moral responsibility (cf. 904b-d). Here Plato 
forcefully suggests that in the ethical domain it is a 
challenge for us to give to our lives a teleological 
orientation, contributing towards the goodness of the 
whole. We are encouraged to learn that whatever is good 
for the whole is also best for us, by virtue of our 
common origin (903d) . Thus, teleology is shown to be 
present at every level, and soul is the agent responsible 
for its fulfilment: on the one hand, the soul of the god 
or gods at the natural -astronomical- level, and also at 
the ethical level with respect to cosmic justice, secures 
the teleological arrangement of the whole as something 
given; on the other hand, human souls at the ethical 
level are responsible for the task of giving a 
teleological orientation to the actions stemming from 
their own will. Plato's tone becomes quite dramatic at 
906a2-b3, a passage which is most important in 
illuminating the problem of evil and its cosmic 
implications in Laws X: 
"Since we have agreed among ourselves that the universe 
(ouranos) is full of many good things, but also of their 
opposites, and that there are more of those which are not 
good (pleionon de ton me), such a battle, we say, 
is 
immortal (mache... athanatos) and requires an 
extraordinary vigilance; and the gods and daemons are our 
allies (summachoi), and we in turn the possession of gods 
and daemons. And what corrupts us (phtheirei 
hemas) is 
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injustice (adikia) and arrogance (hubris) together with folly (aphrosune); and what preserves us is justice 
(dikaiosune) and moderation (sophrosune) together with 
wisdom (phronesis), these residing in the ensouled powers 
of the gods, though one can see clearly a small portion 
also dwelling here in us. " 
Although the allusion to an immortal battle between good 
and evil taking place in the universe could again make us 
think of an evil cosmic soul, this possibility is 
immediately dismissed as soon as we realize that we are 
the protagonists of this battle, the gods and daemons 
being just our summachoi and only on the side of the 
good. From this perspective an extraordinary phulake is a 
task that is now also remitted to us despite other 
passages stressing that the gods are phulakes (cf. 907a): 
it is clear that we and the gods must share this 
responsibility. Folly, injustice and arrogance are again 
left on our side. Plato's pessimism about the existence 
of more evils than goods in the universe is certainly 
astonishing, particularly within a kind of discourse 
which is devoted to emphasizing the existence and triumph 
of teleology. But we can notice here how Plato has come 
to view the ouranos more and more as the stage of human 
life, 43 and it can only be as regards the latter that he 
says that there are more evils than goods (as he had 
explicitly affirmed at Rep. II 379c). 44 This pessimism - 
43 In a way that can remind us of a similar projection of human drama 
onto the cosmos as we interpreted with respect to the Politicus myth 
in chapter 6. 
44 Certainly, one could also read Plato's statement about the 
existence of more evils than goods in the universe as just making a 
point about the numerosity of evils. Evil human souls or their 
effects may be much greater in number than the good souls -including 
those of the gods- in the universe (after all we find more 
multiplicity in the earthly domain than in heaven), but this need not 
dismiss the fact that the latter have predominance, since "more 
evils" does not imply "more evil". For the numerous individual evils 
may each be small compared with the much fewer but much greater 
goods. However it is interesting that Plato does not mention here the 
predominance of good. Rather he stresses that between the forces of 
good and evil there is an immortal battle which is human-centered. 
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or rather, realism- is however only partial, for Plato 
has already shown above, again in martial terms, that god 
has arranged everything so that "goodness might win and 
evil be defeated in the whole" (904b4-5). 45 
Now, we have said that Plato speaks only of human souls 
as the source of evil. This however does not mean that 
the only kind of evil he speaks about is human, for he 
also speaks about natural evil in the terrestrial domain. 
Thus we go on reading at 906c2-6 that "the vice 
(hamartema) just mentioned, namely overgaining 
(pleonexian), is what is called illness in bodies of 
flesh, pestilence in seasons and years, and 
injustice... in cities and states. " What then is the cause 
of "pestilence in seasons and years and illness in bodies 
of flesh"? 
This question about natural disorder could be answered by 
saying that it is an incidental random result of 
corporeal motions imparted by the purposive action of the 
World-Soul, and I think this explanation could arguably 
be given in the context of the Timaeus: Soul purposively 
moves one body, and this another body, until the 
purposive effect of soul starts waning and the corporeal 
begins to manifest random motion, which is no longer 
within the scope of Soul's initial purpose (cf. 58a-c, 
45 As I said above, cosmic justice is one level of ethical teleology, 
and could be seen as a consolation for the just man who cannot stop 
the existence of evil in the universe (cf. 899d-e, 905b-c). This 
however should not lead us to inertia, but, on the contrary, should 
stimulate us to fight better on the side of the gods. For punishment 
is only a second best, both (i) from the point of view of the 
individual, whose wrong-doing is intrinsically bad as a disease, even 
if -in the best of cases- punishment makes 
him better, and (ii) from 
the point of view of the community, since we are told that a society 
of virtuous people is preferable to one which 
has to impose 
punishment on the wicked. (Cf. IX 854b-e with 853b-c. 
) In addition, 
knowledge of cosmic justice -as an aspect of cosmic teleology- could 
not but make us act virtuously and therefore fight 
for the good (cf. 
X 885b). But, even if we do not succeed, we have at least the 
consolation that we have done our best and that teleology after all 
prevails from the perspective of the whole. 
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46d-e). 46 In that case, Soul (even the good divine soul) 
would still be the cause of all motion, including 
disorderly motion as an incidental result which is not 
meant by it and for which it is therefore not 
responsible, in a way that would not affect god's 
goodness but, at the very most, stress the limitation 
with which he has to cope due to the nature of the 
corporeal. Plato had in fact in Laws IX (863e-864a) 
contemplated the distinction between causation of evil 
and moral responsibility for it: if, when an action is 
performed, the opinion for the best prevails, even if 
some harm is done the action thus performed must be said 
to be just (864a). 47 According to this passage there 
should, strictly speaking, be a distinction between a 
soul which is just but "capable of producing contrary 
effects" to the good ones and an "evil soul" as such. 
However, Laws X doesn't leave any room for such a 
distinction, since the two are plainly identified (cf. 
896e6 and 897d1); and it is suggested that whatever is 
bad is due to a bad kind of soul (896d5-e6 with 897d1). 
So, if there are natural disorders or evils in the 
terrestrial realm, and if their ultimate source of motion 
is soul, then that soul should be evil at least in that 
respect (for it is the ultimate "cause" and hence 
"responsible"). Therefore the argument in Laws X seems to 
demand that the ultimate cause of evil be other than god 
or a completely good soul. 
Now, why should Plato lead us to such a conclusion in the 
Laws? He does not focus on any cosmic source of disorder 
in Laws X, probably because he wants conversely to 
emphasize the pervasive presence and concern of the gods 
46 For this interpretation of the Timaeus see Cherniss (1944: 444-5), 
applied to the Laws in (1954: 28-9 and n. 44) ; followed 
by Brisson 
(1974: 503-4). (For different explanations concerning the Timaeus, 
cf. Vlastos [1939: 394-8] -and in his line T. M. Robinson 
[1970: 95- 
7]; Easterling [1967: 31,37-8]; Mohr [1985: 159-70,184-8]. ) 
47 For the implications of this distinction in Plato's moral and 




against atheism. So, we could explain Plato's silence 
about any cause of natural evil other than human by the 
kind of exoteric and protreptic discourse we are dealing 
with here, 48 which is meant to exalt the existence and 
providence of the gods -to an extent which may present 
them as rather more powerful than in the Timaeus-49 and to 
make people aware that the goodness of the gods is such 
that only humans seem to be responsible for evil. 
In this respect, even though Cherniss may be right in 
noting that evil seems to have not one, but several 
sources throughout the dialogues -and so he distinguishes 
between negative evil (due purely to the inevitable 
imperfection of the sensible world as a mere reflection 
of the Ideas), incidental evil (as the indirect result of 
the purposive action of soul) and positive evil, produced 
directly by morally responsible evil souls-50 we should 
again note here that, at least as far as Laws X is 
concerned, the only explicit source of evil given is the 
last one. For we have seen that no room is left in the 
text for incidental evil and, on the other hand, in this 
discourse addressing the crowd no mention is made at all 
of Ideas of which the universe as a reflection could be 
an imperfect copy and in that respect convey negative 
evil. 
48 On this feature of Laws X cf. Vlastos (1939: 392-3). 
49 It is in fact noteworthy that, whereas the Timaeus pointed out 
that nous guides (only) the majority of things (ta pleista) towards 
the best (48a3), here Plato says that god has arranged everything 
(panta) for the excellence of the whole (903b5) and emphasizes that 
it is easier for god, as for any demiurge, to care for the small 
parts than the large ones (902c-903a), thus suggesting that there 
is 
virtually nothing that is beyond his control. This has 
led scholars 
such as Mohr (1985: 185) to believe that, 
in contrast with the 
Timaeus, Plato's god in the Laws is omnipotent. This might 
be 
suggested by 901d7-8 ("the gods are capable of doing everything which 
is in the power of mortals and immortals"); though perhaps we are 
dealing here with a difference of stress rather than with a 
difference of thought. In fact we must not forget that the phrase at 
901d7-8 does not itself suggest omnipotence, for the power of 
immortals might be limited in some ways (cf. Laws VII 
818b). 
50 See Cherniss (1954), after him Brisson (1974: 449-52). 
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Conversely, Plato had already asserted that whatever is 
bad belongs to us (900e). According to this it appears 
that we should also have moral responsibility for what 
seems to be natural evil, and this would accord with the 
allusions to illness and pestilence as examples of 
hamartema (vice) or pleonexia (overgaining) at 906c3-5, 
both words having a strong anthropological and moral 
implication, 51 which is in addition given here a cosmic 
import -in the context of a battle between good and evil 
taking place in the universe (906a-b). If this is so, 
Plato would then be stressing in the Laws, with overt 
ecological resonances, 52 the cosmic implications of human 
behaviour. Human disorder is thus seen to be a pleonexia, 
an overgaining or cosmic disturbance insofar as it 
trespasses the limits of the portion (meros, merismon, 
morion, 903b-c) established for each thing. 53 So we can 
see how human life has become more and more important as 
a part of the whole ouranos. In this regard there are 
some interesting conclusions to draw. 
Moreau has proposed that, in contrast with the Timaeus, 
Laws X lacks the idea of an organized whole (holon), for 
it deals only with "all things" (ta panta, 895a, cf. 
51 This is reinforced even more by the context, which takes pleonexia 
as a vice of unjust souls (906b; cf. pleonektousin... en anthropois 
at 906c1-2), and which tries to eradicate the notion that humans can 
pleonektein without suffering. 
52 Plato was in fact aware of environmental problems, such as the 
deforestation of Attica and the increasing non-absorption by the soil 
of rainfall there (Crit. 111c-d), in contrast with the ideal 
environmental conditions of a past Athens which was also excelling in 
virtue (Crit. 109c4-d2,110e3-111a2,111b-d, 112e2-6). (For the 
Critias as conveying a critique of Plato's contemporary society cf. 
Brisson [1992a: 324-5], with references to other interpreters who 
take it as a political allegory on p. 319. ) See also Plato's 
description of the land in Laws V 740a5-7 as "our ancestral home of 
which we must take greater care than children do of their mother, 
since it is a god and so the mistress of mortal beings". This passage 
is quoted by Clark (1994: 118), and can be added to the evidence here 
against Hargrove (1989: 28-30) and Attfield (1994: 80), in their 
charge that Plato was a hindrance for the development of 
environmental ideas. 
53 Cf. Friedlaender (1969: 439). 
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896d-e). 54 This suggestive idea, though, could apply at 
the very most to the first section of Laws X, 55 which 
deals with the universe in general terms before 
introducing the role played by human beings in it (as 
happens from Laws 899d onwards). However, it is 
noteworthy that we do get the desired notion of the 
universe as a unified whole as soon as human beings are 
introduced into the description. Thus, we are said to be 
the possession of the gods, to whom also the whole 
universe (ton ouranon holon) belongs (902b8-9). In an 
eschatological context we read that the one who cares for 
the All (tou pantos) has arranged everything towards the 
preservation and excellence of the whole (tou holou, 
903b4-6) . 56 The happiness of the life (bios) of the 
universe as to pan is the aim (hou heneka) of every part 
and generation (903c-d); this indicating more than ever 
an organic whole. And we have earlier seen the ouranos as 
the battlefield of human good and evil (906a). All these 
things suggest that Plato does not seem to think of the 
universe as a complete whole unless we include human 
affairs as an essential part of it. 57 
54 Cf. Moreau (1939: 67). 
55 In fact even here there are references to the ouranos (e. g. 896e1, 
899b8), though Moreau is right to say that to holon does not appear 
in this context. 
56 This immanent goodness of the whole sets the goal for soul as the 
agent of teleology (cf. also 904b4-5,903d1-3, XII 966e-967a). This 
is not very different from the aim to which the Demiurge tends in the 
Timaeus, namely "that everything should be good, and nothing bad as 
far as possible" (30a2-3) . In the Timaeus 
however this was understood 
in terms of similarity with the model (cf. 39d-e) and the notion of a 
unified organic whole was given its Ideal counterpart by positing the 
"Living Being Itself" (ho estin zöion, 39e8) which is perfect 
(teleon, 30c-d) as the model which guides the Demiurgic activity to 
produce just one visible world as a zöion (32d-33a) . Laws X does not 
seem to make any explicit allusion to the Ideas -whether or not Plato 
still believes in them in the way they are presented in the Timaeus, 
it is clear that such metaphysically loaded claims are not needed for 
his point against atheism here, nor is knowledge of these entities 
required for the mass of citizens to live justly. However, despite 
these differences between esoteric and exoteric tone, we can discover 
both in the Timaeus and in Laws X the same effort to assert teleology 
by virtue of an intelligent cause. 
57 This does not mean that Plato does not conceive of the universe, 
qua astronomical system, as a unity (for he does at Laws VII 821a, 
for instance, as we have seen). But it does show that, having earlier 
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In the light of this, now it is not so surprising that 
Plato should say that there are more evils than goods in 
the universe, or that we are archontes in it. Neither 
should we be surprised at the importance of our 
cooperation with god for the fulfilment of teleology. For 
his conception of the universe or kosmos has proved to go 
hand in hand with anthropological concerns; and what 
Plato is showing to us in Laws X is that, in the end, 
cosmology gains full significance when seen in its 
interaction with human life. So, whatever we do is 
reflected in the cosmos and affects it, and in turn 
triggers its alloted cosmic consequences, which also 
affect us, though in a way that for Plato can be subsumed 
in an overall teleological design. From this standpoint, 
the purpose of doing cosmology or understanding the 
cosmos is to understand better our place in the cosmos. 
This is also the point, if any justification is needed, 
of our investigating Plato on cosmology. 
in book X focused on the universe as an astronomical system 
(897b- 
899b), Plato is now emphasizing that the human world must 
form part 




We set out on a journey in our introduction that is now 
coming to an end. Through it, we have seen "mind" acting 
as a foundation of cosmic order in a twofold way. 
1. Firstly, I have been concerned with its causal and 
teleological role in the late dialogues, and with its 
status as embodied mainly in the World-Soul, a theme that 
we have recurrently found to be present or implied in the 
dialogues studied, and particularly in the Timaeus. In 
this way, I hope to have given an interpretation which 
can make Plato's account both economical and explanatory. 
Economical, since I have tried to show that instead of 
needing two distinct entities, such as the Demiurge and 
the World-Soul in the Timaeus, with similar functions 
such as those of generating and sustaining order, we can 
understand the mythical functions of the former as 
embodied in the actual functions of the latter, an 
analysis that has in turn been supported by our 
examination of discursive cosmological passages in the 
Philebus and Laws X. This proposal has rested on a non- 
literal interpretation of creation of the cosmos out of 
chaos, and a picture of the universe has been shown to 
be 
preferable in which no total pre-cosmic or a-cosmic 
disorder might occur or threaten to occur (as I have 
argued as regards Timaeus and Politicus respectively). 
' 
Thus we do not need to postulate more than one 
kind of 
intelligent soul in the universe to see how primary 
causes operate to sustain it 
in order. Further, primary 
causes at a cosmic level correspond not 
to an 
ontologically different kind of 
item from intelligent 
soul but to intelligent soul 
itself; as we have seen from 
1 Cf. ch. 2, section 1.2; ch. 6, section 
1. 
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Phaedrus and Laws, the essence of soul consists in being 
the principle of motion, and -as I have also argued- of 
orderly motion insofar as soul is intelligent and 
purposive. In this way the World-Soul, containing within 
itself no irrationality, can be identified as the main 
cause which constantly generates and thus sustains -and 
governs- the orderly structure of the cosmos: this dual 
role of generation and ruling pertaining to the cause has 
been a constant throughout Timaeus, Philebus, Politicus 
and Laws. 2 
From an explanatory point of view, we can see how the 
postulation of an agent which can intend and realize 
goals provides at least a plausible representation of how 
teleology might work, particularly when the goal, as in 
the Timaeus, has its ultimate foundation in a separate 
realm of Ideas which do not seem to affect or be affected 
at all by the sensibles that bear their names (cf. Tim. 
52a). If in the Phaedo participation in the Idea could 
itself count as a reason for a particular bearing the 
name of the Idea (cf. Phaedo 100c), now it seems that at 
the time of the Timaeus the relation between Ideas and 
sensibles is itself a problem, something that has to be 
explained rather than explain. A cosmic Nous is then, 
unlike the Ideas, efficacious. Its postulation does not 
need to do away with the Ideas (the Timaeus doesn't); it 
just serves to secure that the latter be properly 
instantiated in the sensible world. Now, whether or not 
one wants to grant that Ideas might prove to be relevant 
for the cosmologies of the Philebus and Politicus (as I 
have shown to be at least possible above), 3 and even 
though they certainly do not appear as entities superior 
to god and the world in the context of Laws X, we still 
have in all these dialogues the notion of an immanent 
goodness, beauty or symmetry pertaining to the whole 
which calls for Nous as its main agent. In the Timaeus 
2 Cf. ch. 2, section 1.3. and 2.2.2.; ch. 4, section 3.4 and 
5.1; 
ch. 6, section 1.2; ch. 7, section 1. 
3 Cf. ch. 4, section 5.3 and ch. 6, section 1.2. 
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similarity with the model, as the aim pursued by the 
agent, is understood in terms of goodness, implying 
beauty and measure providing unity, features that 
characterize a properly structured whole. 4 In the Philebus 
the cause (nous) guarantees the right communion with 
peras; peras in turn implies summetria between otherwise 
opposing elements, and summetria beauty and goodness. 5 In 
the Politicus too a true cosmos is characterized by 
cohesion between dissimilar elements grounding its beauty 
(273d-e, cf. 273b). And in the Laws, as we have seen, the 
universe appears as an intricate structure where all its 
parts interact towards securing the goodness of the whole 
(903b ff. ). In this way the good state and cohesion of 
the universe can be constantly sustained by virtue of its 
being an organism endowed with exclusively intelligent 
Soul which can act perpetually as goal-oriented primary 
cause. 
Now, in analysing the operation of this cause we have 
also seen how it has to face some limits: while, on the 
one hand, it is many times suggested that the 
teleological action of Nous cannot be fulfilled without 
relying on subservient factors, called co-causes or 
secondary causes in the Timaeus and secondary motions in 
the Laws, 6 both pertaining to the order of the corporeal, 
it has to cope with restrictions, often imposed by the 
very nature of the latter. In this way the necessary 
properties of the corporeal, not completely subdued 
by 
nous, could constitute a random residue of chance 
in the 
universe in the Timaeus; 7 we have found a similar relation 
between apeiron and chance in the Philebus8 and also an 
ineradicable element of necessity amounting to the 
corporeal to be present in the reign of 
Zeus in the 
4 Cf. ch. 2, esp. section 1.1. 
5 Cf. ch. 4, sections 3.2 and 5.3. 
6 Cf. ch. 2 section 1.3 and ch. 7, section 
1. Cf. also ch. 4, 
section 5.1 with regard to the Philebus. 
7 Cf. ch. 2, section 1.3. 
8 Ch. 4, section 5.5. 
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Politicus. 9 But in all these cases, it can be said, Nous 
and therefore teleology prevails in the universe; and 
this is also, as I have argued in chapter 5, the case for 
the present universe in the Politicus. The same can be 
said of the Laws, where the stress is now put on human 
responsibility as a possible restrictive factor to 
overall cosmic teleology, at least insofar as Cosmic 
Nous can settle the consequences for our behaviour but 
never determine our behaviour itself, which has 
conversely its aitia in the bouleseis of each of our 
self-moving souls, which, by not being exclusively 
rational, constitute a potential source of order as well 
as disorder and therefore evil. 10 Now, we can see in Laws 
X that, despite the stress put on the importance of our 
watchfully fighting on the side of the good in the 
context of the whole ouranos (which would lose all 
meaning unless it is believed that what we do is not 
indifferent to cosmic teleology but matters to it), it 
seems that cosmic justice, as one aspect of teleology, 
will unfailingly prevail. But at least as far as 
individual ethical teleology is concerned, one must 
endeavour to act intelligently and virtuously and thus 
fulfil teleology as best one can; punishment is after all 
only a second best. " 
At this point, then, we can see how the analysis of a 
Cosmic Nous in our search for the foundation of the 
world's order vitally requires us to take into account 
the place of human beings in the universe. Here macro and 
microcosm intersect. 
2. For this reason, as a second aim of my thesis, I have 
tried to show how the cosmological speculation on Plato's 
9 Ch. 5, section 2.7 and 3; cf. ch. 6, section 1. 
10 See the attribution of disorderly effects to an evil soul at Laws 
897d1; supra, ch. 7, section 5. Compare Tim. 42e: The gods govern 
human soul "except insofar as it could turn out to be the cause 
(aition) of its own evils"; supra, ch. 2, n. 13. 
11 Cf. ch. 7, n. 45. 
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part is not an isolated feature which has no bearing on, 
and could in turn not possibly be affected by, Plato's 
interest in other areas, particularly the human sphere: 
conversely, in the Politicus, for example, the concern 
that god shows for the universe should be taken as a 
model for the politician to follow as regards the polis 
in order to guarantee its happiness; 12 similarly in the 
Timaeus and Philebus god, mainly the World-Soul, appears 
as paradigmatic for the human soul in its task of 
achieving happiness. 13 In addition, I have pointed out in 
chapter 3 how a demiurgic intellect, separate in the 
structure of reality of the Timaeus, is superfluous not 
only on metaphysical but also on ethical and 
epistemological grounds; it is the World-Soul, and not 
any separate nous, that will constitute the subject of 
astronomy through which human beings could attain 
happiness or even access to the Ideas; and it is also 
this kind of soul, and not any more remote nous, that 
Plato feels in a position to argue for in the Philebus 
and the Laws, as something that is within the reach of 
human knowledge and could thus influence human behaviour. 
Again in the Laws it is a kind of purposive soul that 
leads everything happily: this will be mainly Soul at a 
cosmic level, but also -as I have argued in chapter 7- 
human souls, who, by acting teleologically, will 
contribute to the happiness of the whole which in turn 
affects their own happiness (cf. X 903b-d). 
In this respect I hope to have shown, through different 
strands of argument and pictures provided by different 
dialogues, that Cosmic Mind can not only act as a model 
for human minds -for whom it is rather an ethical task to 
attain order-, but also requires their cooperation for 
the achievement of teleology, thus showing the macro- 
microcosm relation to be so symbiotic that we are 
required not only to imitate but also to sustain the 
12 Cf. ch. 6, section 2.2. 
13 Cf. ch. 3, section 2.2.; ch. 4, section 4. 
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universe's orderly structure. If god or the universe 
could clearly appear as paradigmatic for human behaviour 
in the Timaeus and Philebus, on the one hand, the 
Politicus and the Laws on the other, without dismissing 
the latter dimension, seem to disclose a new one: the 
universe as the stage of human life, whose very 
description can be coloured by ethical and political 
preoccupations. This can reach the point of depicting on 
a cosmic scale an ethical drama which seems rather 
inherently human, as in the Politicus, or appearing as 
the battlefield of human good and evil in the Laws, 14 with 
a consequent warning, one could infer, for human beings 
as regards the cosmos, since whatever we do is reflected 
in the cosmos and contributes towards its being orderly 
or not. 
Let us note in addition that the symbiotic relation we 
have mentioned between macro and microcosm is possible, 
at least partly, because there is a difference of degree 
and not a gulf between god and men, as implied, both in 
Timaeus and Philebus, by the suggestion that our soul is 
of the same nature as that of the universe. One could on 
this basis press the matter further and say that the 
interest in the happiness of all human beings that Plato 
seems to show in these two dialogues might well have some 
metaphysical grounding in the fact that now all souls are 
described as having the same origin. Mankind from this 
perspective is seen as a whole, and even though finding 
an appropriate political framework for the development of 
human life continues to preoccupy Plato (a framework 
however whose ideal or second ideal conditions were far 
from being realized), as we can see from the Politicus 
and Laws, now the universe provides more clearly a wider 
background against which human beings can seek to 
understand their place. 
14 Ch. 6, section 2; ch. 7, section 5. 
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Let me finish by recalling that this thesis has certainly 
focused on cosmology, since the answer required for the 
question: "What is the foundation of cosmic order in the 
late dialogues? " is for the most part a cosmological one; 
and it has been concerned with ethics just insofar as 
cosmology can act as a background to it. In the first 
regard, I hope to have shown through argument that it is 
possible to pursue a fairly coherent line in the 
investigation of Mind as a primary efficient cause of 
cosmic, teleological order, and that through its 
interaction with other factors in the cosmos the 
cosmologies of the four dialogues present themselves as 
extremely fertile. Thus, a coherent reading of these 
issues in the Timaeus and in the Philebus has proved 
possible not only separately but also comparatively to 
one another as to their basic points; and the cosmology 
of the Philebus has proved to be more weighty than if it 
were merely ad hoc. The importance of the cosmologies of 
the Poli ticus and the Laws, in turn, and following a 
spirit already exhibited in Timaeus and Philebus, has not 
only been maintained but shown to be inseparable from the 
ethical preoccupations if one is to make full sense of 
the cosmological picture itself -and only thus can we 
understand, e. g., why the world appears so 
anthropomorphic in the Politicus, or the emphasis on 
human responsibility in the picture of the Laws. 15 In this 
sense, far from pretending to have exhausted the topic, I 
hope to have at least offered fresh grounds for a more 
integrated investigation of the relation between 
cosmology and ethics in Plato. 
15 Cf. ch. 6, section 2 and ch. 7, section 5. 
218 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES 
Allen, R. E. (ed. ) (1965) : Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, 
London 
Annas, J. (1981) : An Introduction to Plato's Republic, 
Oxford 
----------(1982): "Plato's Myths of Judgement", Phronesis 
27,119-43 
Anton, J. P. (ed. ) (1980): Science and the Sciences in 
Plato, New York 
Anton, J. P. and Preus, A. (eds. ) (1989): Essays in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. III: Plato, Albany 
Archer-Hind, R. D. (1888) : The Timaeus of Plato, London 
Ashbaugh, A. F. (1988): Plato's Theory of Explanation. A 
Study of the Cosmological Account in the Timaeus, New 
York 
Attfield, R. (1994): Environmental Philosophy: Principles 
and Prospects, Aldershot 
Benitez, E. E. (1989): Forms in Plato's Philebus, Assen 
Blank, D. L. (1993) : "The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's 
Dialogues", Classical Quarterly 43,428-39 
Bluck, R. S. (1975) : Plato's Sophist. A Commentary, edited 
by G. C. Neal, Manchester 
Bolton, R. (1975): "Plato's Distinction between Being and 
Becoming", Review of Metaphysics 29,66-95 
Brague, R. (1991): "La Cosmologie Finale du Sophiste 
(265b4-e6)", in N. Narcy, (ed. ), Etudes sur le Sophiste 
de Platon, Naples, 267-88 
Brandwood, L. (1990): The Chronology of Plato's 
Dialogues, Cambridge 
----------------(1992): "Stylometry and 
Chronology", in 
R. Kraut (ed. ), 90-120 
219 
Brisson, L. (1974): Le Meme et 1'Autre dans la structure 
ontologique du Timee de Platon, Paris 
------------(1982): Platon, les mots et les mythes, Paris 
------------(1991): (with F. W. Meyerstein), Inventer 
1'Uni vers: le probleme de la connaisance et de les 
modeles cosmologiques, Paris 
------------(1992a): Platon. Timee/Critias, Paris 
------------(1992b): "Interpretation du mythe du 
Politique", paper presented at the Third Symposium 
Platonicum, Bristol, 1992 
Burkert, W. (1972): Lore and Science in Ancient 
Pythagoreanism, Engl. transl., Cambridge Mass. 
Burnyeat, M. F. (1982): "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: 
What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed", The 
Philosophical Review 91,3-40 
---------------(1987): "Platonism and Mathematics: A 
Prelude to Discussion", in A. Graeser, (ed. ), 213-40 
---------------(1990): The Theaetetus of Plato, 
Indianapolis 
Bury, R. G. (1897): The Philebus of Plato, Cambridge 
----------- (1929) : Plato. Timaeus, London 
Byrne, C. (1989) : "Forms and Causes in Plato's Phaedo", 
Dionysius 13,3-16 
Cherniss, H. (1932): "On Plato's Republic X 597b", 
American Journal of Philology 53,233-42 
---------------(1944): Aristotle's Criticism of 
Plato and 
the Academy, Baltimore 
---------------(1945): The Riddle of 








---------------(1950): review of A. J. Festugiere (1949), 
Gnomon 22,204-16 
---------------(1954): "The Sources of Evil according to 
Plato", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
98,23-30 
---------------(1957): "The Relation of the Timaeus to 
Plato's Later Dialogues", in R. E. Allen (ed. ), 339-78 
---------------(1976): Plutarch's Moralia 13, Part I, 
London 
Claghorn, G. S. (1954): Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 
Timaeus, The Hague 
Clark, S. (1994): "Global Religion", in R. Attfield, and 
A. Belsey (eds. ) , Philosophy and the Natural Environment, 
Cambridge, 113-28 
Code, A. (1988): "Reply to Michael Frede's 'Being and 
Becoming in Plato'", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
suppl., 53-60 
Cornford, F. M. (1935) : Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 
London 
-----------------(1937): Plato's Cosmology, London 
-----------------(1938): "The Polytheism of Plato: an 
Apology", Mind 47,321-30 
Craig, W. C. (1980): The Cosmological Argument from Plato 
to Leibniz, London 
Davidson, D. (1990): Plato's Philebus, New York 
Davis, P. J. (1979) : "The Fourfold Classification in 
Plato's Philebus", Apeiron 13,124-34 
De Chiara-Quenzer, D. (1993): "A Method for Pleasure and 
Reason: Plato's Philebus", Apeiron 26,37-55 
De Lacy, P. (1939): "The Problem of Causation 
in Plato's 
Philosophy", Classical Philology 24,97-115 
221 
Demos, R. (1968) : "Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche as a 
Self-Moving Motion", Journal of the History of Philosophy 
6,133-45 
De R1jk, L. M. (1986) : Plato's Sophist, A Philosophical 
Commentary, Amsterdam 
Des Places, E. (1964) : Sungeneia. La parente de 1'homme 
avec Dieu d'Homere a la patristique, Paris 
De Vogel, C. (1970): Philosophia I: Studies in Greek 
Philosophy, Assen 
Dicks, D. R. (1970): Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, 
Bristol 
Dies, A. (1927): Autour de Platon, vol. II, Paris 
---------(1935): Platon. Le Politique, Paris 
---------(1941): Platon. Philebe, Paris 
---------(1956): Platon. Les Lois (VII-X), Paris 
Dillon, J. (1989): "Tampering with the Timaeus: 
Ideological Emendations in Plato, with special reference 
to the Timaeus", American Journal of Philology 110,50-72 
-------------(1992): 
Hermathena 153,21-36 
Dodds, E. R. (1951): 
Berkeley 
"Plato and the Golden Age", 
The Greeks and the irrational, 
--------------(1965): "Plato and the Irrational", Journal 
of Hellenic Studies 45,16-25 
Darter, K. (1994): Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic 
Dialogues, Berkeley 
Dye, J. W. (1978): "Plato's Concept of Causal 
Explanation", Tulane Studies in Philosophy 27,37-56 
Easterling, H. J. (1967): "Causation in Timaeus and Laws 
X", Eranos 65,25-38 
Eggers Lan, C. (1984): Las nociones de tiempo y eternidad 
de Homero a Platon, Mexico 
222 
---------------(1992): "Zeus e anima del mondo nel Fedro (246e-253c)", in L. Rossetti, (ed. ), 40-6 
England, E. B. (1921) : The Laws of Plato, vol. II (VII- 
XII), Manchester 
Fahrnkopf, R. (1977): "Forms in the Philebus", Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 15,202-7 
Ferrari, G. R. F. (1987): Listening to the Cicadas. A Study 
of Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge 
----------------(1992): "Myth and Conservatism in Plato's 
Statesman", paper presented at the Third Symposium 
Platonicum, Bristol, 1992 
Festugiere, A. J. (1947): "Platon et l'Orient", Revue de 
Philologie 21,5-45 
-----------------(1949): La revelation d'Hermes 
Trismegiste, vol. II: Le dieu cosmique, Paris 
Fine, G. (1987) : "Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle", 
in A. Graeser (ed. ), 69-112 
---------(1988a): "Owen's Progress", The Philosophical 
Review 97,373-99 
----------(1988b): "Plato on Perception: A Reply to 
Professor Turnbull, 'Becoming and Intelligibility'", 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy suppl., 15-28 
Fowler, H. (1925): The Statesman. Philebus, in The 
Statesman. Philebus. Ion, transl. by H. Fowler and W. 
Lamb, London 
Frede, D. (1992): "Disintegration and Restoration: 
Pleasure and Pain in Plato's Philebus", in R. Kraut 
(ed. ), 425-63 
------------ (1993) : Plato, Philebus, Indianapolis 
Frede, M. (1980): "The Original Notion of Cause", in M. 
Schofield et al. (eds. ), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in 
Hellenistic Epistemology, Oxford, 217-49 
223 
-----------(1988): "Being and Becoming in Plato", Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy suppl., 37-52 
-----------(1992): "Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue 
Form", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy suppl., 201- 
19 
Friedlaender, P. (1958): Plato, vol. I: An Introduction, 
English transl., London 
-----------------(1969): Plato, vol. III, English 
transl., London 
Frutiger, P. (1930): Les Mythes de Platon, Paris 
Gadamer, H. G. (1975): Truth and Method, English transl., 
New York 
--------------(1980): Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight 
Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, English transl., New 
Haven 
-------------- (1991) : Plato's Dialectical Ethics. 
Phenomenological Interpretations relating to the 
Philebus, English transl., New Haven 
Gaiser, K. (1963): Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre, 
Stuttgart 
-------------(1984): Platone come scrittore filosofico, 
Italian transl., Naples 
Gaudin, C. (1990) : "Automotricite et auto affection: un 
commentaire de Platon Lois, X 894d-895c", Elenchos 11, 
169-85 
Gill, C. (1979) : "Plato and Politics: the Critias and the 
Politicus", Phronesis 24,148-67 
Gill, M. L. (1987): "Matter and Flux in Plato's Timaeus", 
Phronesis 32,34-53 
Gosling, J. (1975) : Plato. Philebus, Oxford 
Gosling, J. and Taylor, C. (1982): The Greeks on 
Pleasure, Oxford 
224 
Graeser, A. (ed. ) (1987): Mathematics and Metaphysics in 
Aristotle, Berne 
Griswold, C. L. Jr. (ed. ) (1988): Platonic Writings. 
Platonic Readings, London 
Grube, G. (1932): "The Composition of the World-Soul in 
Tim. 35a-b", Classical Philology 27,80-2 
----------(1980): Plato's Thought, with new intr. and bibliography by D. Zeyl, Indianapolis 
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1978): A History of Greek Philosophy, 
vol. V, Cambridge 
Hackforth, R. (1936): 
(ed. ), 439-47 
--------------(1945): 
Cambridge 
"Plato's Theism", in R. E. Allen 
Plato's Examination of Pleasure, 
--------------(1952): Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge 
--------------(1959): "Plato's Cosmogony (Tim. 27d ff. )", 
Classical Quarterly N. S. 9,17-22 
Hampton, C. (1990): Pleasure, Knowledge and Being. An 
Analysis of Plato's Philebus, Albany 
Hargrove, E. (1989): Foundations of Environmental Ethics, 
Englewood Cliffs 
Hartmann, N. (1932): Ethics, English transl., London 
Heath, T. (1913): Aristarchus of Samos, the Ancient 
Copernicus. A History of Greek Astronomy to Aristarchus, 
Oxford 
Herter, H. (1957): "Bewegung der Materie bei Platon", 
Rheinisches Museum für Philologie N. F. 100,327-47 
Hirsch, U. (1992): "Mimeisthai and Related Concepts in 
Plato's Politicus", paper presented at the Third 
Symposium Platonicum, Bristol, 1992 
Hitchcock, D. (1985): "The Good in Plato's Republic", 
Apeiron 19,65-92 
225 
Howland, J. (1993): "The Eleatic Stranger's Condemnation 
of Socrates", in Polis 12 (Selected Papers from the Third 
Symposium Platonicum), 15-36 
Irwin, T. H. (1977) : "Plato's Heracliteanism", The 
Philosophical Quarterly 27,1-13 
--------------(1988): "Reply to David L. Roochnik", in 
C. L. Griswold (ed. ), 194-9 
--------------(1995): Plato's Ethics, New York 
Jackson, H. (1882): "Plato's Later Theory of Ideas", The 
Journal of Philology 10,253-98 
Jaeger, W. (1948) : Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History 
of His Development, English transl. 2nd. ed., Oxford 
Jordan, R. W. (1983) : Plato's Arguments for Forms, 
Cambridge 
Kahn, C. (1981) : "Some Philosophical Uses of 'To Be' in 
Plato", Phronesis 26,105-34 
Keyt, D. (1961) : "Aristotle on Plato's Receptacle", 
American Journal of Philology 82,291-300 
Knorr, W. R. (1990): "Plato and Eudoxus on the Planetary 
Motions", Journal for the History of Astronomy 21,313-29 
Kolb, D. A. (1983): "Pythagoras Bound: Limit and Unlimited 
in Plato's Philebus", Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 21,497-511 
Kraemer, H. (1982) : Platone ei fondamenti della 
metafisica, Italian transl., Milan 
Kraut, R. (1984): Socrates and the State, Princeton 
----------(1988): "Reply to Clifford Orwin", 
in C. L. 
Griswold, (ed. ), 177-82 
---------- (ed. ) (1992) : The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 
Cambridge 
Kucharski, P. (1966) : "Eschatologie et connaissance dans 
le Timee", in La speculation platonicienne, Paris, 1971, 
307-37 
226 
Kung, J. (1985): "Tetrahedra, Motion and Virtue", Nous 
19,17-27 
---------(1989): "Mathematics and Virtue in Plato's 
Timaeus", in J. P. Anton and A. Preus (eds. ), 309-39 
Ledger, G. R. (1989): Re-counting Plato: A Computer 
Analysis of Plato's Style, Oxford 
Lee, E. N. (1976) "Reason and Rotation: Circular Movement 
as the Model of Mind (Nous) in Later Plato", in W. H. 
Werkmeister, (ed. ), Facets of Plato's Philosophy, 
Phronesis suppl. vol. II, 70-102 
Lennox, J. G. (1985): "Plato's Unnatural Teleology", in 
D. J. O'Meara (ed. ), Platonic Investigations, Washington 
D. C., 195-218 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1973): Structural Anthropology, vol. 
II, English transl., Harmondsworth 
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1968) : "Plato as a Natural Scientist", 
Journal of Hellenic Studies 88,78-92 
--------------(1991): "Plato on Mathematics and Nature, 
Myth and Science", in Methods and Problems in Greek 
Science, Cambridge, 333-51 
Lopez, M. L. (1963): El problema de Dios en Platon. La 
teologia del Demiurgo, Salamanca 
Lovejoy, A. (1936): The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge 
Mass. 
Lovibond, S. (1991): "Plato's Theory of Mind", in S. 
Everson (ed. ), Psychology. Companions to Ancient Thought, 
Cambridge, 35-55 
MacClintock (1961): "More on the Structure of the 
Philebus", Phronesis 6,46-52 
Mackenzie, M. M. (1981): Plato on Punishment, Berkeley 
Malcolm, J. (1983) : "Does Plato Revise his Ontology in 
Sophist 246c-249d? ", Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 65,115-27 
227 
Mattei, J. F. (1988): "The Theater of Myth in Plato", in 
C. L. Griswold (ed. ), 66-83 
McCabe, M. M. (1992): "Myth, Allegory and Argument in 
Plato", in A. Barker and M. Warner (eds. ), The Language of 
the Cave, Edmonton, 47-67 
------------- (1994) : Plato's Individuals, Princeton 
Menn, S. (1992): "Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and 
as the Good", Review of Metaphysics 45,543-73 
Miller, M. H. Jr. (1980): The Philosopher in Plato's 
Statesman, The Hague 
Mohr, R. (1977): "Plato, Statesman 284c-d: An 'Argument 
from the Sciences'", Phronesis 22,232-4 
---------(1978): "The Formation of the Cosmos in the 
Statesman myth", Phoenix 32,250-2 
---------(1983): "Philebus 55c-62a and Revisionism", 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. IX, 165-70 
---------(1985): The Platonic Cosmology, Leiden 
---------(1989): "Plato's Theology Reconsidered: What the 
Demiurge Does", in J. P. Anton and A. Preus (eds. ), 293- 
307 
Mondolfo, R. (1934) : L'Infinito nel pensiero dei Greci, 
Florence 
Moravcsik, J. M. (1979): "Forms, Nature and the Good in 
the Philebus", Phronesis 24,81-104 
Moreau, J. (1939) : L'Ame du Monde de Platon aux 
Stoiciens, Hildesheim 
Morrow, G. (1950) : "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's 
Timaeus", in R. E. Allen (ed. ), 421-37 
Mourelatos, A. (1980): "Plato's 'Real Astronomy': 
Republic 527d-531d", in J. P. Anton, (ed. ) (1980), 33-73 
-----------------(1981): "Astronomy and 
Kinematics in 
Plato's Project of Rationalistic Explanation", in Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science 12,1-32 
228 
Mugnier, R. (1930): Le sense du mot THEIOS chez Platon, 
Paris 
Naddaf, G. (1992) : L'origine et 1'evolution du concept 
grec du phusis, Lewiston 
-----------(1993): "Mind and Progress in Plato", Polis 12 
(Selected Papers from the Third Symposium Platonicum), 
122-33 
Nehamas, A. (1975): "Plato on the Imperfection of the 
Sensible World", American Philosophical Quarterly 12, 
105-17 
Nehamas, A. and Woodruff, P. (1995): Plato, Phaedrus, 
Indianapolis 
Nissen, L. (1986) "Natural Functions and Reverse 
Causation", in N. Rescher (ed. ), Current Issues in 
Teleology, Lanham, 129-35 
Osborne, C. (1988): "Topography in the Timaeus: Plato and 
Augustine on Mankind's Place in the Natural World", 
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society No. 
214 (N. S. No. 34), 104-13 
Os tenf eld, E. (19 82) : Forms, Matter and Mind: Three 
Strands in Plato's Metaphysics, The Hague 
---------------(1987): Ancient Greek Psychology, Aarhus 
---------------(1990): "Self Motion, Tripartition and 
Embodiment", Classica et Mediaevalia 41,43-9 
Owen, G. E. L. (1953) "The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's 
Dialogues", in R. E. Allen (ed. ), 313-38 
-------------(1973): "Plato on the Undepictable", in E. 
Lee, et al. (eds. )., Exegesis and Argument, Assen, 349-61 
Patterson, R. (1981): "The Unique Worlds of the Timaeus", 
Phoenix 35,105-19 
Prior, W. J. (1985) : Unity and Development in Plato's 
Metaphysics, London 
229 
Reverdin, 0. (1945): La religion de la cite 
platonicienne, Paris 
Ricoeur, P. (1970): "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte? Expliquer et 
Comprendre", in R. Bubner et al. (eds), Hermeneutik und 
Dialectik, vol. II, Tubingen, 181-200 
Rist, J. M. (1964): Eros and Psyche, Toronto 
Ritter, C. (1933): The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, 
English transl., New York 
Roberts, J. (1987): "Plato on the Causes of Wrongdoing in 
the Laws", Ancient Philosophy 7,23-37 
Robin, L. (1908): La theorie platonicienne de 1'amour, 
Paris 
----------(1938) : Platon, Paris 
Robinson, R. (1953) : Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd. ed., 
Oxford 
Robinson, T. M. (1967): "Demiurge and World-Soul in 
Plato's Politicus", American Journal of Philology 88,57- 
66 
-----------------(1969): "Deux problemes de la 
psychologie cosmique platonicienne", Revue Philosophique 
159,247-53 
----------------(1970): Plato's Psychology, Toronto 
----------------(1979): "The Argument of Timaeus 27d 
ff. ", Phronesis 24,105-9 
----------------(1986): "The Timaeus on Types of 
Duration", Illinois Classical Studies 11,143-51 
----------------(1992): "Plato and the Computer", Ancient 
Philosophy 12,375-82 
----------------(1993): "The World as Art-Object: Science 
and the Real in Plato's Timaeus", Illinois Classical 
Studies 18,99-111 




Rodier, G. (1926): Etudes de Philosophie Grecque, Paris 
Rosen, S. (1979) : "Plato's Myth of the Reversed Cosmos", 
Review of Metaphysics 33,59-85 
Ross, W. D. (1951) : Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 
Rossetti, L. (ed. ) (1992) : Understanding the Phaedrus. 
Proceedings of the Second Symposium Platonicum, Sankt 
Augustin 
Rowe, C. (1992a): "La data relativa del Fedro", in L. 
Rossetti (ed. ), 31-9 
-----------(1992b): "On Reading Plato", Methexis 5,53-68 
-----------(1995): Plato. Statesman, Warminster 
Runciman, W. G. (1962): Plato's Later Epistemology, 
Cambridge 
Saunders, T. J. (1973): "Penology and Eschatology in 
Plato's Timaeus and Laws, " The Classical Quarterly, N. S. 
23,232-44 
-----------------(1991): Plato's Penal Code, Oxford 
-----------------(1992): "Plato's Later Political 
Thought", in R. Kraut (ed. ), 464-92 
Sayre, K. (1983) : Plato's Late Ontology, Princeton 
----------(1992): "A Maieutic View of Five Late 
Dialogues", in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
suppl., 221-43 
Scodel, H. R. (1987): Diairesis and Myth in Plato's 
Statesman, Goettingen 
Sedley, D. (1991): "Teleology and Myth in the Phaedo", in 
J. Cleary and D. Shartin (eds. ), Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. V, 
Lanham, 359-83 
Seligman, P. (1974): Being and Not-Being. An Introduction 
to Plato's Sophist, The Hague 
231 
Shiner, R. (1974) : Knowledge and Reality in Plato's 
Philebus, Assen 
------------(1983): "Knowledge in Philebus 55c-62a: A 
Response", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. IX, 171-83 
Shorey, P. (1935): Plato. The Republic, vol. II, London 
Skemp, J. B. (1942) : The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later 
Dialogues, Cambridge 
------------(1952): Plato's Statesman, London 
Solmsen, F. (1942) : Plato's Theology, Ithaca 
------------(1962): "Hesiodic Motifs in Plato", 
Entretiens VII, Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 173-211 
------------(1983): "Plato and the Concept of the Soul 
(psuche). Some Historical Perspectives", Journal of the 
History of Ideas 44,355-67 
Sorabji, R. (1983) : Time, Creation and the Continuum, 
London 
------------(1993): Animal Minds and Human Morals, London 
Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds. ) (1993): Causation, Oxford 
Sosa, E. (1980): "The Varieties of Causation", in E. Sosa 
and M. Tooley (eds. ), 234-42 
Stalley, R. F. (1983) : An introduction to Plato's Laws, 
Oxford 
Stewart, J. A. (1960): The Myths of Plato, second edition 
by G. R. Levy, London 
Striker, G. (1970): Peras und Apeiron, Hypomnemata 30, 
Goettingen 
Tarän, L. (1971): "The Creation Myth in Plato's Timaeus", 
in J. P. Anton and G. Kustas, (eds. ) Essays in Greek 
Philosophy, New York, 372-407 
----------(1979): "Perpetual Duration and Atemporal 
Eternity in Parmenides and Plato", The Monist 62,43-53 
232 
Taylor, A. E. (1926): Plato. The Man and his Work, London 
------------- (1928) :A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, 
Oxford 
-------------(1938): "The Polytheism of Plato: An 
Apologia", Mind 47,180-99 
Teloh, H. (1981) : The Development of Plato's Metaphysics, 
Pennsylvania 
Theiler, W. (1925): Zur Geschichte der teleologischen 
Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles, Zurich 
Tigerstedt, E. N. (1977) : Interpreting Plato, Uppsala 
Trevaskis, J. R. (1967): "Division and its Relation to 
Dialectic and Ontology", Phronesis 12,118-29 
Turnbull, R. (1988) : "Becoming and Intelligibility", 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy suppl., 1-36 
Verdenius, W. J. (1954): "Platons Gottesbegriff", 
Entretiens I, Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 241-93 
Vidal-Naquet, P. (1978): "Plato's Myth of the Statesman. 
The Ambiguities of The Golden Age and of History", The 
Journal of Hellenic Studies 98,132-41 
Vlastos, G. (1939) : "The Disorderly Motion in the 
Timaeus", in R. E. Allen (ed. ), 379-99 
--------------(1964): "Creation 
in the Timaeus: Is it a 
Fiction? ", in R. E. Allen (ed. ), 401-19 
--------------(1965): "Degrees of 
Reality in Plato", in 
R. Bambrough, (ed. ), New Essays in Plato and Aristotle, 
London, 1-19 
--------------(1969a): "Reasons and 
Causes in the 
Phaedo", in (1981), 76-110 
-------------(1969b): "Justice and 
Happiness in the 
Republic", in (1981), 111-39 
_____________ (1975) : Plato's 
Universe, Seattle 
233 
--------------(1980): "The Role of Observation in Plato's 
Conception of Astronomy", in J. P. Anton (ed. ), 1-31 
--------------(1981): Platonic Studies, Princeton 
Waterfield, R. A. H. (1980) : "The Place of the Philebus in 
Plato's Dialogues", Phronesis 25,270-305 
-------------------(1982): Plato. Philebus, Harmondsworth 
White, D. (1993): Rhetoric and Reality in Plato's 
Phaedrus, Albany 
Woodfield, A. (1976): Teleology, Cambridge 
Wright, L. (1976): Teleological Explanations, London 
Wright, R. (1979): "How Credible Are Plato's Myths? ", in 
G. W. Bowersock et al. (eds. ), Arktouros. Hellenic Studies 
Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox, Berlin 
Zaslavski, R. (1981) : Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing, 
Washington D. C. 
C .. 
1 .. <s 
